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ABSTRACT 
 
Globally, health systems accountability and engagement are increasingly claimed to be vital 
means to improve services by providing mechanisms for potential beneficiaries to contribute 
to the design, implementation, and evaluation of service delivery. In Kenya, these have taken 
the form of hospital boards, health facility committees, patient and facility service charters, 
and suggestion boxes. However, there is little information available on the factors that impact 
on the performance of such accountability mechanisms. This thesis addresses the shortfall, by 
investigating process issues that influence the performance of accountability initiatives.   
 
Primary research was conducted in a rural district through a cross-sectional survey of 
households clustered around four public health facilities. Following a pilot study, data on 
accountability mechanisms supporting service delivery were collected through a mapping 
exercise involving in-depth interviews and facility audits. Data on the use of these were then 
collected through a large cross-sectional household survey, participant observation and focus 
group discussions. Analysis focused on accountability mechanisms within the health facilities 
and on issues around the relationship between those facilities and the local community. This 
was supplemented by user experiences of services where this was central to an understanding 
of accountability structures performance.  
 
The research identified health facility committees and Service Charters as the main 
accountability mechanisms adopted. Further analysis showed that four main underlying 
factors - accessibility/proximity, trust, power and responsibility –influenced both of these.  The 
context of the health system and cultural practices were also important determinants of 
performance, either constraining or enhancing their impact on service delivery.  
 
These findings suggest that emphasis on the structure of accountability and engagement 
mechanisms, or adopting simple measures of outcome, are unlikely to account for how and 
why accountability mechanisms perform as they do. Processes that sustain and are sustained 
by accountability mechanisms need to be considered including the selection process of health 
facility committee members, the use of effective communication methods with the local 
community, and appropriate national regulation. In addition, these efforts should always take 
into account the health needs of the local population, their cultural practices, and the policy 
context within which these mechanisms are expected to operate. 
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PART I 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
 
Part I provides an introduction to the thesis, background information on Kenya, and a 
review of the relevant literature  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Place of Accountability in Health 
In many countries, accountability through greater public participation is advocated as 
a means for improving public services. In health, accountability and wider engagement 
of users gained momentum from the 1970s as means for potential beneficiaries of 
health services to get involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
activities [2, 3]. The overall aim has been to increase the responsiveness, sustainability, 
and efficiency of health services, especially in developing countries where health 
systems1 are struggling to meet the growing challenges of disease burden and shrinking 
resources [4, 6-10]. Health system accountability2 (HSA) is also seen as a means of 
providing mechanisms to open up the health profession and of improving both the 
perception and provision of health care [7]. The drive to open up physician-centred 
health care and hospital-based approaches to health provision, is also a result of the 
realisation that the operations of health systems are not purely based on technical 
knowledge and capacities; they are also shaped by the way leadership and authority are 
exercised to maximise scarce resources [12]. 
 
In low and middle income countries (LMICs) in particular, people have become more 
aware of their rights to health hence the need for governments to provide meaningful 
opportunities for individuals to participate in decisions that affect their health and to 
be answerable on their policy choices and performance [12]. With the rising challenges 
from diseases that were formerly not a threat to populations in LMICs - such as non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) - the need for engaged citizens who can make 
informed choices about their lifestyles and how these choices affect their lives cannot 
be overemphasised. But facilitating populations to make these choices is not enough; 
                                                 
1 The term ‘health system’ is used in the thesis to refer to all organizations, people and actions whose 
primary purpose is to promote, restore, or maintain health. Its goals are improving health and health 
equity in ways that are responsive, financially fair, and make the best, or most efficient, use of available 
resources. Adopted from: 4. WHO, The World Health Report 2000 Health Systems: Improving 
Performance 2000, World Health Organization Geneva , 5. WHO, Everybody's Business: 
Strengthening Health Systems to Improve Health Outcomes: WHO's Framework for Action, 2007, WHO: 
Geneva. 
2 Throughout the thesis, health system accountability is used to refer the spectrum of approaches, 
mechanisms and practices used by the stakeholders concerned with health services to ensure a desired 
level and type of performance. This definition is adopted from 11. Paul, S., Accountability in Public 
Services: Exit, Voice, and Capture. World Bank Country Economics Department Working Paper Series, 
1991. 614. 
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efficient management of competition for policy attention and resources, with an acute 
eye for reducing the wide disparities in health and in access to health care resources 
and services is critical [13, 14]. 
 
With this background, HSA has received renewed vigour in the international health 
policy circles. More recently, growing interest in strengthening accountability within 
the health sector has been driven by a number of factors including: growing 
dissatisfaction with health system performance; the view that improved accountability 
is essential for ensuring delivery of basic health services for all citizens, especially for 
the underprivileged; the possibility that changes in the knowledge, scope and size of 
health care structures in both private and public sectors can tilt power relations among 
health system actors in a way that affects people’s lives and well-being; the need to 
ensure proper accounting for all resources given primary health care3 (PHC) consumes 
a lot of resources; and lastly, the realisation that health reform efforts designed 
without an accountability lens can actually hamper health system performance [16-19]. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the growing interest in accountability in health systems and its 
recognised potential for improving PHC service delivery, there are grey areas in HSA 
that need addressing. Firstly, the concept of accountability remains complex, 
contentious and vague. In their latest report on health systems research, the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) classified accountability and governance in health 
systems as one of the ‘neglected health system research areas’, noting that the 
complexity of the concept of accountability in health and the difficulty in applying it to 
health systems research could be discouraging research and researchers: 
[R]esearch on governance and accountability has been neglected. It largely 
focuses on specific health interventions or services, with little work on the 
effectiveness of different regulatory, incentive, oversight, participation or 
decision-making options for wider health systems, including at the global level. 
Work in this area faces conceptual, analytic and design challenges and the 
                                                 
3 Primary Health Care or Primary Care refers to a strategy for organising health systems to promote 
health, and encompasses essential health care made universally available to individuals and families by a 
means acceptable to them and at a cost that the society can afford. Adopted from 15. PAHO, 
Renewing Primary Health Care in the Americas. A position paper of the Pan American Health 
Organization. Available at: http://www.paho.org/English/AD/THS/primaryHealthCare.pdf (accessed April 
16, 2013), PAHO/WHO, Editor 2007. It is the nucleus of a country’s health system and in Kenya, this is 
usually the dispensaries or health centres, which are normally the first point of contact between the 
patient and formal health care system. 
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contested, political nature of the issues may discourage research and researchers 
[12 :1]. 
 
Secondly, little is known about the effectiveness of HSA, and how and under which 
environments or conditions it could be employed as a policy tool to improve health 
system performance. As a consequence, the knowledge and understanding available to 
inform policy and practice remain limited [12, 19-21]. Thirdly, within academic 
publications, there is a growing body of literature on ways and methods of 
conceptualising accountability, but very limited empirical evidence on its functioning 
and impact. This is particularly so in LMICs, where available evidence is often difficult 
to obtain because it is either documented in the grey literature or inaccessible for 
language reasons [20, 22]. This study addresses this knowledge gap in the context of 
HSA and PHC service delivery in rural Kenya, by investigating the factors that 
influence the performance and effectiveness of health system accountability (HSA) 
mechanisms on the delivery of primary health care (PHC) services.  
 
1.2 Kenya – The Context of Health System Accountability 
1.2.1 Economy 
Kenya has an estimated population of slightly over 41 million (initially distributed 
across eight provinces), but now under 47 counties following the enactment of a new 
constitution in August 2010. About 75% – 80% of this population lives in rural areas 
[23-25]. In 2012, agriculture directly contributed an estimated 24.2% of the GDP, with 
the rest contributed by industry (14.7%) and services (61%) [24, 26]. Seventy-five per 
cent of the labour force is engaged in agricultural activities with the rest engaged in 
industry and services [24, 25]. Kenya has experienced a steady economic growth in the 
last decade. Although the gross national income per capita is $ 1,640, an estimated half 
of the country’s population still live below the poverty line [23]. In 2009, under-five 
mortality was 74/1000, maternal mortality 488/100,000, 16% of children under five 
were malnourished, and life expectancy at birth in 2012 was 63.07 years [24-26]. The 
main health challenges arise from HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, and the growing threat from 
NCDs. Adult HIV prevalence was estimated at 6.3% in 2009 and malaria prevalence 
among over-5s was 31% in 2007 [25, 26]. Directed towards these health challenges, the 
government’s total expenditure on health as a percentage of the GDP was estimated at 
4.8% in 2010 [27]. 
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1.2.2 Kenya’s Policy on Health System Accountability 
In Kenya as elsewhere, participation in governance and greater public accountability is 
increasingly claimed as a goal of the health system. The principal approach has been to 
establish structures which are closer to service users, through decentralisation, and by 
including community representatives in at least some of these structures. Although the 
rhetoric of public involvement in Kenya’s development agenda, including health, has 
percolated the country’s development politics since independence in 1963, the concept 
of accountability has been lacking, only becoming relevant in the 1990s following 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed on the country by the World Bank 
(WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Over the years, and in particular from 
the 1990s, when the Bretton Woods Institutions had much say on the country’s 
economic policy through SAPs, efforts have been made by the government (at least in 
theory) to expand public participation and accountability not just in the health sector, 
but also in other sectors of government. Effectively, Kenya’s overall reform agenda has 
been and continues to be much driven by external actors - mainly her development 
partners and international institutions. Much of Kenya’s health system reforms and 
plans are aligned either to key international agreements to which she is a signatory or 
to the wishes of donors who finance a larger portion of the health budget. 
 
To guide decentralisation and potentially improve HSA, various policy documents have 
been published and implemented beginning with the District Focus for Rural 
Development (DFRD) in 1983. The DFRD set to decentralise services to peripheral 
outposts. This was followed by the National Guidelines for the Implementation of 
Primary Health Care in Kenya 1986, which focused on decentralization, community 
participation, and inter-sectorial collaboration [28]. The guidelines were published 
following the 1978 WHO framework for Primary Health Care for all by Year 2000. The 
guidelines were then succeeded by the Kenya Health Policy Framework Paper (1994- 
2010), which geared health developments and reforms to provide ‘quality health care 
that is acceptable, affordable and accessible to all’ [29]. This framework was 
implemented as part of the first National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP 1) 1999-
2004 [29]. 
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Despite the implementation of these plans, studies in Kenya suggest that 
decentralisation has been more rhetoric than reality, that in many cases power is not 
released by central government, and that reforms can in fact result in the complication 
of lines of responsibility and accountability [30]. Weaknesses in management at local 
and national levels, increasing local-level control over expenditure, and improving staff 
incentives and motivation have been highlighted as among the key issues that still 
need addressing. Further concerns include the selection of board members (in many 
cases relating more to political allegiance and patronage than respectability, integrity, 
and professional or technical expertise in their respective fields), as well as the related 
issue of the extent to which they represent a given community, particularly the low-
income groups of that community [28]. 
 
Recognizing these issues, the Kenyan government developed the second National 
Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP II) 2005-2010 as part of the country’s 
development plan Vision 2030 and as an effort to accelerate the achievement of the 
MDGs [31, 32]. Through a community strategy, NHSSP II aimed to: attain greater 
coverage and community involvement and empowerment by creating an interface 
between the community aspirations and expectations on one hand and the objectives 
of the health services on the other; strengthen the community to progressively realize 
their rights for accessible and quality care; and to seek accountability from facility-
based health services [32, 33]. This was the first time that accountability was 
mentioned explicitly as a goal of Kenya’s health system, marking a significant shift 
from previous plans, which lacked government commitment to enhancing HSA. In the 
plan, the government set out to remedy some of the weaknesses identified during the 
implementation of previous plans. 
 
However, the rhetoric can be seen as a weaker take on accountability, taking a one 
sided view of accountability, where service providers (health workers) are expected to 
be accountable leaving out service users (the community) and the government 
(through the ministry of health). It risks being seen as giving patients much power 
ignoring the role, context and place of health workers in the accountability mix and in 
holding the central government accountable in releasing real power to the local 
accountability structures. Nonetheless, one significant change introduced by the 
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NHSSP II – considered to be one of its key innovations and which is of interest to this 
study – is the recognition of the community as a formal health service delivery level 
forming level 1 (see Figure 1.1) to support the delivery of the Kenya Essential Package 
for Health (KEPH) framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: [32] 
 
KEPH represents the integration of all health programmes into a single package that 
focuses its interventions on the improvement of health at different phases of the 
human development cycle. Its goal is to reduce fragmentation and to improve 
continuity of care by emphasizing the inter-connectedness of the various phases in 
human development [33]. In the first year of implementation, the interventions that 
were to be provided included: safe motherhood and reproductive health; child health 
promotion and Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI); Malaria, 
HIV/AIDS, STI and TB control; and sanitation and food safety all aligned to the health 
MDGs. With the multi-layered health system structure above, and the health system 
challenges described, the place of strong accountability structures to support the 
delivery of health system goals cannot be overemphasised.  
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
To improve the performance of HSA and engagement mechanisms and to enhance the 
impact of these mechanisms on PHC services, an understanding of the role of process 
in the functioning of the mechanisms is essential. This thesis uses insights from 
 
Figure 1.1: Kenya Health System Structure 
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accountability and participation theories in health to investigate how the interplay of 
structure, process, and outcome influences the performance of health system 
accountability and engagement mechanisms in supporting PHC services. The study is 
set in the rural areas of Kericho district in Kenya, clustered around four public health 
centres providing PHC services. The study uses a variety of data collection methods to 
gather information from households, facility staff, community leaders and 
administrative staff. 
 
Part I of the thesis continues with a review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on accountability and engagement, and, in Chapter 2, their place in the provision of 
PHC in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
In Part II, the study design and methods for data collection and analysis are described 
(Chapter 3). 
 
Part III comprises two results chapters (4 and 5). Chapter 4 describes the range and 
types of HSA and engagement mechanisms in the study area and their functioning, 
while in Chapter 5, the findings on the interactions of HSA mechanisms with the 
community are presented. 
 
Part IV explores the implications of the results. In Chapters 6 and 7, the findings are 
analysed and discussed in the light of the existing literature. Finally, Chapter 8 
concludes the thesis with a discussion on the limitations of the study, policy 
implications of the findings, an assessment of new knowledge gained, and research 
priorities for the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON HEALTH SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY IN SUB-
SAHARA AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on accountability and engagement and their place 
in the provision of PHC in SSA. The review aims to identify knowledge gaps and 
informs the development of the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3. The 
chapter is presented in sections: Section 2.2 traces the rise of accountability in health 
from its origin and in its development. Section 2.3 presents the various frameworks 
that have grown out of the rise of health system accountability (HSA) as an important 
international health policy agenda. Section 2.4 is a review of the evidence of practice of 
health system accountability in SSA. Section 2.5 provides a summary of the chapter 
and identifies gaps that the thesis will address. 
 
2.2 Accountability and Participation in Health: Origin and Development 
The importance of accountability in health through community participation and as a 
mechanism to open up the health profession gained prominence in the late 1970s. 
Drawing on the successes of community-led health interventions in China, India, and 
Indonesia, as well as on the growing voices for participatory approaches to 
development, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), the WHO set the stage by 
publishing two reports – Health by The People, and Primary Health Care - that gave 
impetus to the HSA bandwagon [6, 7]. In the 1978 Alma Ata declaration, governments 
recognised that, ‘people have the right and duty to participate individually and 
collectively in planning and implementation of their health care’ [7]. The PHC 
approach was articulated as a holistic framework by which the physician-centred 
health care and hospital-based approaches were enlarged to accommodate 
mechanisms which sought to enhance responsiveness, sustainability, and efficiency, 
while promoting equity in PHC at the community and local government level [34]. By 
the end of that decade, over 150 countries had accepted the PHC policy [35], which has 
since then driven the agenda for HSA. 
 
Many donor countries and institutions bought into the HSA agenda, with the UN and 
WB taking central roles in promoting it. The WHO and UNICEF led SSA countries in 
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adopting the Bamako Initiative (BI) in 1987, which committed governments in the 
region to decentralising health decision-making to local levels and establishing 
realistic national drug policies for enhancing the provision of essential drugs for 
citizens [36]. In implementing the BI across SSA, community participation in the 
management and control of resources at the health-facility level was identified as the 
main mechanism for ensuring accountability of public health services to users [36]. 
Shortly after, the WB published its first world development report focusing on health – 
Investing in Health – with an emphasis on greater public accountability in the manner 
in which health services are provided and on the space for clients’ voices in these 
services [8]. 
 
Consequently, questions about procedures came to the fore. Citizens, it has been 
argued, should have the right to ask: how health service delivery plans and policies are 
to be formulated; how health care decisions are to be made; and how those who make 
and implement decisions are to be held accountable for their actions through a variety 
of community or local accountability structures such as, among other measures, the 
district health committees, village health committees, hospital boards, and clinic 
committees [37]. The theory behind all these changes is that having decisions made at 
these levels should enable problems voiced and demonstrated locally to be seen and 
responded to more quickly. 
 
These developments should also be understood in the broader context of the political 
changes that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which saw the rise of the 
liberal democracy tide that swept through Eastern Europe and Africa, dislodging 
perceived dictatorial governments from power. Subject to the hands of western 
countries and the Bretton Woods Institutions, aid was linked to certain 
conditionalities known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), among a raft of 
other demands aimed at expanding democratic space and to improving efficiency in 
service delivery through expanded public accountability. The impact of SAPs on 
developing countries’ economies has been well studied [38-41]. Within the health 
systems, SAPs led to the introduction of user fees in PHC facilities. Several studies have 
reported a catastrophic impact of user charges on PHC uptake in LMICs which include 
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reduced demand for care, expanding inequities and, contributing to medically driven 
household poverty, thereby negating the ideals of PHC [14, 42-52]. 
 
These political developments notwithstanding, HSA continued to grow throughout the 
1990s into the 21st century, driven by the understanding that health systems design and 
operations transcend technical knowledge and capacities. They also include resource 
generation, allocation and rationalisation, getting public voice to bear on decisions, 
and enhancing human resource capacity to achieve efficiency and effectiveness [12]. 
This is critical because poorly managed health services affect the poorest strata, 
especially in LMICs [53]. Initial success of PHC [4, 54-57], led the WHO to encourage 
countries to reaffirm their commitment to the principles of PHC [58]. The 
recommitment to PHC has come with renewed vigour in strengthening health systems 
with a particular emphasis on accountability.  The drive for greater accountability has 
also been due to the growth of human rights approaches to health supported hand-in-
hand by the growing evidence on the significance of social determinants of health [59-
61]. Achieving HSA is seen as important in tackling issues of transparency and 
corruption that prevents the health sector from achieving optimum performance and 
to assist a decline in poverty, mortality and morbidity as stated in the MDGs [53]. 
 
Over and above this tremendous growth in policy setting the stage for HSA and 
engagement in health, there are challenges that still need addressing with regard to 
developing countries. The first of these relates to the origins of the idea. As noted, 
donors and international organisations have largely driven the idea of HSA. It is 
therefore fair to question whether, with such external influence, local leadership is 
ready to adhere to the precepts, most of which challenge their positions of power and 
influence. With regard to local communities, one would question whether health 
facilities committees (HFCs), for example, are ready to accommodate extra scrutiny 
from the community and interested parties on their operations and decisions. Or 
whether health workers (HWs) are ready to accept that even though their clients are 
largely illiterate, it could be to their own advantage to involve them in decision-making 
about their (clients) health and perhaps even allow for scrutiny of the decisions they 
make. Or whether these new structures and concepts, could, result in an extra layer of 
bureaucracy that would eat into the scarce resources that could be best used to save 
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lives. While the growth in the drive for accountability has been accompanied by the 
developments of frameworks for implementing and evaluating it over time, it has not 
been matched with empirical knowledge of accountability in practice. In particular, the 
factors that influence the performance of accountability mechanisms are less covered 
[12, 62]. The following sections address these issues, firstly, by reviewing the literature 
on accountability frameworks, and secondly, by reviewing the available evidence on 
accountability in practice in the context of SSA. 
 
2.3 Conceptions of Accountability and its Application to Health 
There is extensive literature on accountability describing different dimensions of the 
concept [16, 63-66], with considerable overlaps. Three broad pathways to 
understanding accountability can be identified from the literature. These are: 
1. By purpose of accountability / area of interest, 
2. By type of mechanism, 
3. By depth / level of involvement. 
2.3.1 Purpose or Area of Interest 
Accountability mechanisms can be classified on the basis of the purpose or area of 
interest. Mechanisms introduced to strengthen health system accountability can be 
aimed at achieving transparency, answerability and controllability [13, 16, 67-69]. 
Transparency requires that decisions and actions are taken openly and that sufficient 
information is available so that agencies and the general public can assess whether the 
relevant procedures are followed. Answerability involves an obligation on the part of 
the decision makers to justify their decisions publicly so as to substantiate their 
reasonability and rationality. Controllability provides for mechanisms to sanction 
actions and decisions that run counter to given mandates and procedures, often 
referred to as a system’s checks and balances or enforcement mechanisms [13, 16, 67-
69]. 
 
The purposes and types of accountability are described in Table 2.1, with illustrative 
health system issues for each type. According to Brinkerhoff [13], the three main 
purposes of accountability are therefore: 
 to control the misuse and abuse of public resources and/or authority. This relates 
directly to financial accountability; 
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 to provide assurance that resources are used and authority is exercised according to 
appropriate and legal procedures, professional standards, and societal values. This 
relates to financial, performance, and political or democratic types of 
accountability; and  
 to support and promote improved service delivery and management through 
feedback and learning - the focus here is primarily on performance accountability 
(see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1: Accountability Types, Purposes, and Health Service Delivery 
Type of 
accountability  
Illustrative health system 
issues  
Dominant purposes of accountability  
Financial   Cost accounting/budgeting 
for: 
        -Personnel  
        -Operations 
        -Pharmaceuticals/supplies  
 Definition of basic benefits 
packages  
 Contract oversight  
 Control and assurance are dominant.  
 Focus is on compliance with 
prescribed input and procedural 
standards; cost control; resource 
efficiency measures; elimination of 
waste, fraud and corruption. 
Performance   Allocation of resources 
needed for effective system 
performance  
 Quality of care 
 Service provider behaviour 
 Regulation by professional 
bodies 
 Contracting out  
 Assurance and improvement/ learning 
are dominant. 
 Assurance purpose emphasises 
adherence to the legal, regulatory, and 
policy framework; professional service 
delivery procedures, norms, and 
values; and quality of care standards 
and audits. 
 Improvement/learning purpose 
focuses on benchmarking, standard 
setting, quality management, 
operations research, monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E). 
Political/democratic   Service delivery equity  
 Transparency  
 Responsiveness to citizens  
 Service user trust  
 Dispute resolution  
 Control and assurance purposes are 
emphasised. 
 Control relates to citizen/voter 
satisfaction, use of taxpayer funds, 
addressing market failure and 
distribution of services (disadvantaged 
populations). 
 Assurance focuses on principal-agent 
dynamics for oversight; availability 
and dissemination of relevant 
information; adherence to quality 
standards, professional norms, and 
societal values.  
 
Source: Brinkerhoff [13].  
 
It follows then that for accountability to work, it is important that sanctions are put in 
place. Such sanctions could, for instance, be equated with requirements and penalties 
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embodied in laws and regulations such as professional codes of conduct; incentives 
such as market mechanisms (where accountability is enforced through the ability of 
service users to switch from low quality facilities to high ones); and public exposure or 
negative publicity (e.g., self-policing among health care providers where professional 
codes of conduct are used as the standard) [13]. The purpose matrix by Brinkerhoff 
captures conventional thinking around accountability, i.e. as a two way relationships 
where those in positions of power (e.g., Facility In-charge) are obligated to provide 
information about and/ or justification for their actions to other actors, with possible 
imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with or to engage in appropriate action. 
 
2.3.2 Type of Mechanism 
Another way of looking at accountability is by distinguishing whether the mechanisms 
are within the government (horizontal or internal) or outside the government 
framework (vertical or external) [65, 68] and whether they possess high or low 
sanction capacity (Table 2.2). This schema reveals that there are potentially strong and 
weak institutions and mechanisms both within and outside the state. 
 
Table 2.2: Typology of Accountability 
 Accountability within 
government (horizontal)  
Accountability outside 
government (vertical)  
High enforcement/ 
sanctions capacity 
 Supreme audit institutions  
 Courts  
 Comptrollers general  
 Law enforcement agencies 
 Parliamentary hearings 
 Legislative committees 
 Administrative review councils 
 Anti-corruption agencies  
 Elections  
 Professional codes of conduct  
 National/international standard-
setting bodies 
 Accreditation agencies 
 Referenda 
 Public interest law 
Low enforcement/ 
sanctions capacity  
 Advisory boards  
 Inter-ministerial committees  
 Ombudsman offices 
  Blue ribbon panels 
  Citizens’ charters 
  “Sunshine” laws 
 Freedom of information laws 
 Citizen oversight committees  
 Service delivery surveys 
 Civil society watchdog 
organisations  
 Policy research (e.g., by think 
tanks or universities) 
 Investigative journalism (media) 
 
Source:  [68] 
 
The effectiveness of mechanisms is based on two key factors: the importance of 
capacity and political will on the part of public officials to use these institutions and 
mechanisms for the enforcement of sanctions; and the significance of having in place a 
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supportive legal and institutional framework that civil society organisations and 
private sector actors can utilise to exercise accountability functions successfully. These 
factors further point to the central role of government and the health system context 
within which mechanisms operate if accountability is to be achieved. Within this 
perspective, Brinkerhoff locates community accountability – which, based on this 
perspective, includes the interactions between community members and health 
providers within the health system – as a form of vertical accountability characterised 
by low enforcement or sanction capacity. 
 
A second way of distinguishing types of accountability is by considering who initiates 
the structures that support the mechanisms. Khumalo [70] uses this principle to 
classify accountability mechanisms into bureaucratic, organic, and hybrid where: 
a. Bureaucratic accountability mechanisms or structures are initiated by the national 
department of health and include clinic committees and suggestion boxes. 
b. Organic structures are either a cultural heritage or introduced as a modern 
structure charged with developmental issues of the community, (e.g., the 
community development forum or the Induna or village chief in South Africa). 
Organic structures owe their origin to the community although they may receive 
government recognition. 
c. Hybrid structures are neither purely bureaucratic nor organic but a combination of 
both, for example, home based caregivers. 
The framework by Khumalo above is similar to the others in considering vertical 
(involving non-state actors) and horizontal (involving state actors) accountability, but 
highlights how they overlap in practice. 
 
2.3.3 Depth or Level of Involvement 
Another way of framing accountability is to consider the depth or level of involvement 
or participation, by considering whether actors’ involvement is passive or active. In 
looking at accountability in terms of depth of engagement, a distinction can be drawn 
between simple information sharing with communities at one end of the spectrum, 
through consultation, to community influence and control at the other end [17, 66, 71-
73]. Shifts in authority from health workers and managers to communities are 
proportional to increasing levels of community control. Other authors consider the 
16 
 
linkages between citizen ‘voice’ (ability to exert pressure on providers to influence the 
outcome of services) and service ‘responsiveness’ (provider response to citizen ‘voice’) 
to illustrate the varying levels of engagement [65]. They distinguish between three 
different extents of state engagement with citizens: 
 Consultation – opening arenas for dialogue and information sharing. These may be 
one-off consultative exercises, on-going participatory poverty assessments, citizens’ 
juries, or surveys. 
 Representation – institutionalising regular access for certain social groups in 
decision-making. 
 Influence – citizen engagement reaches the point where groups can translate access 
and presence into a tangible impact on policy-making and the organisation of 
service delivery. 
 
Goetz and Gaventa argue that there are three major factors affecting citizen influence 
on the design, delivery, and assessment of public services, and state capability to 
respond:  
 ‘The social, cultural, and economic power of the client group in question within civil 
society – its power to mobilise resources and public concern to support its 
demands; 
 The nature of the political system (the depth and procedural and substantive 
democracy, the configuration of executive/legislative/judicial power, the level of 
political participation), and the organisation of political competition (the number 
and types of parties, their ideologies and memberships, the relative importance of 
high finance or crime in political contexts); 
 The nature and power of the state and its bureaucracies (whether it is a 
developmental state, whether it has the will and capacity to enforce change in the 
culture and practices of bureaucracies, whether there is a professional civil service, 
whether the public service has internalised a commitment to poverty reduction 
etc.)’ [65:9-10]. 
 
The latter two are similar to the factors outlined by Brinkerhoff [68] as influencing the 
level of enforcement/sanctions capacity of horizontal and vertical accountability types. 
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2.3.4 Principal-Agent Approach 
A final way to view accountability within the health system is through the principal-
agent approach (Figure 2.1). This approach proposes a principal (individual or 
institution) with specific objectives and agents needed to implement activities to 
achieve those objectives. The principal is the ‘residual claimant’ to the outcome of the 
agent’s actions [74]. 
Figure 2.1: Principal-Agent Relations 
3
Accountability: A simple framework 
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itself accountable 
for x
Principal demands 
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agent for x
Principal has 
powers to ensure 
that agent 
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Source: [75]  
In recent years, the principal-agent approach has also been used by sociologists, 
economists, and others in the field of health care to analyse the relationship between 
provider and patient and more recently, contracting-out arrangements. In practice, 
principal-agent relations are not only ubiquitous, but also characterised by 
imperfection mainly due to diverse objectives combined with information asymmetry. 
Principals might like to overcome information asymmetry, but gaining information has 
significant costs and may be impossible. In addition to the information asymmetry, the 
principal-agent approach also focuses on who controls information and how to 
improve monitoring [Chai, 1995; Hurley et al., 1995; cited in 76]. A problem with the 
principal-agent approach is its limitations in analysing a system where there are many 
different principals and agents, as well as shifting of roles, as is the case in the health 
sector. The approach also does not adequately conceptualise the ideas of trust and 
power, which are likely to play a key role yet are difficult to measure. 
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2.4 Health System Accountability in Practice in Sub-Sahara Africa 
The growth in the literature offering various frameworks on health system 
accountability (HSA) and participation highlighted above has not been matched by 
empirical studies. This is despite a general consensus in international health policy 
circles that HSA is a key strategy for health improvement especially in LMIC [4, 77-80]. 
Within academic publications, there is limited coverage of accountability, particularly 
in LMIC, and what is available is often difficult to obtain for language reasons or 
because it is documented in grey literature [22, 78, 81]. For instance, the most recent 
systematic review in this area - [77] - only found four studies – three from SSA [82-84] 
and one from Latin America [85] - in which there was a structured evaluation and 
rigorous analysis linking the accountability mechanisms of interest (HFCs) to relevant 
output or outcome measures. 
 
The next section summarises the methods for conducting the studies, the evidence of 
effectiveness and the factors affecting the performance of the mechanisms reviewed. 
 
2.4.1 Methods for Studying Health System Accountability 
Existing studies on HSA primarily draws on qualitative approaches such as in-depth 
interviews and key informant (KI) interviews, participant observation, and focus group 
discussions (FGDs) to understand user experiences with accountability mechanisms, 
perceived effectiveness and outcomes. These data are often supplemented by a review 
of the literature among other descriptive methods. Because most of the studies in this 
area are either projects supported by external actors with their own goals and 
objectives, the results they present may not be completely free of bias [77, 78]. It is 
unhelpful that a lot of these studies rely mainly on descriptive methodology, which 
limits the control for the influence of potential confounders on programme effects. 
 
There is therefore need for studies that can assess aspects of accountability 
mechanisms in their ‘normal setting’ or without the influence of external factors and 
actors. Such data can then provide good grounds for interventions to improve 
performance of HSA. Beyond the data collection methods, many studies have limited 
generalisability. Nonetheless, most of the methodological weaknesses exhibited in the 
studies are not unique and could be a reflection of the fact that this research area is 
relatively new. The complex nature of the concept of accountability means that many 
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studies (and researchers) are faced with limiting conceptual, analytical and design 
challenges [12, 86, 87]. To overcome challenges of methodology in researching 
accountability, the use of a range of study designs, a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods have been advocated [88], and an analysis of process emphasised, with ‘a 
greater level of sharing of analytic frameworks, parameters, concepts and terms’[12 
pg.8]. 
 
2.4.2 Types and Characteristics of Accountability Mechanisms 
Literature on accountability illustrates the various forms and types that accountability 
mechanisms take. Broadly, the mechanisms can be grouped into three main categories 
based on their origins: those formed from government or formal initiative, e.g., HFCs 
and hospital boards; those established as projects either by government, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), or a public-private partnership; and those based 
on existing traditional structures (e.g., the Induna in South Africa or the Village Elder 
(VE), or the local Chief in Kenya). In many cases there is, however, no clear line of 
distinction between the three categories. For instance, a donor may collaborate with 
the government to initiate and support Village Health Committees (VHC) as is the 
case in coastal Kenya reported by Sohani [82]. Other scholars make a distinction 
between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ mechanisms, with formal forms being those officially 
sanctioned and operating within the health system or through other formally 
recognised bodies such as NGOs or Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), and 
informal referring to those that emerge spontaneously out of the community such as 
self-help groups [89]. 
 
The most common accountability mechanism evaluated are the health facility 
committees, which took various forms, including: village development committees [70, 
90]; ward development committees [90, 91]; ward management committees [92]; 
community or clinic committees [70, 91, 93, 94]; village health committees [93, 95, 96]; 
dispensary health committees [82]; and general community committees [70]. These 
were followed by groups (mainly women groups). Other reported, but less covered 
mechanisms, includes patient rights charters (PRC), suggestion boxes (SB), and citizen 
report cards. 
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Community-based health committees are a product of recent decentralisation efforts 
(mostly taking the form of de-concentration) aimed at increasing the responsiveness of 
the health system to the needs of clients. They are usually comprised of elected 
members from the community and health workers (HW) representatives. In countries 
such as Kenya, they also include a representative of the government security arm and 
that of the local government as ex-officio. Studies from Kenya, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda and Nigeria report similarities in the composition of committees, 
whether they were VHCs, HCCs, HFCs or clinic committees [70, 82-84, 96, 97]. 
 
General community groups are formed to represent specific interests or deal with 
specific issues of which health may be one. They include, for example, user 
associations, women groups, youth lobby groups, and clubs [71, 95]. While there are no 
strong indications that such groupings have a strong influence on accountability and 
therefore service delivery, they can be important in fostering group cohesion, 
empowerment, self-esteem, and bargaining skills [98]. 
 
PRCs have been adopted in many countries and include a range of commitments by a 
country’s health ministry through its HWs to improvement of service delivery and 
increased patient involvement in decision-making about health care service delivery 
[70, 92]. Charters are one of three strategies used to advance the rights of patients. The 
others are legislative, either specifically applied to patient rights, or the inclusion of 
patient rights in general health legislation [92]. PRCs are framed as guidelines that 
target the relationship between health professionals and users of health services and 
can be seen as a vertical accountability mechanism [13]. With PRCs, standards of care 
are set that patients can expect to receive and demand as rights that are due to them 
by virtue of being human, while a set of responsibilities for users are articulated. The 
charters disseminate information defining standards that providers must agree to 
uphold and therefore shift accountability downwards from providers to patients [98]. 
 
2.4.3 Evidence of Effectiveness of Accountability Mechanisms 
Committees 
Much of the prior work on health committees and their role in the health system has 
been as part of on-going interventions, reforms, and management systems [see for 
example 84, 99, 100-103] or on their role in supporting the quality of specific health 
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care services [70]. Reviewed studies provide mixed experiences as to whether 
committees were effective in improving service delivery or even meeting the stated 
purpose. These experiences are described here. 
 
Schmidt and Rifkin [95] report that, in general, VHCs were successful in involving the 
majority of the village in the assessment of local needs. The study found that people 
usually went directly to the village Chairman to articulate their needs concerning 
health problems for instance when they felt they were not given good service by the 
staff. Even though the study does not report whether the Chairman was able to act on 
the complaints, it ensured the highest local authority was aware of villagers’ views, 
findings that are reflected in another study within SSA [104]. However, Schmidt and 
Rifkin also found that neither the community nor the VHC had any control over 
finances though this should have been the case according to government policy. For 
instance, it is reported that some years ago, the community had collected money 
(which was kept by the committee Chairman) to pay the health worker but it 
transpired that he had not received a salary for two months. In another instance, 
financial contributions to solve water problems at the health centre, which were not 
under the control of the VHC, disappeared, a clear indication that the committee had 
no powers in the management of health centre resources [95]. 
 
Similarly, a later study in the same district reported mixed results with respondents in 
one of the study areas complaining of no improvements at the health centre, 
continued shortage of drugs despite paying user fees, deterioration in service 
provision, unascertained deaths as a result of drug shortages, few health workers to 
attend to patients and persistent exclusion from priority setting even though village 
and ward committees existed with some elected community representatives [90].4 Yet 
in another location (within the same study), respondents reported that since the 
establishment of the VHC, there were general improvements such as availability of 
malaria drugs, and building of new care centres, showing variation in the impact of 
VHCs in the study area. These variations were not explained, an indication of the need 
for methods that can help in illuminating factors behind them. 
 
                                                 
4 The study was done in the same district of Lushoto, though exact dates when the study was done is not 
reported, it seem it was done a few years later following the study by Schmidt and Rifkin.  
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In South Africa, committees exhibited little evidence of effectiveness. Some had no 
clear structures, others experienced member drop outs, while in others, meeting 
schedules were not kept [91]. The authors report that all the ward and clinic 
committees in the studied area seemed to lack consistency and regularity in their 
functioning, adding that the structures appeared to be affected by milder problems, 
such as not keeping to meeting schedules or not having enough members present at 
meetings to form a quorum. A ward committee member in the study described the 
situation as follows: 
…so we have not been holding regular meetings, not attending some workshops 
like any other wards. In that note we ended up being torn apart as ward 
committee members. Now I think we were left with 4 or 5 persistent members in 
the ward committee [91:6]. 
 
In Nigeria, committees assisted in improving health care in the villages by getting 
involved in the planning and execution of health activities, in the provision of 
equipment, and in identifying those to be exempted from user fees [96]. The authors 
report that all HWs were aware of the existence of the health committees; 95% of HWs 
were members of the committees and 95% of committees had female members. 
However, only one committee had a female Chairman. Moreover, in the handling of 
user fees and drug revolving funds (DRFs), community representatives in VHCs were 
reportedly excluded from the co-management of user fees and DRFs. There were also 
incidences of deliberate efforts to exclude the community from priority setting, with 
minute books showing no evidence of community involvement in co-management of 
DRFs and a deep feeling among community members that health facility heads did not 
want them to participate in ‘money matters’. Similar experiences have been reported in 
Niger, where despite initial enthusiasm, health centre committees did not have 
effective control over the administration of drugs and finance [105]. 
 
In the Nigerian study, there were reported occasions when community members 
refused to participate in some health activities due to opposition to leadership of the 
health committees [96]. Other noted problems include: polarisation into different 
political parties and religious differences; fear that the government would stop funding 
the health centres; and inadequate remuneration. Nevertheless, the authors report 
notable improvements in how committees functioned, with each committees 
consisting of 8-12 individuals - representing diverse groups - who also appointed the 
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Chairman. The committees met at least once every month in their villages and 
districts, where minutes were recorded, adopted, and signed by the Chairman and 
secretary before next meeting. The authors posit that community participation from 
both the perspective of health workers and of the community seem to have been 
enhanced by the introduction of Bamako Initiative [96]. 
 
In rural Zimbabwe, a case-control study of Health Centre Committees (HCCs) which 
had received support from an NGO, showed that, compared to non-control sites (with 
no HCCs), control sites (with HCCs) had significantly higher likelihood of health 
service use for the last illnesses, a significantly greater use of antenatal care, fewer 
cases of diarrhoea and greater use of oral rehydration solutions, more staff, better 
community health indicators (health knowledge, health practices, knowledge and use 
of health services), and stronger links between communities and HWs [84]. 
Additionally, clinics with HCCs tended to be better staffed and better funded a fact 
that the authors attribute to a possible virtuous cycle whereby improved capacity 
helped to draw in further resources. Even with these successes, significant limitations 
were observed. The authors report that many people were unaware of the HCC or their 
work, that despite good relationships between the HCC and some sections of the 
community, vulnerable and poor groups were often overlooked and underrepresented 
in HCC meeting. As in the other studies reported above, the HCC did not have a direct 
control over budgets or over how clinics were managed and run. Additionally, the staff 
did not see such roles as being within the remit of community members. 
 
Other positive outcomes, such as, increased health care utilisation and revenue 
generation, improved drugs availability, and motivation among HWs have been 
reported in rural Kenya and Uganda [82, 97, 99, 106], underscoring the similarity in the 
impact of the context within which these facilities operate. In Kenya, more effective fee 
exemptions and deferrals due to an improved financial accounting system are reported 
to have reduced revenue loses [82]. Nonetheless, many of the challenges reported 
above such as lack of control of the finances by the committees were also noted. In 
Mozambique, the use of Community Health Team is reported to have improved 
accountability about activities done, which were then shared among team members 
and with the community [107]. Involving the community through the team is reported 
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to have enabled community members to discuss problems. The community then 
proposed solutions aimed at expanding access to services, medicines adherence 
through decentralisation of services, timely referral, and information flow between the 
community, the health facility and providers. Such experiences have been reported 
elsewhere [100, 101], albeit in varying degrees. 
 
Citizen and Patients Charters 
Patients’ charters are a relatively new concept, particularly in SSA. This explains why 
only few studies (two in this review) have evaluated this form of accountability. Even 
among these studies, only one - covering two major provinces in South Africa [92] - 
was comprehensive enough. The study evaluated the patients’ rights charter and 
monitoring mechanisms for human rights in the health sector. The study found that 
different actors in the health system had received the charter variedly. Many providers 
openly expressed discomfort with the charter, complaining that it gave patients’ rights 
without emphasising corresponding responsibilities. The following quotes from two 
providers are illustrative: 
…try to move away from that mentality to say it’s like... patients have rights, we 
[health workers] don’t have rights. And it’s not supposed to be like that. It’s like 
we are putting our patients above our health workers [92:8] 
 
…They [health workers] think we have given patients more power, you know like 
we say criminals have more rights than us law-abiding citizens. It’s the same 
thing [92:8]. 
 
Generally, however, most patients and providers felt that the instrument was good. 
Some providers regarded it as a tool with which to raise awareness among both 
providers and patients about the rights and responsibilities of the later. These were 
interpreted as benefitting patients, especially if providers were aware of the charter. 
One provider noted: 
I think it’s a very good, tool. It makes you aware of what the patients’ rights are. It 
makes the patient aware of what his rights are and …what his responsibilities are. 
It helps you as a provider to improve your service, to improve the quality of your 
service. In doing so, you are able to treat the patient better [92:10]. 
 
An illustrative example is the report that the visible display of posters resulted in some 
staff being more mindful of the rights and responsibilities of patients. This had 
practical consequences in terms of how providers responded to patients. Many staff 
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members also agreed that the display of the charter reminded them of what they learnt 
many years ago. Some staff members thought the charter had helped to improve the 
quality of care, understood in such terms as giving more time to patients, showing 
more respect, or and having greater compassion. Some saw it as an instrument that 
could enable them to learn new things about patient care. On the other hand, these 
positive effects might be short-lived since many staff noted that once they had read the 
charter, they seldom looked at it again. Similarly, charters can be a significant tool for 
motivating HWs, especially where there are reward schemes for those who uphold 
them. 
 
2.4.4 Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Accountability Mechanisms 
This section deals with the factors that affect the functioning of HFCs since this is the 
most studied mechanism.5 Various factors influence relationships within the health 
system by either enhancing or constraining accountability mechanisms. These factors 
can be grouped into four main categories namely: features of the HFC (clarity of roles 
and functions, clarity of mandate and authority, accountability arrangements and 
capabilities and resources); features of the health facility and its staff (staff attitudes 
and perceptions, staff skills and resources); features of the community (socio-political, 
socio-cultural, and socio-economic); and process factors (community mobilisation, 
facilitation and support) [77, 79]. 
 
Committee Formation and Composition 
Many studies of HFCs point to the manner in which a committee is set up as an 
important determinant of its effectiveness [70, 84, 90, 97, 99, 108, 109]. Structures 
formed through a participatory and all-inclusive approach tend to function efficiently 
and gain general acceptance of the community. For example, in Kenya, the inclusive 
manner in which dispensary committees were set up - the community having been 
briefed and involved in proposing and directly electing members of the committee – is 
reported to have enhanced the committee acceptability and success in managing 
facility affairs [82]. However, many studies report a lack of transparency in the manner 
in which HFC members are selected. In many settings, committee membership seemed 
to be obtained through connection to powerful political authorities [105] or due to 
                                                 
5 Patient charters are dropped from the analysis since only two studies assessed this mechanism. 
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socio-economic status or gender, with male dominance being the common case [84]. 
Problems resulting from poor or unrepresentative selection processes include: low 
awareness of HFCs among community members [84, 108]; poor or absent linkages 
between HFCs and the community [104]; and, in some cases, difficulty in holding HFCs 
accountable [105]. In Niger for example, a study reported that the village chief 
appeared to select committee members related to himself or to the treasurer, leading 
to difficulties in dealing with their misappropriation of funds [105]. 
 
Committee Roles, Functions, and Powers 
Closely related to committee selection are the questions of whether Committee 
members understand their roles and functions, and whether there is clarity on 
accountability relations between community representatives and the facility [77]. 
Many committee members exhibited confusion and a lack of clarity in regard to their 
roles. In some instances, there were conflicts on where decision making power lay 
between stakeholders [70, 83, 90, 96]. For example, in Tanzania, facility committee 
members reported that district authorities gave orders for the community to follow in 
order to accomplish certain activities planned at district level, even if they [committee 
members] did not know much about the plans: 
We sometimes face a big challenge by finding ourselves implementing things 
whose origin is not known to us [90:6]. 
 
In South Africa, members of the clinic committee felt that they had no authority to 
question the behaviour of health workers because they (committee members) were not 
educated or because this would have been seen as ‘interference.’ Some felt that their 
roles within the clinic was only limited to being advisors, and that they did not have 
any power to influence the behaviour of health workers [70]. The following quotation 
is illustrative: 
[What]…we often fear is that nurses will think that since we did not go to school 
we are talking rubbish, what will we do if we go to the clinic and these nurses ask 
us whether we understand the questions we are asking them?  What are we going 
to say?  We are uneducated therefore; we would not know how to answer any 
questions.  Nurses might even say we went to the clinic to rule them… [70:43]. 
 
In Tanzania, village residents were thankful that in the near future they were going to 
have a health centre in their area, even though the place where it was being 
constructed was not the one the community suggested [110]. In Kenya, despite the 
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successes reported in an intervention to empower dispensary committees to manage 
local health facilities, conflicts between community representatives and staff over the 
control of dispensary finances still hampered their operations [82]. Similarly, another 
study describes how a treasurer of a local committee quit their post reportedly due to 
rumours in the village that he was misusing facility funds [97]. These findings not only 
point to the sense of powerlessness among facility users, but also indicate a lack of 
trust in the ability of established accountability structures to ensure any meaningful 
engagement. These challenges have been attributed to the lack of thorough 
institutionalization of accountability mechanisms [91]. 
 
Other studies have identified staff attitudes, skills, and perceptions on community 
participation in health as important factors impacting on the performance of HFCs [77-
79]. Where staffs were supportive, responsive, and willing to accept that, despite the 
education levels of community members and their representatives, the latter could 
make useful contribution to the benefit of the facility, the HFCs also tended to be 
effective [82]. 
 
Resources Available to Committees 
Resources - whether human or financial -, are another significant determinant of 
accountability. When considering resources available to HFCs, a distinction is made 
between those that touch on HFC members themselves on the one hand, such as their 
health knowledge, management skills, confidence, leadership skills [77, 111, 112], and 
those resources available to the community on the other, such as comparative 
information on quality of care that can facilitate accountability relations between HFCs 
members and the community [83]. Although little is available in the literature on the 
role of leadership skills within HFCs and in relation to the community, it has been 
emphasised as a key factor in shaping health system accountability and associated 
structures. 
 
Where the leadership lacks general acceptance, mechanisms tend to suffer from a lack 
of trust among members and the community in general, thus hindering participation, 
as in the reported case from Nigeria [96]. The selection of appropriate leadership can 
be seen as a pluralistic approach in the community, one where there is interplay 
between positional leaders, those who have been elected or appointed, and 
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reputational leaders, those who informally serve the community [113]. The dominance 
of one leader may result in them using their power over the community or groups 
within the community to manipulate situations to their own advantage. Able 
leadership can mobilise the community to participate in health by providing the 
requisite link between the local health committee and the community. This may 
require properly established procedures of electing such a leadership and providing it 
with necessary resources to perform its roles. 
 
Also important are material and financial resources to enable HFCs members - 
especially from the community - to participate effectively in facility activities. Several 
studies have highlighted how financial assistance provided to committees to facilitate 
their work, such as allowances for their transport costs or for food provision during 
meetings, can greatly improve the functioning of HFCs by acting as a motivator [82, 97, 
99, 106, 114]. This is because, costs of participation, can be substantial and prohibitive 
when other basic needs have not been met [115]. However, there is little evidence on 
how accountability processes in HFCs operating in the normal health system setting 
(devoid of external intervention or support) would evolve, given that all the evidence 
currently presented involved some external support, either through a public-private 
partnership, donors or direct NGO involvement. 
 
Process Factors 
In terms of process, there is a strong argument about seeing accountability and 
participation not purely as a matter of policies and legislation, but as a complex 
process entailing customs, beliefs, ways of life, and power [22, 64, 116, 117]. Recent 
systematic reviews report that successful case studies tended to emphasise the 
significance of process in the functioning of HFCs. [77-79], yet little is available in the 
empirical literature on process. Some significant process factors identified in the 
literature include: wider community mobilisation before and during the establishment 
of HFCs; external facilitation and support in order to help staff and HFCs achieve 
effective working arrangements; as well as time and commitment among HFCs 
stakeholders, especially in the development of trust and skills necessary for HWs and 
community representatives to work harmoniously and for the empowerment of those 
most in need of quality health care [77, 79]. 
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However, despite the central role played by process in the functioning of HFCs, there 
is very little analysis of it in the literature. Instead, the focus has been on accountability 
structures and their outcomes. This is perhaps explained by the fact that no study 
reviewed here, evaluated the functioning of HFCs in a normal health system context, 
i.e., without the support of donors or government intervention, which are known to 
follow the traditional model that considers accountability in health as a linear process 
in which actors can take rational decisions with ultimate responsibility [118]. Yet this 
view overlooks the fact that health systems are complex organisations, dependent on 
rules, social norms, and informal practices, aspects which warrant careful analysis [22]. 
 
Health System Context 
Distinction can be made between the influence of the wider health system (legislative, 
regulatory, and policy framework) and the cultural environment within which local 
communities and clinics operate [14, 22, 77, 79, 117, 119-121]. In their review, McCoy et al 
[77], conclude that the functioning of the primary health care system has a clear effect 
on the effectiveness of HFCs, while Loewenson et al [84], document how the strength 
of HCCs in Zimbabwe exhibited a positively reinforcing virtuous cycle relationship 
with that of the primary health care system. Similar experiences were reported in 
Tanzania, where, due to a weak primary health care system, staff lacked resources to 
meet community needs, which in turn led to the disenfranchisement of the 
community from participation [95, 109]. These experiences highlight the need for 
HFCs to be owned by the local communities rather than constituting a policy directive 
from above [105], and that HFCs need to be nurtured by the health system in order to 
be effective [77]. 
 
Studies also highlight context issues that are beyond the health system but which can 
influence HFCs either through the health system or through the community. These 
include socio-cultural and political factors, such as participatory culture or lack of it, 
the nature of the state (whether democratic or dictatorial), or cultural beliefs and 
practices about illness and healing [77]. 
 
2.5 Summary and Limitations of the Literature 
The rise in the significance of health system accountability in international health 
policy circles has been accompanied by a growth in the body of literature providing 
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various frameworks for examining and understanding this concept. The literature 
provides rich background information, bringing out common themes and patterns 
(with considerable overlaps) relating to accountability and its application to health 
service research. For example, accountability has a directional dimension (vertical 
versus horizontal and downward versus upward), a content dimension (e.g. financial, 
managerial, meeting of performance targets), and a temporal dimension (maintenance 
of feedback loops between citizens and authorities). In obligatory terms, being 
accountable means having the responsibility and commitment to answer questions 
regarding decisions or actions taken by health care providers. From a relational 
perspective, it can be defined in terms of answerability to whom and for what; and for 
accountability to work, it requires sanctions or enforcement, which can include a range 
of negative to positive sanctions or internalized ethics such as codes of conduct. 
 
Within SSA, most studies have focused on committees as the main accountability 
mechanism, with very little information on other mechanisms. In their composition 
and formation, there is not much variation across SSA. Most committees consist of 
community representatives, health facilities staff representatives, and representatives 
of local administration. The literature provides a mixed scorecard regarding committee 
effectiveness as a mechanism for accountability and engagement. The various 
intervention projects described in the literature show that committees can be effective 
in enhancing primary care delivery in many ways such as: by mobilising the 
community to contribute to the management of their facilities and to identify priority 
areas; by ensuring drug availability; by holding HWs accountable for their work; by 
overseeing facility development projects; and, by facilitating health outreach 
programmes, among other activities. These issues are dependent on: whether HFC 
members understand their roles and authority; HFC resources; staff attitude and 
perceptions; local political dynamics; health system and socio-cultural contexts within 
which the committees operate. Little, however, is known about the impact of process 
in achieving the outlined outputs and outcomes. 
 
The reviewed literature highlights several key gaps concerning the functioning and 
impact of accountability mechanisms. 
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Firstly, there is very little empirical data to match the growing international interest in 
this area even beyond SSA, as demonstrated by the most recent systematic reviews in 
this area [77, 79]. 
 
Secondly, the focus on the functioning and impact of accountability mechanisms is 
almost purely on a model which seeks causality [122]. Available studies provide very 
little information on the role of processes that sustain and are sustained by the 
mechanisms [22]. This may be partly due to the role of donors being involved in many 
of the studies thus far available, who, in many cases, are keen to see the impact of their 
investments. They therefore put less emphasis on process and the interaction between 
intervention and context. It is important, however, to understand the processes by 
which mechanisms were successful, the context in which these processes took place, 
and the interaction between intervention and context [77]. Such a study should 
transcend the current boundary that focuses entirely on either committees or the 
community perspectives on committees, and provide analysis of the interaction of 
both. 
 
Thirdly, given the almost singular focus on committees, literature on other 
mechanisms such as facility/provider service charters and suggestion boxes is almost 
non-existent, yet in many cases these mechanisms are embedded within the broader 
committee operations and can as such be analysed as variables along other influencing 
factors. 
 
Fourthly, considerable efforts have been put into providing theoretical frameworks 
that can guide studies on accountability, but there is relatively little information on 
their applicability in guiding empirical studies. Furthermore, the frameworks are 
inclined to view accountability from the perspective of western-democratic models 
that assume a liberal market and defined decision-making space for stakeholders in 
accountability. They are therefore of very limited utility to health systems operating in 
contexts such as SSA which have unique social, cultural, and political circumstances. 
Moreover, most of the studies have relied on descriptive qualitative methods, while 
failing to capture important aspects, such as socio-demographic information, that 
could provide rich data sets for elucidating why the mechanisms perform and produce 
the outcomes outlined. There is therefore a glaring need for mixed methodology 
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approaches sensitive to the context of the study which can explain the how and why of 
accountability. McCoy et al [77], argue for research designs that allow for the 
description and measurement of both process and outcomes, using mixed data sources 
in order to achieve reflection and analysis of the complex web of interactions in HSA 
and participation. 
 
The research described in this thesis addresses these gaps in several ways: 
 
Firstly, a special focus is placed on the role of process in accountability relations. The 
process analysis also distinguishes between ‘intra-committee relations’ and committee 
– community relations or ‘inter-mechanism relations’. Specifically, the study examines 
internal dynamics of the HFCs (intra-committee relations), and the perspectives of 
facility users, allowing a comparison to be made across committees and facilities. 
 
Secondly, the process analysis is augmented with quantitative data on the socio-
demographic characteristics of survey respondents, providing a rich interface showing 
how individual socio-demographic characteristic combine with process factors to 
influence accountability relations in the study area. This analysis is currently lacking in 
the literature. 
 
Finally, an integrated conceptual framework – developed from the literature on 
accountability frameworks above and as well as a pilot study - taking into account the 
structure, process, and outcomes of the mechanisms is used, allowing for a thick 
integration of mixed data sources and analysis. The integrated methodology is 
informed by the fact that whilst processes can be predicted to some extent, by their 
very nature, they are context-specific and likely to consist of local adaptation and 
variation. The framework, and its rationale, will be provided in the next chapter on 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the study design, study sites and methods for data collection and 
analysis. Section 3.2 on study design specifies the aims and objectives of the thesis, the 
conceptual framework is described, and the scope of the study defined. Section 3.3 
covers the selection of study sites and their characteristics. In Section 3.4, methods for 
data collection and analysis are described, including ethical issues, and details of each 
data collection activity, and their analysis and timing. 
 
The choice of these assessment methods was informed by the fact that accountability 
in the health care system is a very complex research issue, lacking a standard 
definition, and context specific. As highlighted in the literature review, the complexity 
of accountability has been identified as one of the main reasons that has discouraged 
research on accountability [12, 22]. It was therefore imperative for this study to employ 
innovative ways to overcome this weakness and to contribute to the development of 
research in this area. Thus, the study took the position that accountability in any 
setting is context specific and that its processes influence and are in turn influenced by 
the everyday ideas, opinions, practices, and cultures of the population including issues 
of power, trust, gender, and stakeholder positions. As such, they must be understood 
in context and as relational to structure and outcome issues. 
 
3.2 Study Design 
3.2.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the factors that influence the performance and 
effectiveness of health system accountability (HSA) mechanisms on the delivery of 
primary health care (PHC) in Kericho District of Kenya. 
Specific objectives are to: 
1. Describe the range, nature, and composition of existing HSA mechanisms 
supporting primary care in peripheral health facilities in Kericho District of Kenya; 
2. Analyse the perceived impact of the above mechanisms on PHC delivery through an 
assessment of their depth of engagement, responsiveness, and impact on PHC 
services; 
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3. Examine the key factors that influence the performance of the above mechanisms 
with a focus on the role of process; and to  
4. Identify policy options for improving HSA at the peripheral level. 
 
3.2.2 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework to guide the study is presented in Figure 3.1. The framework 
is an attempt to create a multidisciplinary approach, benefiting firstly from a 
triangulation 6  of distinct but interrelated theories presented in Chapter 2, and 
secondly from a pilot study conducted specifically to contextualise the study tools in 
order to suit the overall study objectives. A key element of the framework is its 
departure from the current pattern in the literature that looks at HSA structure, 
process, and outcomes issues as distinct. 
 
The framework developed, and used here, considers the three as interconnected, and 
as based on reinforcing interrelationships not just between the three elements, but also 
between the various stakeholders in HSA mechanisms. In developing this framework, 
the idea was to create an over-arching framework for analysis that takes the kernel 
from theory and uses it to develop a way of understanding the complex concepts and 
practice of accountability and engagement in the health system [117, 123, 124]. The 
approach does not deny the ‘rich universe of the theories, arguments and debates that 
exist in the theories’ [117:4]. Instead, the framework contributes to the theoretical 
developments in HSA, by offering a chance for an analysis of HSA that takes into 
consideration its complexity, non-linear nature and context-specific nature without 
trying to assume a theoretical prerogative of truth or superiority over other 
approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Triangulation refers to finding patterns of convergence by comparing result across multiple sources of 
evidence, across methodological approaches, with theory, in this case the literature review and the pilot 
study data. Adopted from  119. Gilson, L., ed. Health Policy and Systems Research: A Methodology 
Reader. 2012, Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, World Health Organization: Geneva. 
 36 
 
Structure 
 Process 
 
 
Health System Context: e.g., on-going 
reforms like decentralisation, financing 
reforms, social capital, and socio-
cultural factors  
 
Health system context: e.g., on-going 
reforms like decentralisation, financing 
reforms, social capital, socio-cultural 
factors  
 
Type & Composition  
 Organic/Hybrid/ 
Bureaucratic/ Others  
 Composition - gender, 
selection methods, size, 
qualifications   
Purpose/Aims 
 Financial,  
 Performance,  
 Political  
Outcome 
Inter-mechanism relations  
 Accessibility   
 Communications  
 Service provider-user relations  
 Depth of engagement 
 Perceived adequacy & 
appropriateness 
 User awareness  
Depth of engagement  
 User awareness of 
mechanism 
 Adequacy and 
appropriateness  
 Accessibility of mechanism 
Responsiveness  
 Communication levels  
 User involvement in decision 
making & priority setting  
 Equity (gender, fairness, 
service delivery, user fees 
exemptions & adherence). 
Effectiveness 
 User Satisfaction levels  
 Perceived quality of care 
(drugs availability) 
 
Mechanism 
 Facility specific (HFCs, DFCs, 
VHCs) 
 Community based (CBOs, 
CORPS, CHWs) 
 General Groups 
 Policy Based (e.g. Suggestion 
boxes) 
Intra-mechanism relations  
 Power and decision-making  
 Accessibility and 
Communications  
 Responsibility  
 Trust 
  
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
 37 
 
In order to facilitate engagement and accountability, it is envisaged that the health 
system will require structures or mechanisms that provide an organisational 
framework of activities [124-127]. These structures or mechanisms could take the form 
of: health facility committees (HFCs), community based organisations (CBOs) whose 
aims may be health-specific or development-oriented with health as one of the core 
areas of concern, general development groups like women groups, health interests 
groups, or NGOs [128]. The mechanisms could also take the form of governmental or 
community initiated legislative or policy instruments like suggestion boxes (SBs), 
patients’ rights charters (PRCs), provider exit surveys, or score cards [92]. The aim is to 
identify the existing structures in the area of study through a mapping exercise, to 
describe the forms, types and composition that they take, and finally to analyse their 
aims, purposes and objectives and how these feed into or overlap with the health 
system goals as defined by the Kenya government’s community strategy for health [33]. 
 
Linked closely to structures or mechanisms are the processes that sustain or are 
sustained by the processes themselves. These are the activities themselves, interaction 
between facility staff and activities, and between staff and users. Analysis of the 
process issues will be interwoven with an exploration of which actors are involved, and 
how far each may be exerting influence on policy (decision-making) [22, 117, 129]. This 
is because processes do not have a life of their own, but are dependent on actors to 
give them expression [117, 124, 129-131]. Process analysis is also important in order to 
identify issues of trust, power relations and mechanism capacities to enhance or hinder 
fair and equitable participation among the various health system actors [14, 119, 123, 
132-134]. Thus, several issues come to fore: accessibility as defined by the level of use of 
facility by different population groups; adequacy and appropriateness; quality of 
relationship within the mechanisms; communications between HWs and community 
representatives, HWs and patients; plans and procedures followed and their 
documentation. Process is envisaged to be particularly central to this study because 
effects of interventions do not solely depend on the inputs; how they are administered 
is important too [123, 129, 135-138]. 
 
The final part of the framework facilitates an assessment of outcomes of 
accountability and engagement mechanisms and processes. ‘Outcomes’ relates to 
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effectiveness, efficiency and equity. Of interest are issues like the responsiveness of the 
health professionals to client needs and concerns ‘measured’ in terms of the 
improvements on facility structure and consultation times, fee waivers and adherence 
to official policy on out-of-pocket charges, regularity of mechanism meetings, financial 
accountability, and trust-building between the community and their representatives, 
community representatives and the HWs, and HWs and the community. ‘Outcomes’ 
such as user satisfaction levels with services offered at the facilities depend on process 
outputs [125, 139-141]. Because an exclusive assessment of outcomes can only ever 
provide a partial snapshot view of HSA in practice, it is important to locate them 
within an interactive model that takes into account process factors. 
 
Engagement and accountability structures, processes and their outcomes are not 
stand-alone health system variables. They are anchored in the broader health system 
milieu within which various policy interventions are mediated [12, 142]. Health 
systems worldwide operate within a context which often shapes policy, and is in turn 
shaped by policy outcomes [143, 144]. It is envisaged that the engagement structures or 
mechanisms will be products both of various policy options taken within the broader 
context of health system reforms in Kenya, and also of the sociocultural context within 
which they are implemented. With this in mind, it will be important to place HSA 
processes within this broader context, and view their outcomes as products, not just of 
specific peripheral facility structures and processes, but also of broader local, national 
and international reform processes [12, 144-148]. Therefore, the framework does not 
oversimplify the complex issues, concepts and practice of HSA. Structure, process, and 
outcomes are not linear processes that can be disentangled and causality ascertained 
as portrayed in most studies [77]. That is why it is envisaged that structural- process-
outcome issues will feed into each other within a system-wide arena with back and 
forth feedback loop. 
 
3.2.3 Defining the Scope of the Study 
The analysis addresses the link between HSA mechanisms and PHC. The main focus is 
on the dynamics informing the performance of the accountability mechanisms – 
mainly the health facility committees (HFCs), but as HFCs are only the overall 
umbrella structure that brings together other mechanisms, such as facility service 
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charters (SCs), and the local administrative forum (the Baraza), a comprehensive 
analysis of HSA performance in this area must consider all these important factors 
influencing PHC delivery. The thesis aims to assess the processes that give or are given 
meaning by the direct interactions between HFC members themselves and with 
patients (the community), rather than between HFCs and household7 heads, without 
losing grip of the cultural context. 
 
3.3 Study Sites 
3.3.1 Study Site Selection 
Several factors informed the choice of Kericho District for this study. The main goal 
was to find a setting that would be ideal for assessing the performance of HSA 
mechanisms in supporting PHC delivery. Kericho district was chosen because: 
 
 It has a high disease burden, especially for those diseases targeted under KEPH i.e., 
malaria, HIV and AIDS, and TB [149]. Malaria transmission is stable throughout the 
year but peaks during the wet season. HIV/AIDS rates are fairly high among the 
population, given the high rates of labour migrants and interaction due to tea 
growing companies in the area. It is one of the districts in Kenya with a high TB 
burden. A combination of these factors means that the rural population here would 
rely to a great degree and perhaps more frequently than usual on the local health 
facilities to meet their health needs. This frequent interaction provides an excellent 
context within which to assess the performance of HSA mechanisms in terms of 
their performance and impact on services provided. 
 
 The district has high poverty levels, with over 44% of the population living below 
the absolute poverty level. Ideally one would expect HSA mechanisms to promote 
equity (of access and costs) and to shield the poor and the vulnerable from the 
extremes of care costs. Given that the study was interested in assessing the factors 
impacting on the performance of these mechanisms through the angle of equity, 
efficiency, and overall effectiveness, these dynamics make Kericho an ideal study 
location. 
                                                 
7 Household is used throughout the thesis to mean a group of persons living in the same area, who are 
answerable to the same head and share a common source of food and/or income. 
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 Thirdly, the study aimed to understand the factors impacting on the performance 
of HSA mechanisms in a setting with little or no external interventions, such as 
those by NGO and or private-public partnerships that could influence intervening 
variables in the performance of HSA mechanisms. Kericho district offered this 
context given that there were no external interventions that directly targeted the 
health centres chosen for the study when the fieldwork for the pilot and the main 
surveys were done. 
 
 Lastly, even though the study does not aim to provide generalisable conclusions for 
the rest of Kenya, the area chosen for this study is typical of most of rural Kenya 
and SSA, albeit with marked cultural differences. The findings of the study are 
therefore likely to be representative of most of rural Kenya and to an extent SSA, 
where there are socio-demographic and health systems similarities. 
3.3.2 Characteristics of the Study District 
The study was conducted in Kericho district of Kenya (Figure 3.2) The district has an 
estimated population of 758,339 (50% male, 50% female), distributed in 160,134 
households with a density of 306 per square kilometre, over an area of 2,479 square 
kilometres [150]. The population is predominantly Kipsigis, a sub-group of the Kalenjin 
ethnic group. The main occupation is small-scale agriculture, which is estimated to 
contribute 80% of all household income. Most families grow maize and keep cattle for 
subsistence, while some grow tea for sale. Poverty levels are relatively high with 44.2% 
of the population estimated to be living below the absolute poverty line. The most 
affected categories are unemployed youth, women, members of female-headed 
households, children, and the landless [26]. Poverty data are important to the study 
given that the HSA mechanisms are expected to cushion the poor and vulnerable 
groups from adverse effects of care costs, which have been identified as one of the 
major causes of poverty [26, 151-160]. 
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Source: [161] 
 
A mix of private and government health centres and dispensaries serve the district. 
Currently, there are 29 government-owned facilities (nine health centres, one district 
hospital, and nineteen dispensaries). The district hospital – Kericho District Hospital – 
is located in the town of Kericho and also serves as the nearest referral facility [162]. 
 
The key health indicators (the most recent data) for the district are summarised in 
Table 3.1 and survey data on illness and morbidity from the study area are provided in 
Table A2, Appendix of Tables. Data from the survey on illness and morbidity in the 
study area reflect a general trend across Kenya and some other parts of SSA. Malaria 
was the most commonly reported illness (44%) of all reported cases, followed by Acute 
Respiratory Illnesses (ARI) at 27.6% (household survey April –May 2011). There were no 
significant variations across the four study clusters. The high rates of malaria and ARI 
are partly explained by the fact that fieldwork was done during a rainy season, a time 
when households are general exposed to these infections due to a rise in mosquito 
breeding and the effects of change in weather on ARI (among other predisposing 
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factors). Illness and morbidity data were verified by checking patients’ records (books 
held by patients where diagnoses are reported). 
 
Table 3.1: Kericho District Key Health Indicators Compared to National Indicators  
Indicator  Kericho District  (Estimate period) Kenya  (Estimate Period) 
Crude birth rate (CBR) -* 32.1/1000 (2012) 
Crude death rate (CDR)  -* 7.9/1000 (2012) 
Life expectancy  -* 62.2 years (2012) 
Infant mortality rate  35/1000 (2012) 47.7/1000 (2012) 
Under five mortality rate  100/1000 (2012) 74/1000 (2009) 
Total fertility rate  4.7 (2012) 3.97 (2012) 
Doctor / patient ratio  1/15,000 (2012) 2.3/15,000 (2012) 
Data Source: [25]  
*data not available  
 
3.3.3 Characteristics of the Study Facilities 
The main characteristics of the facilities reported in this study are provided in Table 
3.2. Respondents for the study were drawn from catchment areas of four 
public/government owned health centres, referred to throughout this thesis, for 
purposes of anonymity, as FA, FB, FC, and FD. Generally, all the facilities were 
understaffed, with FA and FC operating without a clinician or Officer-In-Charge (FI) 
(as normally required by government regulations). The facilities were instead manned 
by Kenya registered nurses, although at the time of the survey the District Medical 
Officer of Health (DMOH) informed the researcher that plans were underway to send 
qualified clinicians to the two facilities. Compared to the rest of the facilities, FA 
served a large number of population spread over a larger area. All the facilities 
provided basic PHC services with FA providing some limited inpatient services. 
 
The facility and study area characteristics described here, are, on the whole, 
representative of most rural primary care establishment in Kenya. As already noted in 
the background section, health centres and dispensaries are the first point of contact 
for primary care services in most of rural Kenya and by extension most of SSA. The 
problems of poverty, gender inequality, burden of disease (especially malaria, 
HIV/AIDS, TB and ARIs), HWs shortage, accessibility, user fee charges, and corruption 
are not unique to the study area. Therefore, even though the experiences of HSA and 
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engagement presented in this study are a product of the data gathered in Kericho 
District, there are marked similarities that are likely to be representative of many rural 
areas in Kenya, SSA, and LMIC. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of Key Facility Indicators/Characteristics 
 Health Centre/Facility 
Selected Facility Indicators  Facility A 
 (FA)  
Facility B 
(FB) 
Facility C 
(FC) 
Facility D  
(FD) 
Demographics   
 Male  
 Female  
 Total  
 Area (Sq. Km.) 
 Density per Square Km. 
 
70,000-75,000 
66,000-71,000 
136,000-146,000 
240-245 
550-650 
 
32,000-37,000 
29,000-34,000 
61,000-71,000 
220-230 
300-320 
 
29,000-34,000 
30,000-35,000 
59,000-69,000 
175-185 
375-400 
 
28,000-33,000 
28,000-33,000 
56,000-66,000 
110-120 
580-600 
Number of staff per category  
 Clinical officers (FI) 
 Kenya Registered Nurses 
 Public Health Officers  
 VCT Counsellors  
 Support staff  
 Total  
 
0 
4 
2 
3 
4 
13 
 
1 
6 
1 
1 
5 
14 
 
0 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
 
1 
6 
2 
4 
5 
18 
Services offered at facility  
 Outpatient curative  
 In-Patient  
 Laboratory  
 Deliveries  
 Voluntary counselling & testing  
 Prevention of mother-to-child-
transmission  
 Antiretroviral therapy (ART) 
 Insecticide treated bed nets 
(ITNS) 
 
Yes 
Limited 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Average monthly outpatient 
attendance  
 Under 5s 
 Over 5s 
 Total 
 
 
853 
1,890 
2,743 
 
 
306 
688 
994 
 
 
712 
1,686 
2,398 
 
 
725 
1,874 
2,599 
HSA mechanisms present at 
facility  
 Health facility committee (HFC)   
 Suggestion Box (SB) 
 Patients Rights’ Charter (PRC) 
 Facility Service Charter (SC) 
 Community Health Worker 
(CHW) 
 
 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
 
 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
     
Data sources: Demographics - Kericho District Statistics Office; 
All other - Household Survey April – May 2011 
 
3.4 Methods for Data Collection and Analysis 
3.4.1 Overview of Data Collection 
Due to the limited amount of previous work on processes underlying accountability 
mechanisms, and on factors associated with their awareness, it became imperative to 
employ a wider range of data collection tools (Figure 3.3). Furthermore, a broad range 
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of quantitative and qualitative methods were employed, as these have been shown to 
be important in providing better understanding of the unique experiences of both 
users and providers [125, 144, 163], getting rich data that can help illuminate complex 
accountability relationships [77, 164], and in capturing different dimensions of the 
central phenomenon of focus [165]. 
 
The study thus adopted an ‘innovative strategy that combined different perspectives, 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies while at the same time respecting the 
distinct branches of philosophical thought from which they are derived’ [126:141]. Data 
were collected from households and health facilities within the four cluster areas. 
Facility users’ data were collected through a cross-sectional household survey using 
multiple data collection tools. The use of mixed methods offered a chance for 
triangulation, which has been shown to reduce weaknesses associated with one specific 
method [119]. For this study, the use of qualitative techniques (in-depth interviews, 
group discussions, and key informant interviews), participatory research (attending 
committee meetings and observing HWs-client interaction), photography, and 
document analysis provided a rich context on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the performance 
of accountability mechanisms. On the other hand, survey methods provided 
statistically representative data on the study population, thus improving reliability 
[126]. However, it is the bringing together of the multiple methods, through 
triangulation, that proved to be a powerful tool, permitting a yield of different types of 
information about HSA in Kericho District. 
 
Data collection instruments were drafted in English, translated into Kiswahili with the 
support of a language expert at APHRC and native speakers, and piloted in exit patient 
surveys in two of the four facilities finally included in the survey (facilities FA & FC). 
All interviews were conducted in Kiswahili and English where the respondents could 
understand English. A few interviews were conducted in the local language – Kipsigis – 
for respondents who could not understand Kiswahili or English. English versions of all 
data collection instruments are contained in Annex 4. All data collection activities 
were designed and managed by the author. The data for this thesis were collected 
between November 2010 and May 2011. 
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3.4.2 Training of the Research Team  
The survey was conducted by the researcher with the help of five research assistants 
(RAs) - three recruited from the locality of the study and two graduate research interns 
recruited by the African Population & Health Research Center (APHRC). Of the five 
RAs, (four male and one female), only one male helped during the pilot and was 
specifically recruited due to his knowledge of the area and linguistic skills (to help with 
translation in the rare cases where the respondent could not speak Swahili or English). 
The other four helped during the survey and two of them - one male and one female - 
were recruited due to their knowledge of the area and ability to conduct interviews 
with female respondents (specifically the female RA), who could have been 
uncomfortable talking to male researchers. 
 
Accountability 
Context 
 
Data collected 
Accountability 
mechanism, type, 
composition, purpose 
and aims  
 
Intra-mechanism 
relations – priority 
setting, decision 
making, power and trust 
within the HFC  
 
Households 
 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics and how they 
influence engagement with the 
accountability mechanisms 
 
Depth of engagement with 
HSA (knowledge, awareness, 
and use of accountability 
mechanisms) 
 
User satisfaction with HSA 
performance and process 
issues affecting/impacting on 
HSA performance  
 
Literature Review (International, LMICs, Sub-Saharan Africa, National, 
District) 
 Health systems reforms  
 Conceptualising accountability and engagement in health  
 Accountability & engagement mechanisms   
 
Health System 
 
Role of health system 
context in influencing 
the functioning of 
HSA mechanisms 
 
 
Methods for collecting information across all levels  
 Cross-sectional survey  
 Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) & Individual In-depth interviews (IDIs)  
 Participant observation, document and facility review  
 
Figure 3.3: Summary of Data Collection Activities 
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The RAs received two weeks intensive training on the contents of the questionnaires 
and techniques for achieving scientific validity and trustworthiness of the data [165] by 
establishing a rapport with the respondents while maintaining the neutrality essential 
to obtaining the most accurate data possible. Specific topics covered included 
introduction to research, background and aims of the study, basic communication 
skills, how to introduce the work, informed consent, giving constructive feedback, data 
collection, mapping, expected problems and their solutions, how to complete the 
questionnaire and other basic field work information. The training was participatory, 
consisting of role-playing and practice sessions aimed at ensuring that the RAs fully 
understood their role and that they were able to complete the data collection tools 
without any difficulties. The researcher not only supervised the RAs throughout the 
research period but also carried out a substantial number of interviews as a quality 
control mechanism. 
 
3.4.3 Establishing Rapport with the Community 
Prior to the start of the main study, the author led the research team in establishing 
contact with the community, a process that involved seeking clearance from the 
district administration (the DMOH, Division Officer, local Chiefs and community8 
leaders) (See Annex 3, A3.4-3.6). This exercise involved providing these key individuals 
in the community with detailed information pertaining to the nature of the research, 
its potential benefits to the community, and what help the research team would need. 
In this regard, the pilot exercise carried out earlier in November 2010 proved very 
useful, as the few community members interviewed at the pilot carried on with the 
discussions at the household level. We later discovered that this took place with a 
‘sense of relief and in a new discursive space’, whereby facility issues that were hitherto 
considered too sensitive or sacrosanct to the health workers (HWs) were discussed. 
For this reason, the research team found the ground fertile and receptive. 
 
                                                 
8 Community is used in the thesis to refer to a specific group of people usually living in a common 
geographical area, who share a common culture, are arranged in a social structure and exhibit some 
awareness of their identity as a group. This definition is adopted from  166. Allman D, M.T., Cockerill R, 
Concepts, definitions and models for community-based HIV prevention research in Canada, and a planning 
guide for the development of community-based HIV prevention research, 1997, Faculty of Medicine, 
University of Toronto: Toronto. 
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Getting to know the community also proved vital in that it helped develop a sense of 
ownership among community members. This was different to previous research 
activities in the area such as those conducted by government agencies. This exercise, 
made the community feel that their views were important given that their consent was 
sought before the interviews and the study was conducted by one of their own. In the 
end, the local administration gave the research team a group of community leaders to 
take the team around, and in many cases individual households volunteered on their 
own to help the team find their way around the community and to introduce the team 
to the next household, thereby reducing the time taken to conduct the survey and 
establishing an excellent research environment where individuals opened up and 
discussed the research questions freely. Finally, involving the community in the 
planning and promotion of the study was useful in generating findings that are 
relevant and reliable. 
 
3.4.4 Ethical Clearance and Informed Consent 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the institutional review committee of 
APHRC (approval reference HSC/2010/59), the ethics review committees of the Kenya 
Medical Research Institute (authorization reference KEMRI/RES/7/3/1 PROTOCOL 
NO.247), the National Science and Technology Commission (permit number 
NCST/RR1/12/1/MED/222/4), all provided in Annex 3. The research team visited the 
households and health facilities sampled for each data collection activity to inform 
them about the study, deliver a letter of invitation, and make an appointment for the 
survey where it was necessary. Village Elders (VE) and staff of the District Health 
Management Team (DHMT) were also informed. 
 
Before the start of all interviews, the interviewee was read an information sheet 
explaining the purpose of the research, the institutions involved, the nature of their 
requested participation, and given the opportunity to ask questions. It was emphasised 
that the information collected would be confidential and in health facilities, that no 
individual details would be passed on to district authorities. Written consent was 
obtained from all interviewees (household, community HFC members, and KIs) or, 
where one could not sign, a thumbprint was taken or a nominated close relative signed 
on their behalf. Consent was also sought specifically for the use of tape recorders 
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during qualitative interviews. Care has been taken in the presentation of results to 
avoid identification of any specific health facilities or individuals, unless where consent 
was specifically obtained, especially where data or pictures have been attributed to 
particular individuals or facilities. 
 
3.4.5 The Pilot 
In mixed methods studies, a pilot study can be used to develop detailed understanding 
of a phenomenon which is then followed by a large scale structured survey to generate 
more extensive understanding of the same phenomenon [165]. Thus, a pilot study was 
conducted in November 2010 in order to help develop a conceptual framework to guide 
the main study and to help refine data collection tools, including getting data for the 
calculation of sample size for the main household survey. The pilot took two weeks 
and was conducted by the researcher with the aid of a locally trained and experienced 
RA who had been involved in several studies in the area before. The pilot involved a 
survey of two facilities: one considered a poor performer and the other a good 
performer based on the recommendations of the DMOH. During the pilot, in-depth 
interviews were conducted with 20 randomly selected patients (10 male and 10 female, 
5 per facility) using a semi-structured questionnaire. 
 
Following the literature review presented in Chapter 2 that identified key gaps in the 
knowledge on accountability, especially in the place of process in informing the 
performance of accountability mechanisms in rural and resource-scarce settings, it was 
important to adopt innovative methodologies that could help explore this complex and 
research sensitive issue [12], while at the same time enabling the collection of insightful 
and rich data that could help in the design stages of the questionnaires for the main 
household survey. Qualitative approaches have been shown to have great potential in 
capturing contextual issues (form and nature of HSA), in being explanatory (reasons 
for or associations between various variables interacting to inform the performance of 
accountability mechanisms), in offering flexibility for assessment (appraising the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms), and in being generative (aiding the development of 
theories, strategies, or actions for understanding accountability in the health system) 
[126, 165, 167, 168]. 
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For these reasons the pilot adopted a more qualitative approach, using semi-structured 
questionnaires enabling the study to ‘unpack’ what accountability meant for users in 
this community, how key stakeholders (the DMOH, HFCs members, and HWs) 
understood their roles within the health system. Respondents were allowed to describe 
and display issues of accountability and service delivery as they experienced them, in 
detail and in their own terms. The data were then analysed by the researcher using a 
thematic approach following a path of familiarisation with the data, construction of a 
preliminary coding scheme, followed by manual qualitative content analysis and 
interpretation using a method adopted from Graneheim and Lundman [1]. After initial 
open coding, each code was examined in great detail, the coding scheme was refined, 
and finally codes were grouped under key themes which were then used to develop the 
tools for the main household survey in April-May 2011 (see Table A1, Appendix of 
Tables). The analysis also benefited from feedback received on a presentation made at 
an international conference.9 
 
Following the pilot and literature review, particularly on conceptions of accountability, 
the following variables were derived for assessing the HSA in Kericho district: 
 HFC responsiveness (HFCs priorities vis-à-vis user’s priorities)  
 Health seeking behaviour (HSB) 
 Equity (user fee adherence, waivers)  
 Quality of care given (whether users were given drugs on payment of prescribed 
user fees, were required to buy additional treatment items outside the facility, 
were satisfied with the care given). 
 Depth of engagement (knowledge/awareness of HFC – selection method, HFC 
work, knowledge of any HFC member, choice of redress mechanism – HFC vs. 
non-HFC, and reasons for these choices, HFC communication with facility 
users). 
 Experience with facility service charter (SC) - whether user had read the SC, 
and, if so, whether the information on the SC was useful or not and why. 
 Other (financial accountability – whether a facility issues receipts on user fee 
payment or not). 
                                                 
9 The results of the pilot were presented as a poster at the Royal Society of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine research in progress conference held in London in December 2010. 
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To build a robust assessment tool, the study augmented the context specific 
accountability assessment tools with the recommendations made by the most recent 
literature reviews in the area [77-79, 139]. In the end, the pilot proved a useful tool for 
involving the community in the planning and promotion of the larger survey.  It 
provided evidence that is relevant and reliable since the researcher took an open-
minded approach concerning which questions were worth addressing, which aspects of 
HSA merited assessment, and what health outcomes were important in the study area 
[169]. It also acted as a mapping exercise by which two HSA mechanisms (HFCs and 
SCs) present in all the HFs in the study district were identified for further investigation 
in the main survey, and those present in fewer than four facilities (SBs and PRCs) 
dropped from the questionnaire (see Figure 3.4 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.6 Household Survey 
The household survey was based on a total sample of 1024 respondents from randomly 
selected households drawn from the Kericho District database. The sample was 
stratified by health facility catchment area, and 256 respondents were selected, from 
each the catchment areas of the four health centres, i.e., FA, FB, FC, and FD. 
 
The sample size was determined using the following formula: 
n = (z2) (r) (1-r) (f) (k)/ (p) (ñ) (e2) where:  
z = confidence level, which was set at 1.96 in order to achieve a 95% reliability in the 
results;  
Figure 3.4: Accountability Mechanisms Selected and the Health System Level Where They 
Operate 
Accountability mechanisms 
• Health facility committees 
(HFCs) 
• Facility service charters 
(SCs) 
• Suggestion boxes 
• Patient rights charters (PRCs) 
• Baraza 
Source: Government of Kenya [32] and Pilot Study, November 2010 
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r = prevalence/awareness of health accountability mechanisms, was set at 40% based 
on pilot results for awareness of HFCs; 
k = non-response rate, set at 15% to represent a conservative value; 
ñ = average cluster size, set at 4, based on most recent Kenya Health and Demographic 
Survey (KHDS); 
f = design effect, set at 1.5  
p = probability, representing the proportion of the total population accounted for by 
the target population and upon which the parameter, r, is based, and was set at 1; 
e = margin of error (%), pegged at 10% for enhanced reliability. 
Thus sample size n = (1.962 x 0.4 x 0.6 x 1.5 x 0.15) / (1 x 4 x 0.42) = 254.22 adjusted to 
256 households per catchment area.10 
 
Households in which one or more members were not present were revisited three 
times. Households that had closed, declined participation, or in which individuals were 
not present on a third visit were replaced. The interview was conducted using a 
structured questionnaire. The design and wording were informed by previous 
quantitative and qualitative work on accountability generally, survey work going on at 
APHRC, and the KHDS of 2008 [26]. The survey questionnaire was administered face-
to-face to any household member who was 16 years and above and had lived in the area 
for at least six months. The questionnaire was divided into five parts. 
 
 Part 1 of the questionnaire covered socio-demographic variables, including: 
household membership; gender; age; marital status; education level; and main 
economic activity. 
 
 Part II covered household morbidity and HSB including: illness experienced in the 
last six months; whether and/ or where treatment was sought; main reasons for 
choice of provider and treatment type; whether respondents received medication or 
not; treatment outcome; and distance to nearest health facility. 
 
 Part III covered financial accountability including: whether respondents paid any 
user fees for the service; if yes, how much; and if they were not charged, why; 
                                                 
10 Households were used primarily as a means to reach the target population, i.e. individual respondents, 
and were not the subject of interest as such, given that the study was interested in personal experiences 
with the health system. 
 52 
 
whether they were issued with a receipt or not on payment; whether they asked for 
a receipt if one was not issued and what response they received; respondents 
awareness of user fee setting and usage at the facility. 
 
 Part IV covered knowledge and awareness of various HSA mechanisms (HFCs, SCs, 
Baraza, local chief). Respondents were asked: whether they were aware of the HFC; 
whether they knew any HFC member (not necessarily by name); how HFC 
members were selected; the role of HFCs; and whether they had approached any 
HFC member with any facility issue. On SC, respondents were asked: whether they 
had seen one at the local health centre; whether they had read it; whether they 
found it useful; and why they thought it useful or not. 
 
 Part V of the questionnaire addressed user experiences with HSA in their area. 
Respondents were asked: what they would do in case they experienced a problem at 
the HF; which authority/HSA mechanism they would approach; and who would be 
their first choice in dealing with facility issues and why. Based on a Likert scale, 
respondents were also asked to rate generally their satisfaction levels with the 
services received at the local facility and to give reasons for their answers. Finally, 
respondents were asked what they thought the main priorities for the facility 
should be. 
The survey returned a 100% response rate (1024 respondents) due to the replacement 
and the community involvement strategies adopted. However, five questionnaires 
from respondents clustered around FB were discarded due to incomplete information. 
The analysis presented thus consists of 1019 questionnaires (Table A2, Appendix of 
Tables). Basic data on household and individual characteristics of respondents are 
reported in Chapter 4.  
 
The survey method was chosen as most appropriate for collecting the data above 
because it allowed for data collection in a natural setting through face-to-face 
interviews. Moreover, the sampling technique involved enables statistical inferences to 
be made in regards to the broader population and allows generalisations to be made, 
thereby increasing the external validity of the study [126, 140, 170, 171]. The survey 
method was also most appropriate because it is cost and time effective. The flexible 
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nature of face-to-face interviews ensured that even illiterate respondents could have 
their voices heard, allowed for clarification of questions where necessary, and allowed 
for the rephrasing of a question if problematic. Moreover, it helped in establishing 
trust, thus encouraging participation in the survey. 
In order to overcome the disadvantages associated with the face-to-face method of 
collecting data during the survey, such as interviewer bias influencing data collected, 
the effect of interviewer-interviewee interaction, and unwillingness to open up by 
interviewees due to fear of lack of anonymity, the researcher took several measures. 
a. RAs received intensive training as described above. 
b. Field tools were piloted to ensure RAs mastered interview techniques and 
captured the best data possible. 
c. The author shadowed the RAs in rotation during the initial interviews to make 
sure they were doing the right thing and, where necessary, provided positive 
feedback to ensure improvement. 
The community was fully informed of the aims and objectives of the study and, as far 
as possible, their ownership encouraged before the survey began. Strict confidentiality 
and anonymity was emphasised and the voluntary aspect of the study underlined. 
Figure 3.5 is a summary of these activities and Figure 3.6 is a pictorial account of the 
research activities. 
 
 54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pilot (November 2010)  
 2 Facilities conveniently picked 
 20 Patient Exit Interviews  
 10 male 
 10 female 
 4 In-depth Interviews with HFC 
members 
 2 Community HFC members 
 2 HWs HFC members  
 1 Key Informant Interviews with 
DMOH 
 
Main Fieldwork (April-May 2011) 
 Household survey 
 Facility Survey   
 Document Reviews 
 Participant Observation 
 Key Informant Interviews 
 Photography   
 
Household Survey 
 1024 Respondents 
 Up to 256 Households 
 ≥ 16 years    
 4 Clusters around 4 health 
facilities  
 Structured questionnaires 
 
Facility Survey 
 24 In-Depth Interviews 
with HFC members 
 4 Community HFC 
members per facility 
 2 HWs HFC members 
per facility 
 Facility Audit & 
Observations  
 Participation in 2 HFC 
meetings 
 
Facility A (FA) 
 256 Respondents 
 Up to 64 households 
 2 Male & Female Group 
discussions 
 Age (16 – 29 years) 
 
Facility B (FB) 
 256 Respondents 
 Up to 64 households 
 2 Male & Female Group 
discussions 
 Age (16 – 24 years) 
 
Facility C (FC) 
 256 Respondents 
 Up to 64 households 
 2 Male & Female Group 
discussions 
 Age (25 – 34 years) 
 
Facility D (FD) 
 256 Respondents 
 Up to 64 households 
 2 Male & Female Group 
discussions 
 Age (≥ 35 years) 
 
Figure 3.5: Summary of Research Process and Activities  
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Figures 3.6 A-C: Research Assistants Administering Household Survey Questionnaires     
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Figure 3.6 D: Research Team at Work 
Figure 3.6 E: Typical Health Centre Figure 3.6 F: The Researcher in the Field 
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3.4.7 Semi-Structured Qualitative HFCs and Provider Interviews 
Qualitative interviews have been shown to be useful in gathering information set 
within the context of personal experience, where issues being investigated are complex 
and require detailed exploration [172]. Therefore, a number of semi-structured in-
depth interviews (IDI) were conducted with community members, health facility 
administrative staff, and HWs who were members of the HFCs, based on an 
ontological approach most closely to what has been described as ‘subtle realism’ [130, 
173].11 The interviews were done with two main objectives. Firstly (in reference to the 
first four IDIs done during the pilot), they informed the design of the main survey 
done in April-May 2011, by generating hypotheses for quantitative investigation, 
providing background information for the HFC audit methodology, and identifying the 
most appropriate and comprehensible wording to use. Secondly, they facilitated 
generation of in-depth personal and subjective perceptions. Accounts of members of 
the HSA structures enabled exploration of accountability relations in depth and detail, 
and the exploration of sensitive and complex accountability and engagement processes 
and issues especially around power, trust and status, which are not readily addressed 
using quantitative methods [172, 174]. 
 
A sample of 24 HFCs members was selected purposively, stratified by health facility, 
i.e. 6 per facility. The 24 interviewees were selected to capture the diversity within the 
HFCs, such that all the four main accountability stakeholders within the HFCs were 
represented, i.e. community representatives, representatives of the local 
administration (mainly the chiefs or their assistants), and HWs representatives. 
Moreover, based on the literature review and the pilot in November 2010, female 
members of the HFCs were also interviewed to capture gender perspectives and to 
understand the depth of their voice within the HFC decision-making structures, given 
that women are the majority clients at the HFs. Finally, two key informant interviews 
were carried out with the district health administrator and the DMOH in order to 
                                                 
11  Subtle realism, accept that the social world does exist independently of individual subjective 
understanding, but that it is only accessible to us via the respondent’s interpretations, which may then 
be subject to researcher’s further interpretation. It acknowledges that respondent’s different vantage 
points will yield different types of understanding, which does not negate the existence of an existence of 
an external reality which can be ‘captured. A subtle realist approach thus takes the view that external 
reality is itself diverse and multifaceted and it is this diversity of perspectives that adds richness to our 
understanding of the various ways in which reality has been experienced. The aim thus, is to apprehend, 
and convey, a whole picture as possible of the nature of that multifaceted reality [130, 173]. 
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bring in the health system context as outlined in the conceptual framework. A full 
description of the HFCs is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
The author and four RAs visited each health facility in April-May 2011. The interviews 
took between 45 minutes and 2 hours. Following each interview, the research team 
held a debrief session to discuss the issues raised, impressions about the interviewee’s 
attitude and behaviour, and any responses needing clarification, which in some cases 
necessitated repeat visits or phone calls. Between interviews, some minor changes were 
made to the interview guide in order to make the questions clearer and to incorporate 
new areas of discussion or to remove unfruitful ones. The author then initiated 
informal analysis of the interview data through the drafting of memos to summarise 
important findings, emerging themes, and research questions and hypotheses. 
 
The interviews were tape-recorded, fully transcribed in Kiswahili, translated into 
English, and the translations checked against the original Kiswahili manuscript. Where 
translation proved difficult, terms were left in Swahili with accompanying notes in 
English. These were supplemented by notes on observations during the interviews. The 
general approach to data analysis followed the same path used during the pilot 
described in section 3.4.5 above. Examples are provided in Table A1 and Figure A1 in 
the Annex of Tables of Figures. 
 
3.4.8 Focus Group Discussions 
A total of eight group discussions were conducted, two per facility, and each 
containing 8–12 participants. Respondents were selected based on age and gender. The 
main aim of the group discussions was to generate information that would deepen and 
offer meaning to the survey data and document analysis, and to identify areas of 
consensus as well as differences of views, since this often emerges through group 
discussion more than during one-to-one interviews. The group process was used to 
explore what shaped respondents’ ideas about accountability and to provide an 
opportunity for participants to reflect and refine the issues they raised during the 
survey [164]. The discussions were also used to explore further issues that were 
identified in the survey as being sensitive or polemic [175] among respondents and 
could benefit from group dynamics. Thus, in each facility, potential issues were noted 
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based on field reports from each RA, and the data merged to identify what issues to 
pursue further during the discussions (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: Group Composition and Discussion Guide for the Focus Group Discussions  
Age group and gender of 
FGD participants  
Number of participants per 
gender in each facility  
Issues discussed/ Discussion guide  
FA FB FC FD 
16 – 24 years  
Male  
Female  
 
 
 
12 
10 
   Barriers to youth/women 
involvement in HF management. 
 Awareness of HFC, its functions, 
and selection.     
 Experiences with engaging HFC 
members.  
 Perceived effectiveness/ 
responsiveness of HFs and HFCs 
to youth/ women health needs.  
 Ways to enhance accountability 
within the HFCs and to attract 
youth/women interests in HF 
affairs.  
25 – 34 years  
Male  
Female  
 
10 
8 
   
35 year and above  
Male  
Female  
   
10 
10 
 
11 
9 
Source: Household Survey April – May 2013 
 
Finally the FGDs were used to help in generating themes for analysing the survey data. 
The discussions for the FGDs were guided by the author with the support of the 
research team (who also took notes). The discussions were tape-recorded after group 
consent was obtained. In analysing the FGD data, the focus was on the key areas of 
consensus and disagreement among individuals and groups of individuals, and, where 
necessary, on triangulation with other data sources to meet the study objectives. 
 
3.4.9 Quantitative Data Entry and Analysis 
Data from the household survey, facility survey, and HFC audits were entered using 
Sirius, a software programme used at APHRC to process and manage survey data. The 
data was checked for logical consistency and coding errors. Analysis was performed 
using IBM SPSS version 19. Differences in proportions were tested for significance 
using the Pearson chi-square statistic with the adjusted standard residuals. Logistical 
regression models were used for multivariate analysis of variation in key outcomes 
(awareness of HFCs, user perception of facility SC usefulness, and general user 
satisfaction with services received as a function of various socio-demographic and HSA 
predictor variables). 
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3.5 Summary and Plan of Analysis 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the factors that influence the performance and 
effectiveness of health system accountability mechanisms (HSA) on the delivery of PHC 
in Kericho district, Kenya with a particular focus on the role of process. Data were 
collected from rural households clustered around four public health centres in Kericho 
District of Kenya. The results are presented in the next two chapters. The chapters 
have been organised by theme of analysis, rather than by data collection activity, in 
order to synthesise and triangulate data from different sources and to provide a richer 
understanding of each theme. 
 
The results begin in Chapter 4 with an assessment of intra-mechanism relations (intra-
committee relations) and processes of main HSA mechanisms in the study area - HFCs 
and the facility SC - (Objective 1). This is followed by Chapter 5, where the results are 
presented on user engagement with accountability mechanisms (committee-
community relations). The importance of the Baraza, a key engagement forum for the 
community and the HFCs, and the context within which HSA relations take place, are 
woven into these two results chapters, where appropriate. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 draw together the findings from the two results chapters and 
consider them in the light of the existing literature, leading to an assessment of the 
main process factors influencing the functioning of HSA mechanisms supporting 
primary care in the area of study (objective 3). The fourth and final objective is 
addressed in Chapter 8, which focuses on policy implications that can be drawn from 
the results and analysis. Overall, the analysis presented in the next two chapters 
provides a detailed, holistic account, drawing on multiple data sources to overcome 
methodological weaknesses of single data sources which fail to address adequately 
conceptual and empirical gaps identified in the literature review provided in Chapter 2. 
Analysis, therefore, consisted of a two-pronged approach: quantitative and qualitative 
as described above, while a further meta-level was achieved by integrating and linking 
the types of data as various issues emerged. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HEALTH SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS & THEIR OPERATIONS IN 
THE STUDY AREA  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first objective of the thesis: to describe the range of existing 
health system accountability and engagement mechanisms supporting primary care 
services. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 set the context for the analysis. On the client-side, 
Section 4.2 provides background information on the study population, through a 
description of the household and individual characteristics of household survey 
respondents. On the service provider-side, Section 4.3 reports the range and type of 
health system accountability (HSA) and engagement mechanisms in the study area, 
and survey data on their composition and variations, if any. The main accountability 
mechanism - the health facility committee (HFC) – is described. Here data from three 
main sources – In-depth interviews (IDIs) with HFC members, household Survey, and 
document review -, are used to provide a detailed description of the composition, 
committee selection criteria, the rules and procedures governing committee functions, 
HFC members training and skills, HFC role and powers, and the committee influence 
on service delivery. 
 
Section 4.4 describes the second major accountability mechanism – the Facility Service 
Charter (SC) - from users’ perspectives, supported by photographic evidence of the 
various SCs from the four cluster sites, given the SCs are facility-based. Variations in 
the information provided in the SC across the four HFs are highlighted. Finally, 
Section 4.5 concludes by summarising key findings of the analysis, and setting the 
agenda for the next results Chapter. 
 
4.2 Characteristics of Individuals and Households  
The socio-demographic characteristics of households and individuals included in the 
household survey are presented in Table A2, Appendix of Tables. Overall, the survey 
captured more women (63.6%) than men (36.4%). Several factors explain this bias. 
First, in rural Kenya, it is common for men to leave their families (wives) in the rural 
home to look for jobs in the city. Many respondents in the survey reported this. 
Second, men in this community tend to leave home very early and return very late at 
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night even if they are unemployed. Even though the research team tried to reach the 
homes early as was advised by the members of the households, we could only reach so 
many. In each household where a potential respondent was absent at the time of the 
visit, the research team visited the household again three times after which they would 
be replaced if still absent. Nonetheless, stark gender differentials in survey response for 
studies conducted among rural populations have been noted in Kenya [26]. 
 
Nonetheless, the potential bias as a result of the gender imbalance is substantially 
reduced given that men in this area tended to disassociate with health and facility 
issues, as will be shown later. This ‘intentioned absenteeism’ from matters of health 
(for instance not wanting to be seen to be taking a sick child to the hospital for fear of 
being seen as less manly or being controlled by the wife), is one of the major cultural 
practices undermining the performance of accountability mechanisms and health 
services delivery in the area. It was not uncommon for women to know a lot about 
health facility issues given that they were expected to carry out the role of ensuring the 
wellness of their families and thus, by default, act as the main links between the 
household and the health facility. 
 
The majority of the respondents (34.2%) were aged 16-24 years reflecting the Kenyan 
demographic structure. There was no significant variation in age groups across the 
sites even though FC had a higher proportion (37.9%) of respondents aged 16-24 years, 
a 3.7 percentage points difference compared to the all the clusters combined. There 
was no significant difference in age structure between men and women. Of the 
individuals that responded to the survey, 68.3% were in a marital relationship, 27.8% 
reported to have never married, and 3.9% were separated, divorced or widowed. A 
larger percentage of women (70.8%), were in a marital relationship compared to only 
(63.9%) of men. The mean household size was 6.16 persons with the modal household 
size being 5. This household size is slightly higher than the national average of 4.6 
persons for rural areas according to the latest government survey [176], perhaps 
reflecting the tendency for early marriages or low education levels for the females as 
shown in the survey data. Household sizes ranged from 1 (n=8) to 20 (n=1). 
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Education levels were generally high for a rural area with 58.6% having primary 
education or less, 33.8% secondary education, and 7.7% post-secondary education. 
There was no significant variation in education levels across the clusters, except in the 
cluster around FD, where those who had completed some primary school education or 
less stood at 65.6%, about 7% points above the level for all clusters. In order to validate 
reported levels of education, literacy levels were investigated and the results (87.6% 
being able to read a simple sentence in Swahili and English) are in tandem with the 
education levels reported, and with the national literacy average of 85 – 87%.12 
However, there was a significant variation among the genders with a higher percentage 
of males (43.4%), having achieved some secondary education compared to only 28.2% 
of females. The majority of females seem to drop out at primary level, perhaps due to 
early marriage, or because the families in this area, like in many parts of Kenya, still 
prefer to educate the boy child due to cultural reasons. 
 
Agriculture (small scale farming, commercial farming) was the most common 
occupation practiced by 62.3% of respondents in all the four cluster areas. Students 
constituted 14.4%. Income levels were generally low with more than half (54.3%) 
reporting a monthly income of KES 2,000 or less (approximately £ 15)13 translating to a 
daily income of less than a dollar. Income inequality was evident between the genders 
though less significantly so. 18.6% of men were in the highest income category (KES 
5001>) compared to only 14.7% of women, while 52.8% of men compared to 55.1% of 
women were in the lowest income category of KES 2000 or less. There was not much 
variation across the clusters. Given this data (low income levels, general high poverty 
rates, and general income inequality), an effort was made to understand how this 
interacts with aspects of accountability (such as user fee payment and management, 
user satisfaction with accountability mechanisms) in this area and the results are 
reported here and in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
12 To assess reported education levels and because one might have expected a stronger relationship 
between education and literacy on the one hand, and knowledge and use of accountability mechanisms 
on the other, respondent were asked whether they could read a letter written in Swahili and English. 
The answers were verified by asking the respondents to read simple short sentences previously used in 
the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey. These sentences were 1. The child is reading a book. 2. 
Farming is hard work. 3. Parents should care for their children. 4. The rains were heavy this year.  
13 At the time of the study GBP 1 = KES 135 based on http://www.xe.com/ rates. This rate is used 
throughout the thesis, but income categories are quoted in KES.  
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4.3 An Overview of Accountability Mechanisms in the Study Area 
There were four main accountability and engagement platforms linking households to 
the health system. These can be grouped into two main categories - facility specific 
and non-facility specific. Facility specific mechanisms were the Health Facility 
Committee (HFC), Facility Service Charter (SC), Patient Rights Charter (PRC) and the 
Suggestion Box (SB). Only FC had a SB (Figure 4.5), while a PRC was present only in FB 
(Figure 4.6) and therefore, the two mechanisms were dropped from the main survey. 
The non-facility specific mechanisms included the Baraza (an administrative forum 
convened by the local administration, usually the chief’s office to discuss development, 
law and order issues), and the local administration (Chief and Village Elders).14 These 
mechanisms are described below in detail. 
 
4.3.1 Health Facility Committees (HFCs) 
Composition  
The characteristics of the HFCs in all the four facilities surveyed are summarised in 
Table 4.2. All the HFCs can be described as hybrid in composition and structure [128] 
given that they are embedded in the health system structure and supported by various 
government policies yet they draw their membership from both traditional and 
government bodies. There were no major differences in composition; all the HFCs 
surveyed were homogenous in make-up. They drew their members from four main 
sources:  
1) Community representatives (either elected by the community or selected to 
represent special interests). In most cases the community representatives were five 
in total although the number was not constant. In all the committees a distinction 
                                                 
14 All the mechanisms described here, though sometimes operating at distinct levels and serving certain 
distinct roles were inextricably linked to the HFC. The service charter is put up at the HF by the HFC 
and is essentially a platform facilitating interaction between the HFC and the community on one hand 
and the health centre on the other. The Chief or his deputy are members of the HFC by virtue of their 
posts in the community. The office of the area Chief convenes the Baraza. The Baraza, though initially a 
law and order forum, has evolved over time to take up a more developmental face and as such, health 
and HF issues are only but part of the larger agenda dealt with at the meetings. The idea (of 
incorporating the local administration into the HFC) apart from serving as a political tool for control, is 
driven by the Kenyan government integrated approach to development where each sector is expected to 
feed into the work of the other ostensibly to avoid duplication of roles. This study was interested in 
mechanisms that had a direct role in linking households to the health system and whose impact could 
be measured. As such the Office of the Chief and the Baraza will only be used as explanatory variables 
since they are linked to HFC and do not have any defined role directly touching on the HF except 
through the HFC. Nonetheless, a description of each is provided in this chapter to provide a context for 
the following analysis.  
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was made for gender/women representatives who were two in total for each HFC. 
It was not clear whether the women representatives would still be picked even if in 
an election, two female community representatives were chosen. In all the 
committees, the chairperson and the treasurer were selected from the community 
members though none were female.  
2) Government administrative representatives (mainly the local Chief/Assistant Chief 
representing the local administration and considered as ex-officio members of the 
HFCs).  
3) Health workers represented by the FI who also served as committee secretary, the 
Public Health Officer (PHO) and in some committees the facility clerk in charge of 
facility finances  
4) Area councillor serving as an ex-officio member  
 
In general, the HFCs had nine members (five community representatives, two HWs, 
and two ex-officio members). However, depending on the facility, the number could be 
bigger given that some HFCs co-opted more health workers, such as the Nursing 
Officer In-charge, to serve as the need arose. 
 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Facility Committees (n = 4) 
Health Facility  FA FB FC FD 
Mode (all 
HFCs)  
Committee characteristics  
     
Number of community HFC members 5 5 5 5 5 
Number of community female HFC members  2 2 2 2 2 
Number of HWs in the HFC 3 2 2 4 2 
Number of community HFC members trained in facility 
management and financing  
2 3 3 3 3 
Number of HWs HFC members trained in facility management 
and financing 
1 2 2 2 2 
HFC tenure (years)  3 3 3 3 3 
Number of HFC meetings held in the last quarter  2 2 1 3 2 
Number of community HFC members present in last meeting  5 5 5 4 5 
Source: In-depth interviews with Facility In-charge (FI) and selected members of HFCs and reviews of 
HFC minutes  
 
Committee Selection  
Although official guidelines from the MOH required that the community elect HFC 
members from the community, this was not always the case. From the IDIs with HFC 
members across the four facilities, it was unclear whether the community elected 
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committee members or if they were handpicked to join the committees as accounts 
differed. For instance, a female member of the committee for FB reported that she was 
handpicked by the Chairman to join the committee and that this decision is often 
based on how active one is seen to be in the community:  
I was chosen by the Chairman to join the committee; they look at how active you 
are, before and after you join the committee. When they [referring to the 
Chairman and the local Chief] feel you are inactive, they drop you and pick 
someone else to join them (Female HFC member, FB). 
 
The Chairman, on the other hand, offered a different account. He reported that 
villages, based on juxtaposition to the facility, selected HFC members who then met to 
elect from among themselves the committee officials (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and 
Treasurer): 
The proposal [of names for the committee] comes from the villages; we don’t 
actually interfere with that; it depends on their modes of selection either picking 
somebody and they say ok this particular person can represent us and once the 
committee members have been elected from this particular area [village] it will be 
the responsibility of those who have been selected to go and elect their officials. 
HFC Chairman, FB. 
 
Other committee members interviewed reported that they were elected in a Baraza 
summoned by the Chief for that purpose, although they could not categorically state 
when and how this was done and the accounts varied. In FC, the committee term was 
renewed by the DMOH in order to facilitate HSSF programme (it was a requirement by 
the Ministry of Health (MOH) that there be a functioning committee before any funds 
are sent to the facilities). It was only in Facilities FA and FD where the committee 
members were unanimous about their election by the community. 
 
Some committee members felt that the mode of selection did not result in getting the 
best people to run the facility since involving community members in voting did not 
necessarily result in a good committee. Some pointed out that the HF needed 
professionals who understood the operations of the facility and this could not be 
guaranteed when populist politics took centre stage and community members voted 
for people based of perceived friendliness: 
What I prefer myself is the government to have a nominating panel composed of 
MOH, area councilor, area MP who can then select the people based on 
professional background from within community unlike this system where the 
majority who are not organized as such end up electing people that have no idea 
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how the health system functions. I don’t think it’s the best system. HFC 
Treasurer, FA. 
 
The treasurer for FA cited his HFC as a case in point. He noted that the Chairman and 
the Councillor had personal differences because of populist politics and yet both owed 
their membership to the committee through an election process which he considered 
flawed in that it did not reward merit. He lamented that this mode of election resulted 
in people making their way into the committee by virtue of their other positions in the 
community (the Councillor here being an ex-officio member of the HFC by virtue of 
his political office and the Chairman because he was also the local teachers union 
representative making him popular): 
The [HFC] Chairman is temperamental but the Councilor is worse (laughter) … ok 
you see the current DMOH has no problem with him (the Councilor) but like the 
Chairman he is also very temperamental. The Chairman likes advocacy and is 
also involved in the community as the local teachers’ union representative 
because he is a teacher. Now committee meetings are sometimes chaos 
(laughing). So with the current system of elections we invite all manner of people 
and you end up with the most popular and not necessarily the best to run the 
facility [more laughter] (HFC Treasurer, FA). 
 
To understand the process from the service recipients’ point of view, respondents in 
the household survey were asked whether they knew how HFCs were selected. The 
descriptive results are presented in Table A4 column 4 (Appendix of Tables) and 
analytical results presented in Chapter 5. These factors are also explored in depth in 
the Discussion chapters especially the mode of committee selection as an important 
influence on its acceptability, perception and by extension its effectiveness. In all cases, 
committee tenure was three years and there was no limit as to how many terms one 
could serve in the committee, contrary to the provisions of the constitution governing 
HFCs (see Annex 2). 
 
Committee Members Training and Skills 
Most of the community committee members were professionals such as teachers or, 
practising nurses, while some were farmers. FB, for instance, had a university lecturer 
as Chairman, FA, had a professional qualified accountant (Kenya Certified Public 
Accountant – CPA (K) as its treasurer and a primary school head teacher as Chairman. 
FD had a retired teacher as Chairman while FC, had a retired telecommunications 
engineer as Chairman. The women representatives were also well-educated by local 
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standards – FA had a practising nurse, FB two teachers, one retired and one practising. 
This is in contrast to findings by studies elsewhere in Kenya [97] and SSA where low 
education level was highlighted as a major issue undermining HFC performance [79]. 
 
Although a good level of education for HFCs would seem to translate to a better 
functioning committee, data from the survey indicates that community members, 
especially the youth, were disenfranchised by the committee composition. Most of the 
young people and women complained that the committees were made up of elite or 
wazee [the elderly] in the society and were not representative of their voices. This 
highlights the tension between a desire to achieve representativeness and having the 
required skills to participate effectively in HFCs. Many reported that HFCs are either 
handpicked by the chief or area politicians to represent their interests or are elected at 
the Baraza where the youth have no voice or could easily be victimised or penalised if 
they spoke out. The use of the Baraza as the main medium of engaging the community 
is presented in chapter 5. 
 
Most of the executive committee members had some training in committee 
management and financing through a government initiative to finance HFs through 
the Health Sector Services Fund (HSSF) programme.15 As mentioned earlier, this 
programme was only beginning to be rolled out countrywide and by the time of the 
survey in April 2011 was only picking up. Prior to this programme there was no formal 
training for committee members, who relied on their everyday life skills to run the 
committees. All the committees reported to have at least two of the community 
representatives trained in committee management and financing which also involved 
staff who were members of the committees. Most committee members were happy 
with training noting that it helped them build skills especially on handling finances 
transparently: 
One thing we learnt is that if you want to do anything in the facility, you have to 
sit, plan, then you do a voting [allocate vote heads], then you withdraw money 
based on what you want to do. Initially, somehow we could say ok, we want to 
construct these things, we decide ourselves how much it would cost, we call a 
fundi (mason), we make an agreement we sign, and then we construct. But in the 
training we learnt we must sit together as a committee, prioritise and then tender 
the job publicly… (HFC Chairman, FC). 
                                                 
15 The HSSF is a programme that now funds health facilities in Kenya by directly transferring money to 
their accounts for general administrative use. 
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However, some HFC members reported feeling inadequately prepared to take on their 
roles in managing the HF especially when it required negotiating and engaging other 
third parties, including the community members. Some HFC members singled out 
fund raising and negotiating with the political class to support the HF, as areas of 
challenge, and for which they were not adequately prepared, since, it often resulted in 
programmes not being implemented when sufficient finances were not available. Yet, 
in such instances, the committee would bear the blame: 
I don’t think we are adequately prepared for our roles. You can see this in 
programme implementation. Most of the things we plan are not being 
implemented, not all of them are being implemented. I think it’s partly because we 
are not trained for this kind of work. For example, the sourcing of the funds is 
somehow cumbersome, every now and then we have to go to mheshimiwa [area 
MP] or run to the Councilor for any assistant and may be when we have that 
problem we cannot reach mheshimiwa, like this time round you cannot reach him 
because of these other things [referring to Kenya’s cases going on at the 
International Criminal Court] and maybe we have a need which needs to be solved 
and we are not able to reach him. In the end though, the committee takes the 
blame (Area Assistant Chief, Committee ex-officio member, FB). 
 
Other committee members even felt the three-day training was too short and not 
enough to cover everything that would enable them serve the community well. 
 
I think I should be trained, I should get more training, I feel inadequately prepared 
to perform my roles in the committee because there are some issues which am not 
conversant with, even this other training [HSSF training] in which assistant chief 
went to, was just for three days which I don’t think covers all the things which are 
supposed to be done (Area Chief, Committee ex-officio member, FA). 
 
HWs also felt that community HFC members needed to be trained on their roles in 
order to be effective. Some reported that because of the lack of understanding of roles 
among community HFC members, HWs ended up performing the roles they would 
ordinarily not play, leading to conflict in some cases. 
I think that each member of the committee should be trained on his/her role; I 
think they are not well trained on their roles. For example, when the HSSF was 
introduced, we have to pay these people - the suppliers through cheques, so when 
the goods are delivered you are supposed to sign the cheques. Now the signatories 
include the treasurer and the Chairman and for the two you have to go looking for 
each one as they do not understand their roles. So if it were possible if we could 
have members who are well trained and committed to their work (FI, for FA). 
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Committee Rules and Procedures  
None of the HFCs had a constitution outlining rules and codes of conduct regulating 
committee functions, nor were they aware of the existence of such a document, even 
though the MOH has prescribed one (see Annex 2).16 Although a general guide is 
provided by the MOH, ideally committees should have their own locally developed 
constitution to guide their operations. Such a document would also signify some level 
of independence, voice and accountability and would provide an enabling 
environment for an accountability relationship with their clients. Instead, all the HFCs 
depended on regular guidelines from the DMOH office and the MOH. 
 
At the time of the survey, there seemed to be regular interaction between the DMOH 
and the committees ostensibly because there were plans to roll out the HSSF 
programme countrywide. Moreover, the personal leadership style of the serving 
DMOH at the time, endeared him to the local communities. Committee meetings were 
fairly regular (quarterly) though there was a noticeable change in frequency between 
the time of the pilot (November 2010) and the time of survey (April –May 2011). 
Reviewed committee minutes revealed that all the committees now met monthly, a 
change that was attributed to the need to operationalize the HSSF programme and an 
increase in sitting allowance from about US$ 2.5 to US$ 6.25 per sitting provided for in 
the HSSF programme:17  
Before they [community HFC members] were saying there were no motivations 
but now it is a bit fairer because they can get some allowances from the HSSF 
money (FI, for FA). 
 
In most cases, committee minutes of the last meetings were available. The minutes 
also showed most of the meetings recorded full attendance after the HSSF was 
introduced, though initially, most HFC secretaries and the Chief’s being ex-officio 
                                                 
16 The research team was surprised when the PHO, also a member of the Committee, FB provided a copy 
of the HFC constitution developed by the MOH, yet she had admitted no knowledge of the existence of 
such a document despite the fact that it was in her custody. With further interrogation, she admitted 
she had never bothered to read it and had only stumbled upon it when she was asked to preside over a 
local dispensary committee election and was informed that the constitution is among the documents in 
her files by the DMOH’s office.  
17 HFCs sitting/meeting allowances are proposed by the committee members and sanctioned by the 
DMOH. Before the HSSF, committees received this money mainly from the user fees funds though two 
HFCs had income generating activities, which supplemented the user fee money. A review of committee 
minutes from two facilities revealed the committees are not adhering to MOH guidelines for committee 
allowances, drawing approximately £ 7.40 per meeting instead of the official £ 3.2.  
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members reported a general lack of seriousness among community HFC members 
mainly exhibited in absenteeism from meetings or lateness: 
There are times meetings are called and they [community HFC members] fail to 
turn up; that is an indication that they are tired and should be replaced (Area 
Chief, and HFC ex-officio member, FA). 
 
Even then, most HWs especially those in charge of the facilities reported a general lack 
of commitment from the community HFC members, mainly due to lack of motivation 
especially before the introduction of the HSSF, and also because this group of HFC 
members were busy with their own activities. In some cases, it meant that the HWs 
had to perform HFC roles adding to their already heavy schedule of work: 
Members of the committee like the treasurer, he is supposed to monitor the funds; 
that is his work, but you will rarely see him here, he is committed elsewhere so 
now his work is left to us (Facility In-charge, for FA). 
 
All the committees reported using short message service (SMS), phone calls and in 
some cases memos to summon meetings; an indication of the evolving role of mobile 
phones in the delivery of health services. Depending on the management style of the 
HFC Chairman, the duty of summoning meetings was the responsibility of the FI who 
also doubled as the committee secretary. The facility in-charge did this in consultation 
with the Chairman with whom they also agreed in advance on the meeting agenda. 
However, the practice varied from one committee to another. In FA, for instance, there 
was conflict between the facility in-charge and the Chairman and as such the 
committee had not held meetings as required. Instead the Chairman resorted to 
running committee issues with a few members of the committee and ignored the input 
of the facility in-charge. From the in-depth interview with the DMOH, this was not the 
first time; the DMOH had on several occasions stepped in to calm tensions between 
the Chairman, health workers, and local leaders. 
 
Meeting agendas were not communicated in advance to HFC members; a fact the 
study investigated in order to understand how this affected the process and quality of 
decision-making. Many HFC members agreed that accessing the meeting agenda in 
advance would help them prepare well, for instance by consulting the community on 
the matters to be discussed and thus getting their views. They did not feel, however, 
that the HFC roles were onerous and that most of the decisions required much initial 
thought. None of the HFCs reported prior consultations with the community on 
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matters of discussions at their meetings. In fact, some HFCs members viewed this as 
negating the spirit of accountability in that they have the authority to make these 
decisions on behalf of the community by virtue of their election. As such, they argued, 
it would make no sense to keep ‘consulting the community’ who were also not very 
responsive to meeting summons. 
 
Other HFC members however felt that having an agenda in advance was a good idea 
that they had been ignoring yet it had the potential to improve the level of 
engagement with the community and to get them to understand what is going on at 
the facility. Some attributed it to a system-wide weakness, characteristic of the health 
system in Kenya where there are two ministries handling health issues compared to 
education where there were clear rules and procedures governing the operations of the 
school board of governors and clear lines of accountability. To this group, because the 
MOH now had two ministries, complicated lines of accountability translated to weak 
systems of management and accountability at the health facility level. Some HFC 
members felt the current system of running health facilities did not tap into existing 
capacity, limited the room for manoeuvre and creativity and was prone to much 
control from the DMOH: 
We have the capacity but what is lacking is the structure; either we should be 
allowed to come up with our own structure like I know how the school board of 
governors looks like, the rules and regulations of governing schools so either the 
ministry should prepare a clear structure like in the ministry of education or allow 
the committee to come out with their own internal structures… I believe that in 
the nominations or elections you will find people who come into the committee 
but cannot talk or make any meaningful contribution (HFC Treasurer, FA). 
 
During meetings, the FI takes minutes, which were made available to the research 
team in all facilities. All the committees had a small executive committee made up of 
the Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer (and in one committee the Vice-Chairman) 
that met on an ad-hoc basis to handle urgent or minor issues that they deemed did not 
require full committee attention. The practice was then to report these 
issues/decisions at the full committee meeting and in some instances to seek approval 
for the decisions already taken. However, there was not a clear modus operandi that 
defined what is urgent and thus required executive committee meeting and what kind 
of decisions needed full committee approval. The practice varied from one committee 
to another mainly depending on the management style of the Chairmen. For instance, 
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in FA, committee members reported that the Chairman tended to be rash and to act 
on his own with a few selected committee members when it seemed convenient. 
Similar experiences were reported in FB, where the woman representative felt that the 
Chairman and the Treasurer often made decisions unilaterally without involving other 
members of the committee yet they [other committee members) would do nothing 
about it as the centre of power seems to lie with the two: 
There are the some leaders like the Treasurer and the Chairman who decide when 
they need us and when they don’t need us, they make decisions themselves, and in 
such cases what can I possibly do? Once they’ve made the decisions, we just 
accept them as committee decisions (Female HFC member, FB). 
 
In FC, the committee and the community seem to have immense trust in the FI 
allowing him to make most of the day to day facility decisions with little consultation 
with the committee, while in FD the Chairman worked hand-in-hand with the FI and 
in many cases spent most of his time at the facility. All these leadership styles had a 
direct impact on the functioning of the committee and how the community viewed the 
committee; elements that are discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. None of the HFCs 
had sub-committees for addressing specific issues, an indication that the smaller group 
of the executive run most of the activities and only involved the larger committee as 
they viewed fit. All committees received a sitting allowance of about US$ 6.25 after the 
introduction of the HSSF and US$ 2.5 before, except the HFC for FD, which reported 
receiving US$ 12.6. None reported receiving any other benefits though some HWs in 
some facilities reported that they at times provide free services to committee members 
and their families. Figure 4.7 is a picture of a committee meeting (consent received to 
use picture for this purpose). 
 
Committee Roles and Powers 
As mentioned in the methods chapter, this study was interested in understanding the 
roles and functions of the members of the HFCs as they viewed them and to take into 
consideration contextual issues that informed their performance as ‘role holders’. The 
study was thus designed such that the HFCs’ performance is assessed taking into 
consideration what these HFCs thought and saw as their roles without necessarily 
using a benchmark developed elsewhere. Attention was paid to the official roles and 
powers as provided by the MOH (see Table 4.2). The measures evaluated in later 
chapters were developed in the pilot, during which, four HFC members (the Chairmen 
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and FIs) from two facilities were interviewed about their roles and functions including 
their powers. The information was corroborated by in-depth discussions with the 
DMOH. 
 
Table 4.2: Roles and Powers of Health Facility Committees 
Committee Roles  Committee Powers  
1. To oversee the general operations and 
management of the health facility; 
 
2. To advise the community on matters 
related to the promotion of health services; 
 
3. To represent and articulate community 
interests on matters pertaining to health in 
local development forums; 
 
4. To facilitate a feedback process to the 
community pertaining to the operations and 
management of the health facility; 
 
5. To implement community decisions 
pertaining to their own health; 
 
6. To mobilise community resources towards 
the development of health services within 
the area. 
1. The committee shall have the authority to 
raise funds from within itself, the community 
or from donors and other well-wishers for the 
purpose of financing the operations and 
maintenance of the facility; 
 
2. The committee shall have the authority to 
hire and fire subordinate staff employed by 
itself in the health facility; 
 
3. The committee shall oversee the 
development and expansion and maintenance 
of the physical facilities within their 
respective area. 
Source [177]. 
In general, HFC members from the four study sites saw themselves more as HF 
managers in charge of overseeing HF operations, together with the HWs, rather than 
as representatives of the community voice in the HF. Some of them did not understand 
their roles beyond being ‘members of the HFC’. The majority emphasised the 
development of the HF as their main function, i.e. that the committee existed to help 
with fund raising in order to improve the outlook of the HF. The Chairpersons were 
particularly outspoken about this, and could mention the development projects 
(mainly physical) they had initiated to improve service delivery at the HF: 
As a chair, mine is to ensure there is progress and development in the facility; 
there should not be a stand still. We have to fundraise so that we develop this 
place because government alone cannot come and do all these things, so mine is 
to persuade the leaders, the MP, Councillors, and NGOs so that they can come in, 
they do projects. Currently we need staff quarters and wards so that’s the role of 
the Chairman to see that we engage the leaders so that we can fund the facility 
and move ahead. That’s my interest as a chair, to see that there is progress in the 
facility (HFC Chairman, FC). 
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Some HFC members saw their relationship with the community not as one of mutual 
cooperation and accountability when it came to their roles and powers, but rather one 
of ‘aid providers’ or ‘favour’ only accountable to the DMOH and at a certain level the 
local politicians. This perhaps explains why none of the HFCs had formal structures for 
consulting with the community except through the Chief’s Baraza and why none of 
them felt it was necessary to gather community views in a structured way before 
making decisions such as to which project to commit scarce facility resources. HFC 
members were asked to describe their roles and powers in specific situations. The data 
are summarised in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: Committee Roles in Selected Scenarios (n = 24, 8 HWs – 2 per facility, and 16 
Community HFC members - 4 per facility) 
 
Situation  Respondent No role 
to play 
Be 
consulted 
Make final 
decision 
Deciding how HFF are spent  HFC 0 2 14 
HW 2 2 4 
Setting user fees HFC 1 3 12 
  HW 0 4 4 
Deciding how user fees are spent  HFC 0 4 12 
  HW 0 4 4 
Handling disciplinary issues among staff  HFC 9 7 0 
  HW 7 1 0 
Employing new casual staff HFC 0 4 12 
  HW 0 4 4 
Employing new MOH staff HFC 16 0 0 
  HW 8 0 0 
Source: In-depth Interviews with HFC members and HWs  
HFC = Community HFC members, HW = Facility In-charge and PHO 
 
As shown in table 4.3, there was a general consensus on four issues across all the 
facilities: deciding how health facility funds are spent; setting user fees; deciding how 
user fees are spent; and, employing new casual staff. Even then, it was difficult to know 
who the exact decision maker was in each situation. For instance, in setting user fees, 
the majority of HFC members agreed that they relied heavily on the advice of the FI, 
who proposed the various charges taking into consideration the socio-economic 
circumstances of clients and the prevailing market conditions in the area including 
regularity of government drug supplies. The HFCs would then meet to sanction those 
proposals in consultations with the community and then pass the same on to the 
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DMOH for approval. Even though in most cases the DMOH would approve majority of 
the requests, that office also relied on the MOH for guidance. This is in spite of the 
government official 10/20 policy18 which the HFs are expected to adhere to and the 
HFC’s role in ensuring clients are not overcharged by health workers. 
 
Decisions on how to spend user fees and general other facility funds were also unclear. 
There was a consensus across the four facilities that the HFCs make the final decision 
on how these funds were spent, although in reality the practice varied. In FA, health 
workers and the committee ran parallel systems in which the staff held on to the user 
fees while the Chairman held on to the Drug Revolving Fund (DRF) generated from 
the facility community pharmacy mainly due to conflict and mistrust between the FI 
and the Chairman. The facility in-charge claimed that the Chair did not consult them 
when making decisions about the community pharmacy, which had been set-up to run 
in parallel with the facility pharmacy stocking government supplies, while the 
Chairman felt he needed a hands-on management of the community pharmacy given it 
was initiated through his personal efforts.  
 
In FB, the FI, though working in harmony with the HFC, made most of the decisions 
without consulting the HFC. The FI argued that many of the decisions required her 
skills as ‘a clinician and would therefore not be trusted to untrained HFC members’. In 
FC, there was mutual trust and HFCs members interviewed confirmed that they 
trusted the FI to make the right decisions about expenditures since he already enjoyed 
good relations with the community (see Box 1). 
                                                 
18 According to this policy, dispensaries and health centres are supposed to charge a maximum of KES 10 
(£ 0.07) and KES 20 (£0.14) respectively per visit irrespective of a patient’s condition. The policy was 
introduced during the SAPs described in Chapter 2, policies that were imposed on the government of 
Kenya as part of donor aid conditionalities. One of the key aims of the 10/20 policy was to show-up 
facility funds through cost sharing systems (the patient paying either KES 10 or KES 20, and the 
government providing the rest of the treatment costs). The assumption has been that these facilities 
only offer outpatient services, but experiences from this study area showed that in some cases the 
facilities were forced to admit critically ill patients reporting at night or who could not be immediately 
be transferred to the nearest referral hospital, Kericho District Hospital. 
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Box 1: Income Generating Activity – Facility Garden (FC) 
Compared to all the three facilities studied, FC had the smallest land size. But this did not seem 
to inhibit the facility committee from utilising the land. On arriving at this facility, I noticed a 
thriving garden with a variety of crops planted. During discussions with the Facility In-Charge, 
HWs and other HFC members, I am informed that the garden generates about KES 20,000 per 
month for the facility. This figure is reflected in the committee records and the facility account 
records. The management of the garden is in the hands of the FI, though from the look of things, 
the HWs have an equal say and take weekly rounds in managing the facility. The HFC Chairman 
confirms during an interview that they completely trust the FI to manage the garden and its 
income. This they argued was because the FI had kept them informed about every activity in the 
facility, accounted for the monies generated from the garden produce, and that they had never 
received any complaint from the community about him. The FI, in turn, delegates the 
responsibility to other HWs, who are required to account for how they used the money during 
the week they were in charge in monthly staff meetings. The income from the garden is spent 
mainly on staff meals, supplementing the drug revolving fund, general facility maintenance, and 
supplementing support staffs pay. From interviews and chats with HWs, the staff meals were 
singled out as a major boost for staff morale. From the DMOH, FC is one of his best performing 
facilities and tends to attract patients from facilities around it. The Chairman and the FI are quick 
to point out the harmonious working relations between the HFC, the HWs and the surrounding 
community; information that is supported by a majority of respondents in the survey.  
 
Community members interviewed as part of the survey reported about trusting their FI, with 
some noting that sometimes they would get well, or feel better ‘just by speaking to the FI’. Many 
of them also mentioned that the FI was attentive, listened to their problems, often offered waivers 
when they could not afford the cost of care, and was very accessible to the community generally. 
On comparing our notes after finishing surveying the cluster around FC, we noticed a pattern 
among women commenting that they preferred to deliver at this particular facility since, unlike 
other facilities, the FI handles them ‘with gentleness, listens to their needs, and can be trusted to 
act on complaints against particular staff’. In one instance, I met a HIV positive lady who had 
come for her regular dose of ARVs, who narrated how, on one occasion, one of the HWs had 
demanded pay before issuing her with the drugs. She then informed the FI, who ordered that she 
be issued with the medication and reprimanded the member of staff concerned in the presence of 
patients who were queuing. But all was not rosy. On investigating why the facility is squeezed 
into such small piece of land; the FI informed me that the Chairman, in collusion with a local 
council official, had fraudulently acquired part of the land where he subsequently established a 
thriving private school. He also mentioned that he tried to avoid confronting the Chairman over 
the issue to avoid antagonising the committee. Instead, he had chosen to use the local 
community elders to handle the matter. 
Source: Field notes  
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Financial issues were a major indicator of accountability relations not only between 
the HFC and HWs, but also with the households and the health system at large. Many 
HFC members felt they lacked the powers/authority to manage funds that came from 
the government as they came with vote-heads already assigned, meaning they had 
little manoeuvring space to realign these funds to local priorities if need be. They felt 
the important accountability element of authority and the responsibility that comes 
with it was clipped leaving them powerless yet the community expected so much from 
them. The HFC Chairman of FA, narrated how the facility had lost money, which they 
could not spend because the FI – who is one of the important facility bank account 
signatories - was transferred and due to government regulation, the unspent vote head 
was returned to the ministry, only for the transferred FI to collude with bank officials 
to withdraw all the money. On the other hand FGDs and survey data revealed a 
general dissatisfaction among community members who complained that user charges 
were often increased without involving them yet there was no corresponding 
improvement in service provided signified by regular drug stock-outs forcing patients 
to buy drugs from outside the facilities. These issues are considered in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Finally, there was consensus on the HFC employing and disciplining new casual staff. 
However they had no role in disciplining HWs employed by the government. This was 
a grey area in the role and function of HFC as a mechanism for accountability. It was 
clear that the HWs were not answerable to the HFC in any way, neither were there 
clear guidelines on the lines of accountability between the two groups: 
That is an area where there is a big weakness because we are not consulted when 
the HWs are being hired and even when they are deploying they don’t consult us 
as the committee and then the worst part of it when it comes to disciplining them 
we don’t have power over them. It is not clearly spelt out but I believe that should 
be the role of the committee but if you don’t have power what can you do? (HFC 
Treasurer, FA). 
 
As explored in Chapter 5, this lacuna left many community members lost as to whom 
they would approach in case of problems with health workers. Many respondents 
reported preferring to approach the politicians (mainly in the case of men), their 
family members or to shift to another facility, in most cases a local private clinic, 
entirely (mainly in the case of women). Many HFCs also felt that the government 
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needed to consult them whenever they wanted to transfer or employ new staff. This 
way, they argued, they would have a hand in holding the new staff accountable and 
also ensure services are uninterrupted due to unplanned transfers leaving clients 
unattended. In general, the cases presented in Table 4.3 pointed to the mismatch 
between the committees’ ‘theoretical’ roles as prescribed by the government (Table 
4.2), and how the committees operated in practice, highlighting the challenges and 
dilemmas that these committees face in trying to be accountable the government 
(upward accountability) and to the community (downward accountability). 
 
4.3.2 Committee Influence on Service Delivery 
Interviews with HFC members produced varied opinion on the impact HFCs were 
having on service delivery. In general, committee members across the four clusters felt 
that they were making an impact in two broad areas: leading facility infrastructural 
development (identifying and planning for projects to fill gaps in key areas of need, 
fundraising and project management); health promotion (mobilising the community 
to seek care from the local facilities, challenging traditional cultural practices that 
undermined the health and wellness of the population, and mobilising the community 
to attend health talks and outreaches). For instance, in FB, HFC members reported on 
an exclusive breast-feeding seminar they had attended after which they mounted a 
campaign to enlighten the community about the benefits of exclusive breast-feeding: 
In January we had some seminar on exclusive breast-feeding; when community 
HFC members came back from the seminar they went to various villages and 
disseminate the information on breast-feeding. Mothers from the villages were 
encouraged to visit the facility where they were trained, so there was some 
awareness on exclusive breast feeding, information that most of the women did 
not possess previously (Area Assistant Chief and HFC member, FB). 
 
Experiences also varied from one HFC to another with facilities where there seemed to 
be harmony between the community committee members and the HWs (Facilities FC 
& FD), reporting significant support for primary care, while facilities where there was 
disharmony between the two groups (mainly FA), reporting that the wrangling indeed 
hampered service delivery. For instance, in FC, the committee had made tremendous 
progress in fundraising through local income generating projects such as converting a 
once idle piece of land into a fruit and vegetable farm. In order to bring the community 
on-board, the HFC built a sense of community ownership around the project by 
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employing members of the community to run the farm. Money generated from this 
project and other funds raised were used to expand the maternity wing in the facility 
for deliveries and overnight stays in the case of complications. The Chairman 
explained thus: 
When I joined this place as a treasurer, we managed to call for a Harambee 
[fundraiser], to complete the outpatient block. Now it is complete. We also 
wanted this place to look clean, so we bought a mowing machine because initially, 
there were cattle that were grazing here, but we decided to lock them out and 
bought a mowing machine, thereby improving hygiene around the facility. Also, 
this garden [showing the research team the garden], we are supposed to construct 
a patient ward there, but because it is still idle, we decided to do some gardening 
so we can get some money monthly – vegetables, fruits, so that when we sell from 
it, we can boost the money coming from service charge. We can then pay the 
support staff. We also sought government permission to ensure we have a 
laboratory here because patients were suffering a lot, having to go to 
neighbouring facilities. So these are some of the major achievements of the 
committee. 
 
In FA, health workers were forthright with their comments about community HFC 
members arguing that the committee members were often too busy with their own 
personal businesses and hardly performed their roles at the facility. Ultimately, this 
meant, in some cases, that the HWs would take on more administrative 
responsibilities, thus reducing their time with patients. 
 
The Facility In-charge at FA further stated that it was inconceivable that the 
committee should have any impact on service delivery when in the first place they did 
not understand their roles and were not using the facility altogether: 
I think also that each member of the committee should be trained on his/her role I 
think they are not well trained on their roles. I doubt [that they influence service 
delivery] because you see some of our community committee members, we have 
ARVs now and the HIV clinic but instead of mobilizing the community members 
to come and take their services here, they themselves [the committee members] 
do not use the facility, I don’t think they help much. 
 
However, further investigations in the survey revealed that it was not just the 
community HFC members who were avoiding this facility as male members of the 
community were too. This was because the facility had recently received a young 
female clinician as the FI, and the male members found it unacceptable to be seen by 
her. Interviews revealed that the community did not consider a female to be a ‘doctor’ 
as they considered female HWs to be nurses. Most community members also reported 
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that they would have preferred a clinician from outside the community for 
confidentiality purposes. When the research team visited this facility, there was 
obvious tension since we had arranged to interview the Chairman and the FI the same 
day. During our interview with the Chairman, he often referred to the FI as ‘that 
woman’. 
 
4.4 Service Charter 
The second major mechanism providing a platform for interaction between the clients 
and the health system is the Facility service charter (SC). According to interviews with 
the DMOH, the SC should ideally be placed in a clearly visible place, in most cases at 
the entrance of the facility. It should be clearly written in visible, legible and client 
friendly language (for this study area, a Swahili and Kipsigis translation should be 
available) and it should be updated regularly to reflect any changes in the facility. 
Additionally, it should contain the names of committee members and where 
appropriate their phone numbers to enable accessibility by the community whenever 
they require help from the HFC. The SC should also contain basic financial 
information like the costs of various services for different categories of patients, the 
waiting times, facility operation hours and other relevant health information. 
Interviews with the MOH officials also indicated that the HFC should commit to 
provide basic facility income and expenditure information as part of their SC.  
 
These ideals are captured in the government’s open data policy and reflected in several 
legal and policy documents, particularly the community strategy and the guidelines for 
managing HFs [29, 31-33, 177, 178]. The SCs from the four study sites are provided in 
Figures 4.1 – 4.4. It is clear that they fail to meet the basic minimum requirements. 
Each facility had varying information and a different location for the SC. However 
there were some similarities in the SC across all the facilities. These included mainly 
information about the type of service offered (consultations, lab tests, drugs available), 
the attendant costs, and the facility working hours. In addition to these, FB had a 
patients’ rights charter as part of its SC, though the print was very small in size and 
pasted somewhere near the consultation room entrance (Figure 4.6). 
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Across all the facilities, the information provided on the SC was fragmented, 
incomplete, selective, and in some cases incomprehensible to the users. 
 
To understand whether this accountability mechanism was relevant/useful to clients, 
respondents were asked whether they had seen the SC, and if they had, whether they 
had read it, and whether they found the information on the SC to be useful in light of 
their everyday experience with care at their local facility. The outcome variable was 
coded into four categories (1 = Very useful, 2 = useful, 3 = less useful, and 4 not useful), 
and recorded into two categories (0 = Not useful, 1 = useful) for purposes of analysis. 
There were varied views about the usefulness of the SC among the community and 
HFC members, variations that were investigated through a univariate and bivariate 
analysis (Table A3, Annex of Tables) and multivariate logistical regression analysis 
(Table 4.4) and qualitative interviews. 
 
Variables that were significantly associated with the perception of SC usefulness 
following bivariate analysis were: respondents’ cluster facility (p value < .001), 
occupation (p value < .001), income (p value <.001), marital status (p value < .001), 
whether one was given drugs at the facility after paying user charges (p value < .001), 
and whether a user was required to buy additional drugs from outside the facility after 
paying (p value < .001). Gender was non-significant. However, despite a higher 
percentage of women (65.8%) compared to men (63.2%) reporting to have seen the SC 
in their local facility, a higher percentage of men (86%) had read the information on 
the SC, compared to 82.8% of women. There were no major variations across the age 
groups, though a significantly lower proportion (49.7%) of those aged 45 and above 
had seen the SC compared to the other three age categories that reported 66% and 
above. 
 
Similarly, significant differences were noticeable among those reporting to have read 
the information on the SC among the age groups (60.8% for those aged 45 and above 
compared to over 87% for each of the other age categories). Noticeably, a higher 
proportion (66.9%) of those who had been charged more than the HFC set KES 50 (£ 
0.37) on their last visit to their facility had also seen the SC. This is in comparison to 
58.8% of those who were charged the HFC set amount. The same findings were seen 
among those who had read the SC (84.6% for those who were charged more than KES 
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50 and 74% for those who were charged KES 50 or less), meaning that users were still 
overcharged even though they had read the information on the SC. 
 
Table 4.4 : Multivariate Logistical Regression for Determinants of Perceived Service 
Charter ‘Usefulness’ (N = 498)  
Variables  
Useful vs. Not Useful 
Odds Ratio 95% C.I. 
Cluster Facility (Ref = FD) 
  
FA 6.36*** [2.70 - 15.00] 
FB 4.30*** [2.01 - 9.18] 
FC 1.18 [0.54 - 2.58] 
Gender (Ref = Female) 
  
Male  1.13 [0.62 - 2.05] 
Age (Ref = 17 - 24 Years) 
  
25 - 34 Years  1.04 [0.39 - 2.77] 
35 - 44 Years  1.10 [0.44 - 2.72] 
45 and above 1.19 [0.46 - 3.03] 
Occupation (Ref = Agriculture) 
  
Skilled Labour  1.37 [0.62 - 3.05] 
Unskilled Labour  0.24** [0.10 - 0.59] 
Student 0.77 [0.21 - 2.80] 
Income (Ref = KES ≥ 5,001  
  
KES ≤ 2,000 6.32*** [2.82 - 14.15] 
KES 2,001 - 5,000 1.11 [0.53 - 2.32] 
Ill Household Members (Ref = Over 5) 
  
Under 5 1.17 [0.65 -2.12] 
Education (Ref = Post-Secondary)  
  
Primary of less 0.81 [0.27 - 2.43] 
Secondary  1.02 [0.35 - 2.93] 
Marital Status (Ref = Not in a Marital relations) 
  
Married  0.63 [0.26 - 1.51] 
Given Drugs at HF (Ref = No) 
  
Yes 3.85* [1.03 - 14.43] 
Required to buy drugs outside facility (Ref = No) 
  
Yes 0.47** [0.27 - 0.83] 
Given Receipt (Ref = No) 
  
Yes 1.78 [0.94 - 3.36] 
User fee Charged (Ref = KES > 50) 
  
KES 50 or less 1.81 [0.58 - 5.68] 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Source: Household Survey April - May 2011 
 
Table 4.4 shows multivariate analysis results for determinants of perceived usefulness 
of SC, with ‘not useful’ being the base outcome, - that is, those who found the SC 
‘useful’ are being compared to those who found it ‘not useful’.  The estimates presented 
for each variable are adjusted, controlling for all other variables in the model. Holding 
all else constant, respondents using FA and FB had significantly higher odds of finding 
their SC useful (OR 6.36; p value <.001, OR 4.30; p value <.001) respectively. Those in 
unskilled labour were significantly less likely to find the SC useful (OR 0.24; p value 
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<.01) compared to those in agriculture. Individuals in the lower income category of 
KES 2000 or less had significantly higher odds (OR 6.32; p value <.001) of finding the 
SC useful compared to those in the income category of KES 5001 or more. Holding all 
else constant, users who had received drugs at the facility had significantly higher odds 
(OR 3.85; p value <.05) of finding the SC useful compared to those who did not get 
medicine at the facility. Conversely, users who were required to buy additional 
medicine outside the facility had significantly lower odds (OR 0.47; p value <.01) 
compared to those not required to purchase additional medicine. Gender, age, 
education, marital status, whether one was given a receipt, and user fee charged, were 
not associated with perceived SC usefulness. 
 
The quantitative results were investigated further during in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions (FGDs) to gain a deeper understanding of the process issues that 
influenced users’ perception of SC usefulness. Users who found SC useful reported that 
it gave them a voice given they could query the HWs if they were charged more than 
what was indicated on the SC: 
It’s good because when you go to the doctor they will tell you pay KES 200 [£1.48], 
but you can ask them ‘why doctor? Isn’t the fee indicated not more KES 150 [£1.11], 
you shouldn’t ask for KES 200 from me (Female respondent, FA). 
Others felt it was useful in providing general information and preparing them when 
they visit the facility, because they would know how much to bring with them to the 
facility, apart from knowing what services were offered at the facility. This, to some 
respondents, signified a level of transparency on the side of the facility management as 
implied in the following quotes from users: 
Now people know the amount of money they should pay and that it depends on 
the type of service or medical tests required; its transparency, you know 
sometimes you go to the chemistry to get malaria drugs when they are supposed 
to be free. The doctor may ask for say KES 400 [£ 2.96]. In this case you can just 
report with the book, and inform them ‘I don’t have the money, haven’t they been 
broadcasting through the radio that malaria treatment services should be free or 
TB free? (Male respondent, FA). 
It’s good because nowadays it is a form of transparency; again it makes people 
aware of what is being done here (male respondent, FD). 
Yes, there is a difference, if there is no information displayed, you would not know 
how much you will pay, but if you see it on the notice board, if they overcharge, 
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you tell them ‘no, let’s go and check the notice board, why are you overcharging 
and yet here you have indicated a lesser figure? (Male respondent, FC). 
Interviews with some HWs at of the facilities confirmed this line of thought: 
They [users] find it useful because at times somebody can come and complain 
that he or she has been overcharged … there was a time I was on leave, and a 
patient called me to complain that they had been overcharged. I asked how he 
knew he had been overcharged and by how much. After some time he called again 
to say he had confirmed the charges on the service charter and that indeed he was 
charged the right amount as indicated on the service charter, so I think it is very 
useful tool (FI for FA). 
 
The most contentious issue arising on the SC was the user fees charged, accounting for 
the facility finances, and waiting and opening times. A spot check on the facilities 
showed that none adhered to its own user fee policy despite having its committee 
setting those charges over and above the official government policy of 10/20. It was not 
uncommon for clients to be charged more than what was stipulated on the SC. All 
facilities HFCs had set a uniform fee of KES 50 (£ 0.37) for outpatient services. In some 
cases, patients were forced to pay for services across all the counters they visited for 
instance at the registration desk, consultation desk, facility chemistry, and at the 
laboratory. Results for user fee charges as a measure of accountability are presented in 
Chapter 5. This led some patients to doubt the usefulness of the SC pointing out that 
the HWs hardly adhered to the provisions of the SC since they continued to 
overcharge despite the amounts being shown on the on the SC. They felt helpless and 
could not question HWs for fear of retribution or being denied service: 
You know the doctor says pay this much, as he wishes, yea? Will you argue with 
the doctor? He says, pay this, you pay… how can you ask (With an expression of 
shock on his face)? If the doctor says, he wants you to pay this small amount of 
money, how can you ask what the money is for and I want to get better? All I want 
is to get better (Male respondent, FB). 
 
You know if you ask such questions you will be seen as kimbelembele [naughty], 
but even if you ask you won’t be told. They will ‘mark’ you if you insist on such 
questions (Participant, Youth FDG, FB). 
 
Other respondents also questioned why this form of transparency was one-sided, in 
that the SC showed what people should pay yet no facility displayed the information 
on how the money collected was spent: 
Why is it that we are only shown on notice what we are supposed to pay but once 
paid they do not put up notice showing how it was spent? (Participant, Youth 
FDG, FB). 
 89 
 
But other respondents were cautious about displaying certain information on notice 
boards, especially financial information, a line of thought that was very much 
supported by the HWs: 
You know you cannot expose such things, there are things you would not display; 
there are things you have to put in secret, such as money details (Participant, 
Male adults FGD, FD). 
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The first objective of the thesis is to describe the range of existing health system 
accountability (HSA) mechanisms supporting primary care services in the study area. 
This chapter has identified the HFCs and the Facility Service Charters (SCs) as the 
main mechanisms supporting HSA in study area. Several points can be picked from the 
findings on the HFCs: 
 An inherent gender imbalance within the committees having positions reserved for 
‘women representatives’ and how this affects decision making and ‘voice’ 
representation within the committees. It was confirmed that female members of 
some committees did not have much say on what was going on in the committees, 
given that they owed their positions to the Chairman and the local administration. 
 
 Power and trust within the committee and how this impacts on decision-making 
processes – how meetings are conducted, where the true committee decision 
making power lies, and how those who hold this power try to incorporate 
community voices into their decision-making. 
 
 HFC members training and skills are important factors influencing both the 
perceived and real impact of the committees from the role-holders’ point of view. 
 
 Though most committee members saw their role as overall managers of the 
committees, a position supported by the government, it was not clear whether 
committee members understood clearly what this meant and in many cases, they 
acted in a manner that gave meaning to what they saw as their roles given the 
health system milieu within which they operate. 
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 There is inherent tension between the need to have committed and skilled 
members on the committee and the desire for representativeness, even from the 
committee members themselves. 
 
These issues are pursued further in the next chapter but from the clients’ point of view, 
providing an important triangulation intersection. 
 
On the SCs, there were several similarities across all the facilities; these included 
information about the type of services offered (consultations, laboratory tests, drugs 
available), the user fee charged for each service, and the facility working hours. User 
perception of SC usefulness varied depending on one’s occupation, cluster facility, 
income, and whether a facility provided drugs or not after user fee payment. Some 
respondents reported that the SC provided them with a useful platform to challenge 
perceived ‘acts of corruption’ and was therefore an important tool for ensuring 
accountability at the facility. The SC was also seen by some users as having useful 
information that ensures that they do not waste time when they visit the facility, 
including finding the right amount of money for specific services before they reported 
for treatment. Therefore, the SC was an important tool for planning one’s medical 
budget and as a signifier of transparency at the facility. 
 
The next results chapter (Chapter 5) explores how these two accountability 
mechanisms interact to support care from the users’ perspective. Given the SC is a 
function of the HFC, and, like the Baraza, is used by the HFC to engage the facility 
users, the SC is incorporated in the analysis as a predictor variable on user awareness 
of HFCs. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMMITTEE- COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The second objective of the thesis is to analyse the impact of health systems 
accountability (HSA) mechanisms – in this case the HFC - on service delivery. As 
specified in the conceptual framework, the impact of HSA on health care delivery 
arises from the interaction of the key stakeholders making up the mechanisms, i.e. the 
HFC, the MOH represented by the DMOH and the local administration, and the 
community – referred to in the conceptual framework as inter-mechanism relations. 
This chapter analyses the impact of HFCs building on the description of the range, 
nature and composition provided in Chapter 4. 
 
A preliminary step in any analysis of the impact of the HFC is to understand the depth 
of engagement between the HFC and their clients. Therefore Section 5.2 addresses this 
based on three main outcome measures: users’ awareness of the existence of HFCs; 
users’ knowledge of the committee members (not necessarily by name); and users’ 
knowledge of the HFC’s selection criteria and roles. The underlying hypothesis is that 
an effective HFC should be well known among community members who depend on it 
to resolve any facility related issues. Therefore, the assessment is based primarily on 
evidence from the household survey on individual reported knowledge of the HFC, 
supplemented with evidence from qualitative interviews with HFCs members on their 
interaction with the community. Analysis of the depth of engagement is completed by 
the use of multivariate logistical regression to identify the determinants of user 
awareness of their local HFC. 
 
The next step in Section 5.3 takes the analysis further by assessing HFC responsiveness 
to users’ needs and priorities. This is done based on four main outcome measures: the 
nature and type of communication between the HFCs and the users; whether the HFCs 
involve users in decision-making and priority setting; how the HFCs handle equity 
issues and financial accountability; and users’ engagement of the HFC to resolve any 
HF problems. As described in the introduction and literature review chapters, 
accountability is not a linear process; indeed this thesis takes the view that 
accountability within the health system is a complex social process that is facilitated or 
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hindered by everyday stakeholder relations. It is about relationships in which ‘actors’ 
negotiate and apply themselves in a manner as to enhance their positions. One 
straightforward method to evaluate its impact would be to ask each stakeholder 
whether they think the other party is having any impact on HF performance. However, 
this can be misleading. A different approach was used instead, where users were asked 
who they would approach to help resolve a HF issue and who would be their first point 
of call in dealing with facility issues. A key hypothesis is that an effective HFC should 
integrate users’ perspectives into its planning process in order to capture user’s needs 
and enhance responsiveness. 
 
The assessment of HFCs’ responsiveness in Section 5.3 is completed by an analysis of 
the main factors that influence the choice of accountability mechanism or authority to 
approach, by users in resolving problems at the facility. The section therefore identifies 
the main process issues that influence the performance and impact of accountability 
mechanisms in the study area. It is important to note that the four ‘accountability 
markers’ identified are not mutually exclusive, and given that accountability is a 
complex social process, these four process influencers permeate almost every aspect of 
every day accountability relations in this area. 
 
Section 5.4 brings together the analysis by considering the effectiveness of HFCs based 
on the availability of drugs at the facility and user satisfaction and experiences during 
their visit to the facility. The availability of drugs, especially after one had paid the 
requisite user charges, is used here as an outcome measure, since it was identified as 
one of the key indicators of effectiveness during the pilot study. The analysis is 
therefore based on whether an individual got drugs from the facility, and or, whether 
they were required to buy additional treatment items/drugs from outside the facility 
after paying the requisite user charges. 
 
The section is concluded by a multivariate logistic regression analysis to identify the 
determinants of user satisfaction with the service(s) one received during one’s last visit 
to the facility based on two outcome variables: ‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’. This is based 
on the hypothesis that an effective HFC would ensure user satisfaction with services at 
the HF. An important element of the analysis in this section is the consideration of 
user satisfaction through the lens of user-identified elements of accountability (receipt 
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issuance, drug availability, awareness of HFC among others), in addition to selected 
socio-demographic characteristics already identified as being significantly associated 
with user satisfaction through bivariate analysis. The analysis is complemented by 
qualitative data drawn from FGDs and IDIs. 
 
The chapter is completed with a summary in Section 5.5 setting the stage for a 
discussion of the results in light of available literature and contextual data from the 
field. 
 
5.2 Depth of Engagement 
As shown in the literature review, to distinguish the depth of community-committee 
engagement, a distinction can be between simple information giving to communities 
at one end of the spectrum, through consultation, to community influence and control 
at the other end [71, 72, 179]. In many cases, the creation of opportunities for 
consultation does not in itself lead to community influence and control; there could be 
an element of ‘manipulation’ or ‘tokenism’ in initiatives. Therefore issues of legitimacy, 
representation and health system– community relations are important [71, 72, 78, 79], 
and are thus analysed in this section. 
 
5.2.1 Committees Awareness among Survey Respondents  
More than half of respondents (55%) reported being aware of the existence of a HFC in 
their area. There was a significant, though not a strong association between the 
knowledge of existence of a HFC and the associated cluster facility (health facility to 
which one received care). Respondents who used facilities FB, FC, and FD were 
significantly more likely to know about the existence of a HFC in those facilities 
(58.2%, 56.6%, and 57.8% respectively), compared to those attached to FA (47.3%). The 
majority of the respondents cited lack of involvement in the election of the HFCs, 
along with the general aspects of HF management, as the main reason why they did 
not know about the HFC. Other reasons cited were distance (that they reside far away 
from the HF and were thus unlikely to know when the elections were taking place), a 
general lack of information when the HFC was being set-up, and a general lack of a 
proper forum to discuss HF issues. As one person stated: 
Because my place is very far from here, if I were here I would know a lot (Male 
respondent, FA). 
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While others had never bothered with issues of the HF or the HFC because of their 
daily commitments elsewhere: 
All along I have been busy with work; you know you get busy at work until some 
things you don’t even bother to ask (Female respondent, FC). 
 
During FGDs, respondents, irrespective of gender or age drew parallels between the 
management of the HF and the local schools.19 The majority felt that the latter were 
more inclusive, had proper structures for engaging the community and were generally 
responsive to their needs. Comparing the school system with the health system, 
participants in a female FGD at FA noted: 
In the selection of the school’s committee we get more involved… (Participant 1, 
Female FGD, FA). 
 
And we really get to talk… (Participant 2, female FGD, FA). 
 
They send our children home to call us for the committee selection… (Participant 
5, female FGD, FA). 
 
But with the HFC, we do not even know who they are; we are not involved in their 
selection (Participant 1, Female FGD, FA). 
 
Qualitative interviews showed that many felt they were systematically ignored in the 
election/formation of the HFC, though there was some marked different between the 
age groups:  
You know we are living in a world whereby people like me [women] do not qualify 
to join committees because they normally choose Wazees [old people], the retired 
people (Female high school teacher, FC). 
 
These views were also particularly expressed by young people (16 – 24 year olds) 
exhibiting a general lack of awareness about the existence of a HFC. This group felt 
that the forum where the HFC are selected – the Baraza - was unfriendly to them. They 
viewed the Baraza as ‘elders’ or ‘an adult club’ exclusively to be attended by the 
parents, and which had lost taste and favour among the young, apart from being seen 
as a historical system of local governance. 
                                                 
19 The respondents easily drew comparison between the HFCs and the school management boards. It is 
misleading to assume the two are generally comparable given the differences mainly in structure: unlike 
the HFCs, school boards in Kenya are generally well-remunerated because of substantial resources 
including direct government funding; parents tend to interact with the schools more frequently as 
opposed to the HF where one visits only when one is ill. There was also a general feeling among 
respondents that health and HFs are a domain of the professional HWs, that they would add very little 
given they are not knowledgeable on issues of health. Surprisingly, it is this kind of feeling that 
accountability and engagement in the health system is meant to eliminate.   
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Quantitative data from the survey confirmed some of these views. Bivariate analysis 
showed that age, occupation, distance from the facility, income levels, and marital 
status were all significantly associated with knowledge of HFCs (p value <.001). 
Younger respondents (16 – 24 year olds) were less likely to know about the existence of 
HFCs (40.7%) compared to their elderly counterparts aged 35-44 years (68.8%) and 
those aged 45 and above at 66.5%. Awareness of HFCs seemed to rise with age, 
underscoring the views expressed during qualitative interviews that this society tends 
to entrust areas of responsibility to the elderly in society. Youths reported that they 
were not expected to take up active roles in community matters such as the HFC, areas 
that were seen as the domain of parents. Besides societal norms, ideals and 
expectations, it was important to investigate further what other factors played a role in 
influencing awareness of HFCs in this community, taking into consideration the 
context. The results of this investigation are presented in Section 5.5 below where key 
drivers of accountability are identified. 
 
That said, a similar pattern was noted in social-economic status. A higher proportion 
(68.9%) of respondents on an estimated monthly income level of KES 5,000 knew 
about the existence of the HFC, unlike those in the monthly income bracket of KES 
2,000 or less (only 49.4%). Variations in income levels and knowledge of HFCs could 
be an indication of inequality when it comes to who is selected to join the HFC. As 
described in chapter 4, members of HFC in the study area were fairly well-educated 
and well-off according to local standards. If indeed the community is involved in 
selecting HFC members then this reflects the broader Kenyan political system where 
the rich, irrespective of their education levels, tend to be given leadership roles in 
elective posts; an indication of the role of money in elective politics. If the opposite is 
true, i.e. community members are not involved in the selection of HFC, then one 
would question whose interests the HFC are representing and whether they are just an 
embodiment of elite interests. These issues are investigated further under the main 
reasons for using a given accountability authority for redress in Section 5.3.5. 
 
The difference in awareness of the HFC was even more pronounced in the category of 
occupation, with a lower proportion of students (29.3%) reporting knowledge of the 
existence of HFCs compared to those in skilled employment (65%) and agriculture 
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(58.9%). Even among those in gainful economic activities, the >6 percentage point 
difference between those in agriculture and those in skilled employment is still 
significant. 
 
The distance to the facility was significantly associated with HFC awareness. A lower 
proportion (44%) of those residing > 3 kilometres from the facility, knew about the 
existence a HFC compared to 57.7% residing within 3 kilometres (p value <0.001). This 
could be mainly because they would be expected to have less interaction with the HF 
or due to the high poverty levels, not being able to afford transport to a Baraza where 
HFC issues are discussed. The association between gender and knowledge of HFCs 
existence was insignificant, though a higher percentage of men (58.8%) knew about 
the existence of HFC compared to 52.8% women. However, marital status was 
significantly (p value <0.001) associated with HFC knowledge. Those in a current 
marital relationship (61.6%) were more likely to know about HFCs compared to 38.2% 
among those never married and 57.5% among those who were either separated or 
divorced. 
 
A surprising finding was that user fee charges levels, education completed and the 
level of satisfaction with service received when a patient last visited a HF were not 
significantly associated with knowledge of HFC. Given the level of poverty in this area 
(with over 83% reporting a monthly income level below KES 5,000)20, and given the 
evidence gathered in qualitative interviews which showed that women particularly felt 
overwhelmed by the user charges mainly due to non-adherence to user fee policies, 
one would expect that these issues would drive any associations with knowledge of 
HFCs. Again, all these findings are subjected to further analysis and the results are 
presented in later sections of this chapter. 
 
5.2.2 User Knowledge of a Member of the Health Facility Committee 
A second measure of depth of engagement between the HFC and the community that 
the study investigated was whether the respondent knew a member of the HFC (not 
necessarily by name). The responses from the qualitative interviews were not very 
different from those cited for not knowing about the existence of the HFC. Many 
respondents reported that besides never having been invited to the election meetings, 
                                                 
20 Approximately less than US$ 72 per month, at an exchange rate of US$1 = KES 70 at the time of survey 
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no meetings had been held to introduce the HFC members to the community. This 
was quite a common response among those reporting awareness of the HFC: 
I have heard about them but I have never seen their faces, I don’t know who they 
are. They are people who are managing this institution but I don’t know them 
(Male respondent, FC). 
 
However, other users felt that they would only know the HFC if there was something 
wrong going on at the facility. This was particular among FC users, which was 
considered a good performer by the DMOH and had received positive comments from 
users. In this facility, the FI had developed a good rapport with the community who 
reported that they trusted him. According to these respondents, this trust translated to 
good working relations with the HFC whose impact they were seeing in how the 
facility was being managed. As such, they did not bother to query much about what 
was going on at the facility: 
Maybe it’s because I have not cared to ask, you know kibaya chajitembeza [a 
Swahili saying loosely translated in this context to mean where there is smoke 
there is fire and it would be difficult to hide such] if they were doing wrong things, 
it could be easy to know as it would spread quickly, but there is no need for us to 
query more when you are seeing work here is organised. It depends on the 
management (Female respondent, FC). 
A significant number of users also reported that the HFC members were distant from 
them, that the HFC was composed of ‘who-is-who’ in the community, and that the 
committee was almost exclusively selected by the local elite. This group of respondents 
also felt that if they asked more about the health facility issues and committee 
operations, it would be seen as ‘bad politics’ or ‘sowing strife’ thus instilling fear in 
them: 
I know there are health facility committees, but I haven’t asked about one for this 
hospital specifically, I haven’t spoken to them either. I fear...because they would 
say its ‘fitina’, [discord or bad politics]; people would say you are going to tell the 
committee ‘fitina ya hospitali’ [you are bringing bad politics into the health 
facility]. Now we fear (Male respondent, FA). 
These issues were investigated further in the survey and the results are summarised in 
Table A4 Appendix of Tables, largely confirming the data from qualitative interviews. 
The question was administered to 55% or 560 respondents who had reported 
knowledge of the existence of the HFC in their area. The factors that were significantly 
associated with knowledge of a member of the HFC included the nearest HF, Baraza 
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attendance, gender, age, income and education. Respondents from FB were more likely 
to know a member of their HFC (63.7%), compared to those in Facilities FA (57.9%), 
FD (54.7%) and FC (42.1%). Community members who had attended a Baraza (60.9%) 
in the last six months were more likely to know a member of their HFC, unlike those 
who had not (50%) representing more than ten percentage points’ difference. 
 
The variation was even more pronounced among the genders, with more men (67%) 
likely to know a member of the area HFC than women (46.5%); a massive >20 
percentage points’ difference. This is not surprising given that the majority of women 
reported not to have regularly attended Barazas, the main forum where HFC issues 
were often discussed and decided upon. Just like in the knowledge of existence of HFC, 
respondents aged 35 and above were more likely to know a member of their local HFC 
as opposed to their younger counterparts aged 16 – 24 years. These differences are also 
reflected in income, where those reporting a monthly income of more than KES 5,000 
were more likely to know a member of their HFC (69.9%), compared to those in the 
lower income bracket (KES 2000 or less a month) at 45.4%; and in education levels 
where those with post-secondary education are more likely to know a member of the 
their HFC (63.8%) as opposed to those with primary education or less at 48.8%. 
 
5.2.3 Users’ Knowledge of Committee Roles and Selection Process  
Committee Selection 
Of the 560 individuals reporting knowledge of the existence of a HFC in their area, 
only 105 (18.8%) knew how the HFCs were selected (see Figure 5.1). Awareness of HFC 
selection was significantly higher among respondents using FA (35.5%) compared to 
FB, FC and FD (16.4%, 11.7% and 14.2% respectively). A large majority (64.8%, n=68) of 
those who knew how the committee was selected reported ‘election by community 
members’ as the method of selection, and the rest ‘other’ (defined as nomination by 
special groups e.g. churches, selected by local administration, selected by DMOH). 
Committee selection methods also differed significantly across the four sites with 
79.1% (n=34) of respondents from FA reporting that the community elected their 
committee compared with 71.4% in FD, 70.6% in FC and only 29.2% in FB; a pattern 
that was confirmed in IDIs with HFC members. 
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There was also a significant variation in the knowledge of HFC selection among the 
age groups, gender and Baraza attendance. Knowledge of HFC selection increased with 
age. Those aged 45 years and above were more likely to know how the HFC is selected 
(27%) compared to their younger counterparts aged 16 – 24 years (10.6%). Baraza 
attendance was significantly associated with knowledge of HFC selection; of those who 
reported knowing how the HFC was selected, 23.9% had been to a Baraza compared to 
15.2% who had not. Being male was also significantly associated with knowledge about 
HFC selection; 27.5% of men reported knowing how the HFC was selected compared to 
only 13.2% among the women; a 14.3 percentage points’ difference. Again, education 
was surprisingly not associated with knowledge of HFC selection, as was occupation 
and reason for choice of HF and provider. Marital status and income levels were 
marginally associated with knowledge of HFC selection. 
 
Committee Roles 
Data from the household survey confirmed the consensus among HFC members that 
they were in charge of general facility management as described in chapter 4. Figure 
5.2 show that a larger percentage of respondents (87.3%) mentioned managing the HF 
as the main role of HFCs. However, a significant proportion of respondents (23.5%) 
also reported that the HFC should ensure the HWs performed their duties as well as 
ensuring there is a supply of drugs and being in charge of facility funds. Surprisingly, 
Elected by 
community 
members 
65%
Nominated by 
special groups
10%
Selected by local 
administration 
(Chief/VE)
10%
Selected by 
DMOH
10%
Others (specify)
5%
Figure 5.1: Committee Selection Criteria According to Survey       
Respondents (n = 105)
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
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only 9.6% reported that the HFC represented community interests at the facility. This 
also confirms the findings from the group and individual interviews, where some 
respondents expressed disappointment that the HFCs rarely advocated for patient 
interests. Instead, the HFCs chose to ignore respondents’ complaints about issues such 
as HWs being rude to users or drug shortages. It is however important to recall that 
few HFCs ever saw themselves as representatives of the community. This might also be 
an indication of varying perceptions and understanding of accountability between the 
various stakeholders in the health system. 
 
 
 
5.2.4 Determinants of User Awareness of Health Facility Committees 
Table 5.2 shows adjusted multivariate analysis results for determinants of HFC 
awareness with ‘Unaware’ as the base outcome – that is, those ‘Aware’ of the HFC are 
being compared with those who are ‘Unaware’. The odds of being aware of the HFC 
tended to increase with age, education, and income, although non-significant results 
were observed for income category KES 2001 – 5000. Compared to students, those in 
agriculture, skilled, and unskilled labour, had significantly greater odds of being aware 
of their facility HFC (OR 2.88; 95% CI, 1.30-6.41, OR 2.97; 95% CI 1.23-7.19, and OR 6.22; 
95% CI, 2.08-18.4), respectively. Similarly, those clustered around facilities FB, FC, and 
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40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
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Committee Roles
Figure 5.2: Committee Roles According to Survey Respondents (N = 
308 in each case)
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
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FD, had greater odds of being aware of their HFCs compared to those in FA. Gender 
and marital status returned non-significant results. 
 
Table 5.1: Multivariate Logistic Regression Model for Determinants of ‘HFC Awareness’  
Indicators 
Aware Vs Unaware  
Odds Ratio 95% C.I. 
Socio-Demographic Indicators      
Gender (Reference Male)     
Female  1.23 [0.74 – 2.03] 
Age (Reference 16 -24 years)     
25 - 34 years  1.99* [1.11 – 3.56] 
35 - 44 years  2.56** [1.31 – 4.97] 
45 and above  2.74* [1.15 – 6.53] 
Education (Reference Primary or less)     
Secondary  1.92** [1.20 – 3.09] 
Post- Secondary 3.45** [1.42 – 8.39] 
Monthly Income (Reference KES up to 2000)     
KES 2001 - 5000 1.18 [0.69 – 2.02] 
KES 5001 and above 2.29* [1.13 – 4.66] 
Occupation (Reference Students)     
Agriculture  2.88** [1.30 – 6.41] 
Skilled Labour 2.97* [1.23 – 7.19] 
Unskilled labour  6.22*** [2.08 – 18.54] 
Marital Status (Reference Married)     
Not in a Marital relations  1.23 [0.66 – 2.27] 
Cluster HF (Reference FA)     
FB 2.87*** [1.55 – 5.32] 
FC 2.26* [1.15 – 4.45] 
FD 1.82* [1.01 – 3.26] 
Health & Morbidity Data      
Distance to facility (Reference 3Km or less)     
> 3Km 0.51* [0.29 - 0.96] 
Don’t Know  0.33 [0.07 – 3.05] 
Age of Ill HH Member (Reference Under 5 years)     
Over 5 years  0.90 [0.58 - 1.42] 
Given Drugs at HF (Reference Yes)     
No  0.34 [0.10 – 1.23] 
Required to buy drugs outside facility (Reference No)     
Yes  1.77* [1.13 – 2.77] 
HSA Indicators      
Given Receipt (Reference No)     
Yes  0.91 [0.58 - 1.43] 
Have attended a Baraza (Reference No)     
Yes  2.64*** [1.57 – 4.40] 
SC Usefulness (Reference Not Useful)     
Useful 1.46 [0.80 – 2.68] 
User fee Charged (Reference KES 50 or less)     
KES >50 2.63* [1.18 - 5.86] 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Data Source: Household Survey April - May 2011 
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As would be expected, those living more than 3 Km from their facility were 49% less 
likely to be aware of the HFC, compared to those living within a radius of 3 Km or less. 
 
The quality of care as indicated by whether one was required to buy drugs from 
outside the facility was also a significant determinant of HFC awareness among users. 
Users who were required to buy drugs outside the facility after paying the requisite 
user fees had higher odds of knowing about their HFC (OR 1.77: p value <. 05), 
compared to those who were not. 
 
Individuals who had been to a Baraza had higher odds of knowing about the HFC (OR 
2.64; p value < .001), compared to those who had not. Holding all else constant, 
individuals who were charged more than the HFC set amount of KES 50 had higher 
odds of knowing about the HFC (OR 2.63; p value < .05), compared to those who were 
charged the requisite KES 50, or less. Although those who found the service charter 
useful had greater odds of being aware of their local HFC compared to those who did 
not, the results were non-significant. Surprisingly, the odds of being aware of the local 
HFC reduced (insignificantly so) for those facilities that issued receipts compared to 
those that did not, despite this variable emerging as significant in the qualitative data. 
 
5.3 Responsiveness 
Arguably, HSA should move beyond user involvement to requiring the health system 
to be responsive to the issues raised through participation. Responsiveness thus results 
from changes made to the health system on the basis of ideas or concerns raised by, or 
with, users through formally introduced decision-making mechanisms [79]. This 
section considers to what extent responsiveness was achieved in the study area. 
 
5.3.1 Committee - Communication Processes 
As discussed in Chapter 2, communication is an important element of accountability in 
any setting. Communication is also a two way process, rather than simply about 
disseminating messages and instructions. From the interviews with HFC members, it 
emerged that the HFCs rely on both formal and informal mechanisms to engage the 
community. The main formal mechanism for reaching the community was through the 
Baraza.21 Other formal methods included health promotion/outreach forums, and in 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of a Baraza.  
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some cases school and CBO meetings. Informally, the HFCs mentioned that they 
interact with the community almost on a daily, individual basis given they are 
members of the same community and relied on the information spreading from one 
household to the next: 
We rely on this technique – ‘reach one, teach one’. For example if you teach me 
something then I meet a friend of mine, I tell him the same thing that is of 
importance to the community.  By the end of the week or by the end of the day we 
shall have reached many people. We also use the headmasters of the school and 
that particular information goes down to the grass roots. Otherwise we mainly 
rely on the Baraza (HFC Chairman, FB). 
 
Apart from the Baraza, male HFC members also mentioned using local daily 
gatherings in market centres or at local drinking dens where they gather any 
information about the HF, while the female HFC members mentioned local women 
group development forums (merry-go-rounds) and other informal settings to reach the 
wider community: 
When we have Barazas is when we meet the community and maybe there are 
some meetings let’s say Mary-go-rounds or chamas22, we [women] visit each other 
say when a woman delivers, after one week we go to that home, take tea and gift 
the new born. We then talk about HF issues among other development issues that 
affect us (Female HFC member, FB). 
 
It emerged from the pilot that while the HFCs felt that they were doing a lot, they were 
either failing to communicate their activities/successes to the community or the 
methods they were using were not effective. All the HFCs depended on the Baraza as 
their main method of communication with the community. The study thus 
investigated this medium of interaction between the HFCs and the community to 
understand what factors influenced these interactions and to gain a deeper 
understanding of the depth of engagement between the HFCs and the community. 
 
In order to understand how the Baraza support HSA, the study looked at its awareness 
among households. Respondents were asked whether they had ever been to a Baraza, 
and if yes, whether any health facility issue was discussed at the last Baraza they 
attended. Only 32.2% (n = 329) of the respondents (N = 1019) had been to a Baraza in 
the last six months. There was no significant difference across the four 
clusters/facilities. However, there was a significant association between Baraza 
                                                 
22 Small women groups where individuals pool together resources and lend to each other  
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attendance and gender; attendance among men was significantly higher (52%) 
compared to among women (21%). In fact, of the 329 who had attended a Baraza, 
58.7% were men and 41.3% were women. A similar pattern was noted with age, 
occupation, income levels, the main reason for choice of treatment provider, and one’s 
marital status. Conversely, the main reason for choice of HF for treatment, education 
level completed, and estimated distance to nearest HF was not associated with Baraza 
attendance. These data are presented in Table A5 Appendix of Tables. Qualitative 
interviews with those who had attended a Baraza confirmed that health and health 
facility issues were indeed discussed and that the forum was used as a platform for 
health promotion: 
They [at the Baraza] talked about toilets, malaria, and use of ITNS, spraying of 
the houses; they told us this [referring to FA] is the nearest facility with so many 
services being offered. They also they talked of VCT, malaria, clinics, and to the 
mothers talked to majority of whom were old (Male respondent, FA). 
Perhaps underscoring the issues of fear particularly among the youths, some 
respondents reported that community leaders tried to dissuade them from this line of 
thought and to build some confidence and trust that as government officials, they are 
there to help: 
They advised community members to observe hygiene at home by using clean 
items for their daily activities. They also encouraged people not to fear them 
thinking as government workers, they are there to arrest them. That they should 
not hide from the government officials because they may be of help but if they 
hide, that will not be possible (Male respondent, FC). 
 
Survey data showed that 58.4% of those who had attended a Baraza concurred (see 
Figure 5.3) that a health facility issue was discussed at the last Baraza they attended. 
The issues mentioned ranged from HWs’ behaviour, drug shortage at HF, disease 
prevention and care (mainly malaria, TB, HIV and AIDS), general facility development 
and health promotion. Qualitative FGDs and IDIs revealed that the Baraza was not an 
effective mode of communication between the health system and the households. 
Community members mentioned several frustrations with the Baraza, especially the 
way it was summoned and conducted. HWs also felt that in certain circumstances, the 
Baraza was being used as a platform to wage war against the HF, rather than help 
restore its reputation. 
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Some HWs narrated incidences where area leaders or some community members, who 
were unhappy with services at the HF, were reported to use the Baraza to castigate 
HWs and criticise the services offered in the HF, thereby discouraging the community 
from using the facility. These incidences were reported mainly in FA and FB; facilities 
that were seen not to be performing well. IDIs with HWs revealed that such incidences 
were demoralising to staff who felt they were unappreciated even though they worked 
so hard with such limited resources to serve the community. When asked what the 
main challenges to the functioning of the HFC and the HF were, the FI, at FB, 
reported: 
When people go to a Baraza, they talk negatively about us, you know it 
demoralizes our work very much… may be you go for a break, and when they go 
out there, they say when you go to the hospital, you don’t get service and may be 
that patient has just arrived and had not waited for that long anyway. You see 
when they just go talking, claiming that a HW stayed in break for 1 hour and it is 
a lie, it demoralizes us a lot (FI, for FB). 
 
Survey respondents also complained that the Baraza was not helping people to know 
about the on-goings at the HF and was not inclusive. The youths were particularly 
vocal about being excluded from discussions at the Baraza as the conversation in a 
group discussion with youths at FB below illustrates: 
Facilitator: And the Chief or councillor? Can’t they address such issues [HFC 
members being exclusively selected and unknown to respondents] 
during the Baraza? 
Res 1: They don’t mention such things... 
Res 2: They do not. They talk of other agendas, other issues  
Res 1: in fact we have not heard of Barazas 
58.4%
34.0%
7.6%
Figure 5.3: Users reporting that a health/heath facility 
issue was discussed at a Baraza (n = 329) 
Yes
No
Cannot Remember
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
Was any health or 
health facility issue
discussed at the last 
Baraza you attended?
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Res 2: I attended a Baraza sometime back 
Res 3: Baraza was spoilt by the Nyayo regime [referring to former 
government],  
Facilitator: How? 
Res 1: Because they are not open to everyone, 
Res 4: people hate the chief 
Res 2: it [Baraza] belongs to the old men, so what they decide is final. Do 
you think we youth should be attending such meetings? 
Res 1: No it’s not open for every one 
Facilitator: But why are youth not attending the Baraza? 
Res 4: We go, but we do not get a chance to be heard 
Facilitator: why? This is a major issue that we need to discuss openly, why are 
we not given a chance at the Baraza? 
Res 1: the old men [village elders] get all the time to speak and say what 
they want to say, when they are done the chief says one woman to 
speak then one man. There is usually no chance for the youth 
Facilitator: Do they mention the youth? 
Res 1: No, unless if you are somehow rich… 
 
5.3.2 Involvement of Users in Decision-making and Priority Setting 
Two indicators were used to assess user involvement in decision-making and priority 
setting – user fees setting and priority setting. The study investigated what users 
viewed as the priority or main problems at the facility. Results are summarised in 
Table 5.2. Of the 1,019 individuals included in the survey, 82.9% could identify main 
problems they felt affected their care experience at the facility, while 17.1% either did 
not see any problem or could not identify any. Respondents identified three main 
problems that they felt should be the main priority for the HFC to deal with: drug 
shortage or stock outs (59.9%), few or inadequate human resources especially qualified 
clinicians/nurses (43.8%), and inappropriate/bad HW behaviour (15.4%).  
 
Interestingly, though overcharging/high costs of care were identified as a major issue; 
it did not rank among the urgent or significant issues. The data does not compare well 
with HF priorities as defined by the HFCs. IDIs and document reviews reveal that most 
facilities considered inadequate funds, shortage of HWs, and long queues as the major 
problems and thus their priority. Only the HFC for FD identified drug shortage as a 
major issue forming a priority for the committee. HW behaviour was not mentioned by 
any of the HFCs as a major problem; neither did HFCs consider overcharging and/or a 
lack of waivers for the vulnerable groups as a problem. In essence, priorities and 
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perceptions of what should be the HF priorities for the two accountability stakeholders 
were mismatched, except for the case of shortage or few qualified HWs. 
 
Table 5.2: Health Facility Priority Problem Areas According to Community Members (% of 
individuals who think a given issue is a major problem per facility)  
  FA FB FC FD Total  
N 225 209 171 240 845 
Drug Shortage  167 
(74.2%)** 
135 
(64.6%) 
58 
(33.9%)*** 
146 
(60.8%) 
506 
(59.9%) 
Shortage of HWs 99 
(44%)* 
54 
(25.8%)* 
62 
(36.3%) 
79 
(32.9%) 
294 
(34.8%) 
Bad HWs behaviour  25 
(11.1%) 
28 
(13.4%) 
30 
(17.5%) 
47 
(19.6%) 
130 
(15.4%) 
Overcharging/ 
High costs of care 
15 
(6.7%) 
7 
(3.4%)** 
21 
(12.3%) 
32 
(13.3%)* 
75 
(8.9%) 
Health Facility 
Mismanagement  
19 
(8.4%) 
15 
(7.2%) 
9 
(5.3%) 
19 
(7.9%) 
62 
(7.3%) 
Short opening hours  4 
(1.8%)** 
25 
(12%)** 
12 
(7%) 
14 
(5.8%) 
55 
(6.5%) 
Long Queues/  
Waiting time  
7 
(3.1%) 
7 
(3.3%) 
12 
(7%) 
26 
(10.8%)** 
52 
(6.2%) 
Inadequate maternity 
facilities  
3 
(1.3%)* 
15 
(7.2%) 
13 
(7.6%) 
10 
(4.2%) 
41 
(4.9%) 
Poor referral facilities  10 
(4.4%) 
14 
(6.7%)* 
3 
(1.8%) 
6 
(2.5%) 
33 
(3.9%) 
Poor lab services  6 
(2.7%) 
6 
(2.9%) 
4 
(2.3%) 
9 
(3.8%) 
25 
(3%) 
Inadequate health 
facility funds 
3 
(1.3%) 
4 
(1.9%) 
4 
(2.3%) 
2 
(0.8%) 
13 
(1.5%) 
*Significant difference between facilities (chi2 test, ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05) 
Source: Household Survey April – May 2011 
 
On deciding/setting user fees, qualitative data revealed that the community was not 
involved and that this was done almost exclusively by the HFCs. Most of the 
community members interviewed expressed surprise when asked whether they were 
consulted when the fees were decided or whether they knew who set/decided on how 
much they were charged for the services they received at the facility. Of all survey 
respondents only 15.8% (161) reported to know who decides the user fee at the HF and 
of the 161 respondents only 1 person said the community decides (this has been 
grouped under ‘other’) and only 6 (or 0.6%) reported that they have been consulted 
when the user fees were being set. As shown in Figure 5.4, 44.1% reported that the FI 
determined the user fees with only 16.1% reporting that the fees were determined by 
the HFC, further showing the grey area around who exactly is the decision maker on 
this important aspect of accountability in the health system. 
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These claims were collaborated by data from the IDIs with HFCs members: 
The committee decides on how much is charged at the facility. After receiving 
proposals from the facility in-charge, we sit down as a committee and agree on set 
figures and forward them to the DMOH for approval (HFC Chairman, FC). 
 
It [setting user fee charges] is done by the committee… we are being help by those 
running this place on a day-today basis - the facility in-charge - they give us some 
figures we discuss, then we agree on the limits (HFC Chairman, FD). 
 
5.3.3 Role of Committee in Achieving Equity and Financial Accountability 
User Fees Charges and Fee Waivers 
Financial accountability emerged at the centre of discussions around HSA and was the 
most referred to dimension of accountability by all the stakeholders interviewed. 
Because the HFCs are directly in charge of the overall management of the HF, 
including setting user fees, managing drug revolving funds, and protecting the most 
vulnerable and poor from exorbitant care costs, this study investigated how the HFCs 
performed on these indicators but with respect to what the local populations identified 
as important. The main indicators were: the involvement of the community in setting 
and using user fees (described in chapter 4 and in section sub-section 5.3.2 above), user 
fees adherence, the availability of exemption schemes or waivers for the most 
vulnerable groups (defined as pregnant women, the poor and children under 5), and 
finally accounting for facility funds to the community. 
44.1%
16.1%
28.6%
8.7%
4.5%
Facility In-
Charge
HFC HWs Government Other
Figure 5.4: Authority that decides User Fees According to Survey 
Respondents (n=161) 
Authority
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011 
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The most important aspect of equity to a majority of the community seemed to be user 
fee adherence and the availability or lack of exemption schemes for the vulnerable 
members of the community. Both survey and document review data reveal that none 
of the facilities adhered to their user fee policy as set out by the HFC on the facility SC, 
neither did they have any proper exemption schemes in place for those who could not 
afford the charges. Of the 954 respondents23 who had used their local facility in the last 
6 months, 97.5% or 930 paid for the services they received at the HF. Figure 5.5 shows 
the amount paid by patients at their last visit to the facility in percentages. There was a 
significant association between the fee category charged and the HFs (p value =< .001). 
FA had the highest rate of non-adherence to user fee policy with 97.5% of respondents 
who visited the facility being charged more than the stipulated KES 50, followed by FD 
(96.6%), then FC (89%) and lastly FB which had the best user fee adherence with 81.7% 
reporting to have been overcharged. 
 
 
 
Across all the clusters, users reported a ‘no-money no-service’ policy. Many users 
complained that government facilities were now being run like private clinics: 
                                                 
23 Excludes 65 individuals: 35 who had no reported cases of illness in the last 6 months, and 30 (5 sought no 
treatment, 23 self-medication, and 5 faith healing) who used other providers for treatment  
2.5%
18.3%
11%
3.4%
40.3%
55%
35.9%
23.9%
41.1%
18.3%
42.2%
64.1%
16.1%
8.3%
11%
8.5%
FA FB FC FD
Facility
Figure 5.5: Percentage User fee Charges Across all Facilities (n=930) 
KES ≤ 50 KES 50 - 100 KES 101 - 500 KES ≥ 501 
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011 
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They [HWs] asked me whether I had money and I told them I didn’t have. Then 
they informed me ‘no money, no service’ (Male respondent, who had gone for an 
anti-tetanus jab, FA). 
You know even if I go to the district hospital, I must still pay, I think it’s become a 
tradition in public hospitals, you have to pay; we have come to know these public 
hospitals like private clinics or pharmacies where you pay and you just leave 
without asking what the money is for; if you are unable to pay you leave the drugs 
and go your way; you know the human tendency is that if you are inquisitive you 
are answered back rudely (Female respondent, FA). 
While many respondents reported awareness of the government’s cost-sharing policy, 
many decried a ‘money-first culture’ at public facilities that they expected to cushion 
them from ill health if they could not afford the cost of care (see Box 2). But most 
worrying was the fact that the HWs in many instances denied the most vulnerable 
groups - expectant mothers requiring delivery, under 5s, and the poorest – services 
when they could not afford them. In two Facilities (FB and FD), the research team 
encountered two families that had lost their loved ones due to postpartum 
haemorrhage because the HWs reportedly denied them service without advance 
payment (see Box 2). In Facilities FA and FB, the HWs were reported to demand 
advance payment before helping with the deliveries retorting that ‘they were not paid 
to work at night’, while in FD, the HWs refused to attend to the women because it was 
late in the night and they were ‘tired’. 
 
In all the cases, the women lost their lives due to postpartum haemorrhage and the 
community turned their anger at the HFC and the HWs: 
We lost a mother here, but she did not pass away here, she died at the district 
hospital. I was not there because it was at night. I was informed there was a delay 
in attending to her and in referring her to the district hospital. That mother had a 
problem of excessive bleeding during her previous deliveries and was informed not 
to deliver in a small hospital like this. It was unfortunate for all of us; we were all 
sorry about it. After that a Baraza was held and the blame came to us that the 
management was poor, that we didn’t care…. Community members were warned 
that ‘there is negligence in that hospital, don’t go there to deliver your child, you 
will be neglected’ … such like things… now you see not only that particular staff 
got demoralized but everyone in the hospital (FI, for FB). 
 
You cannot take your wife to deliver in that hospital, unless you want her to die. 
The HWs there do not care, what they want is money first, without money you 
will not be helped even if you are dying. We wish the facility was turned into a 
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chicken farm, we would all benefit from the meat and the eggs (Male respondent, 
FB).  
 
 
 
All the facilities reported to charge KES 700 or £ 5.20 for delivery; an amount the HWs 
felt was not enough to cover the costs associated with such deliveries but which was 
out of reach for the majority of community members; many of whom live below a 
dollar a day (see Table A2, Appendix of Tables). Concerns over high charges at the 
Box 2: Health System Failing Expectant Mothers – Family Loses Expectant Mother to 
Postpartum Haemorrhage  
Kiplimo* is a 27 year old subsistence farmer, who lost his wife due to postpartum haemorrhage, at 
FD. He narrates his story about how the nurses at the local facility (FD) had refused to attend to his 
wife because it was at night and he could not produce the KES 700 delivery fee that they had 
demanded. He tells his story as follows: 
They [nurses] asked me to pay the money or look for a taxi to transfer my wife to the 
District Hospital [about 30 kilometres away]. I did not have the money to pay for her 
delivery, so I wondered how I could raise the taxi fare. I pleaded with them, but my pleas 
fell on deaf ears. Then I rushed to look for a local taxi man I knew who could accept to help 
transport my wife on credit. When I arrived back at the hospital, the baby was already 
coming out but it was obvious that my wife had bled a lot. With the help of my neighbours 
and those who came to witness, we managed to get the baby out but unfortunately the 
mother died. I could not believe my eyes. This was her first pregnancy and our first child. In 
a way, I blamed myself because I could not provide for my wife when she needed me most.  
It pained me, but there was nothing I could do… I could not even convince the nurses to 
help. I was in deep shock and anger seeing the nurses lock themselves in their rooms while 
my wife cried for help outside in the cold on the hospital veranda. It’s not in our culture to 
be that heartless… They have a God given responsibility to help, even if in credit…to save 
lives...to listen to the community they serve since they are members of this community. 
 
Kiplimo is one of the local residents who is aware of the local HFC since one of the committee 
members is his neighbour. He tells us that the committee is aware of the incident but had taken no 
action since ‘I don’t think they have the powers to discipline the HWs, given the community has raised 
these issues with them several times but no action has been taken…, if this is the way public facilities 
will continue to be managed, many people will continue to suffer…, you cannot rely on them [the HFC] 
to solve facility issues, it’s like the HWs control them rather than them controlling the HWs… I 
personally do not trust that they can act on our complaints… maybe people like you from outside can 
help, but the chief, the village elders… nothing’. 
Source: Field notes  
*Name changed for anonymity  
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facilities were said to lead many expectant mothers to deliver at home putting their 
lives in danger, a fact that was confirmed by HWs who also expressed their frustration 
at being expected to facilitate such deliveries without requisite equipment. 
There are many mothers delivering at home because they cannot afford the [KES] 
700, but there is little we can do because we cannot let them come for a free 
delivery… some even come at second stage others come at night and we don’t have 
a pharmacy around where we can buy necessary equipment, so we just sat down 
[HWs] and decided to charge that amount. They say it is expensive but when we 
go to Barazas we always explain to them why we are doing this, we can provide 
deliveries for free if we are provided with the equipment (FI, for FA). 
 
There were no defined exemption schemes even for children under-5 despite 
government policy requiring under-5s services to be free. Survey data showed that only 
10.6% of children under-5 were charged the HFC set KES 50 or less. One user 
explained: 
When you come here [at the HF] whether you’ve brought a child or yourself, you 
must pay [KES] 50 for registration, and [KES] 100 for laboratory tests (Female 
respondent, FA).  
In setting user fees, only six respondents said they had been consulted, confirming the 
evidence from IDIs with HFC members that they do not consult the community in 
deciding on the user fees. Data on how user fees is set has been provided in Chapter 4. 
Issuance of Reciepts on User Fee Payment 
It emerged from the qualitative interviews with the community that being issued with 
a receipt after making any payment was as important, if not more, as adhering to the 
user fee policy. Respondents viewed  being issued with a receipt as an indicator of 
‘uwazi’ the Swahili word for transparency, at the HF, i.e. perhaps an indication of an 
understanding of accountability that transcends what is done to include what is seen 
(or recorded) to have been done. It was quite surprising that many respondents were 
not as concerned about the amount they were charged as they were about being issued 
with a receipt after any payment as a sign of transparency in the way hospital funds 
were administered (how and for what purpose) or whether the HWs adhered to the set 
user fee. Some respondents explained: 
So that you know where it (referring to the user fees) is going, in fact you cannot 
pay without them giving you a receipt (Female respondent, FC, which issued 
receipts). 
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You know the receipt is showing transparency, without the receipt there is no 
transparency (Female respondent, FA, which did not issue receipts). 
 
Some associated the lack of receipts to corruption at the facility: 
Now you know you may ask [for a receipt] and you may be given so many ‘nini 
nini’ [meaning excuses]. In other words you can be quarrelled ‘why are you asking 
this?’ I think it’s just corruption (Female respondent, FA). 
 
Survey data confirmed respondents’ worries about facilities collecting money and not 
issuing receipts for the same. As shown in Figure 5.6 below, none of the facilities 
achieved a 50% receipt issuance. Receipts were more likely to be issued in FC 
compared to the other three facilities investigated. FB had the lowest number of 
respondents (13.9%) reporting they were issued with a receipt after making payments, 
perhaps an indicator that most of the user fee collected was not recorded and thus 
went unaccounated for. 
 
 
 
5.3.4 User Engagement of the Committee to Resolve Facility Related Issues 
In order to elucidate the role of HFCs in service provision and to understand the depth 
and breadth of HFC engagement with the community, the study investigated what 
options or persons in authority, users resorted to when they had a problem at the 
facility. The study further investigated which authority respondents would approach 
first, and why, in order to identify factors that influence the choice of a given 
accountability mechanism for addressing HF problems. The results are summarised in 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8. 
19.3%
13.9%
48.5%
18.3%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
FA FB FC FD
Facility
Figure 5.6: Respondents Issued With a Receipt on Payment of User 
Fees (% per facility, n =404)
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011 
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As shown in Figure 5.7 above, only 14.1% of respondents said they would approach the 
HFC to resolve a HF related issue with a majority (41.5%) preferring to talk to the HWs 
and 26.2% to a family member. 
 
On the subject of what authority or persons in authority users would approach first to 
resolve problems at the facility, the majority (35.1%) preferred to speak to the HWs 
first (and in particular the FI), followed by a family member (26.4%). Only 13.7% had a 
community member of the HFC as their first choice for problem solving, clearly 
indicating that the HFC is a not a preferred mode for addressing HF issues (see Figured 
5.8). 
 
 
41.5%
26.2%
20.3%
14.1%
11.2% 4.4%
Figure 5.7: Accountability Mechanism/Authority that Users would 
Approach to help Resolve a Problem in the facility (% per authority, 
n=977 in each case)
HWs
Family Member
Chief's Office
HFC
Councillor/MP
Other
Health Workers, 
35.1%, 
Family, 26.4%, 
Local 
Administation, 
21.3%
Community HFC 
Member, 13.7%, 
Area 
MP/Councillor, 
3.5%
Figure 5.8: Authority Users Would Approach First to Resolve 
Facility Problems (% Per authority, n=569)
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011 
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5.3.5 Factors Influencing Choice of Accountability Mechanism/Authority in 
Resolving Facility Problems 
 
The study went further to try to understand the main reasons why respondents would 
choose to engage or not engage with particular accountability structures/authorities 
both at individual household survey sessions and at the FGDs. The majority (42.2%) 
mentioned responsibility (i.e. that the authority is charged with that responsibility and 
thus should be the one to be approached) as the main reason they would approach/use 
a given mechanism to resolve a HF issue, followed by proximity, or accessibility, i.e. a 
given mechanism being nearest to them and as such they would easily access them in 
case of a problem (25.8%). Some HFC members interviewed also had similar views. On 
responsibility, one explained: 
Responsibility means many things: one you have to be responsible to people who 
elected you, to give them the support they need; you also pass the information 
that you think is going to help them; you are also to avail yourself when you are 
wanted by either those who elected you or from the people whose services are 
rendered within that facility (HFC Chairman, FB). 
 
A significant number (16.9%) also mentioned trust as a determining factor, while the 
least popular reason was a given office/mechanism being powerful and thus most 
likely to help solve the problem (15.1%). The data is summarised in Figure 5.9 below. 
 
 
 
Power, 15.1%
Trust, 16.9%
Accessibility/ 
Proximity, 25.8%
Responsibility , 
42.2%
Figure 5.9: Users’ main Reasons for approaching/using a Given 
Accountability structure/authority to Resolve a HF issue (n = 569) 
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
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In defining trust, most respondents referred to ‘ninamwamini’ - a Swahili word literary 
meaning ‘I trust him or her’. Often, trust in this context was associated with feelings of 
compassion, care, understanding, friendliness and a sense that someone was genuinely 
interested in one’s problems. These were common among respondents from FC, who 
reported that their FI was friendly, took his time to listen to them and thus understood 
their problems. They considered him to be ‘mtu anayeaminka’ [someone who can be 
trusted] with not just their health, but also the management of the facility. Most of 
them did not therefore see a need to ask how the money they paid was used because 
most of the time they received drugs, they noticed improvements such as hygiene and 
income-generating activities at the facility, and whenever they complained about any 
HW, the FI took action to correct the problem, be it overcharging, lateness, or 
rudeness on the part of the staff. 
 
Power was often cited in relation to the local politicians who community members 
viewed as having the means and authority to deal with HFC issues. Power in this 
context was seen in terms of someone having the means and willingness to help, so it 
was not uncommon for respondents to report they would not approach the HFC 
Chairman because, even though they felt he had the powers to help, in many instances 
they feared that he would not be willing to help. This was particularly typical among 
respondents using FA who referred to several occasions when they had had to rely on 
the area councillor to solve problems at the HF. 
 
As shown in Table 5.3, there were significant associations between the 
authority/mechanism member that respondents would approach first and the main 
accountability markers. 24  Community members were more likely to approach: a 
community HFC member and the Chief’s office because they perceived these 
mechanisms or authorities to be nearest to the them; a HW because they felt s\he was 
responsible or the ‘duty bearer’; the area politician (MP/Councillor) because they 
                                                 
24 In understanding the main factors influencing the choice of any given mechanism for redress, it is 
important to note that these are not mutually exclusive in the everyday life of members of this 
community. Its common that while one would report approaching the facility in-charge for instance 
mainly because of trust, that relationship could very much be influenced by the view that a facility in-
charge is the most powerful of all HWs, has the responsibility of ensuring proper management of the 
HF, and perhaps most importantly, has access to resources such as drugs or the authority to allocate a 
fee waiver. 
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believed s/he was the most powerful person to deal with the issue; and finally, the 
family because they trusted them most. 
 
Table 5.3: First Authority Users Would Approach to Solve Facility Problems and 
Corresponding Main 'Accountability Marker'  
Authority talked to first 
to resolve HF issues 
Accountability Marker  
Total 
 
Proximity Power Trust Responsibility 
Community HFC Member  35 (44.9%)** 14 (17.9%) 2 (2.6%)** 27 (34.6%) 78 (100%) 
Chief's Office 70 (57.9%)*** 17 (14%) 7 (5.8%)** 27 (22.3%)*** 121 (100%) 
Health Workers 5 (2.5%)*** 39 (19.5%)* 9 (4.5%)*** 147 (73.5%)*** 200 (100%) 
Area MP/Councillor 2 (10%) 14 (70%)*** 2 (10%) 2 (10%)* 20 (100%) 
Family 35 (23.3%) 2 (1.3%)*** 76 (50.7%)*** 37 (24.7%)*** 150 (100%) 
Total 147 (25.8%) 86 (15.1%) 96 (16.9%) 240 (42.2%) 569 (100%) 
Significant difference between authority approached and specified accountability marker chi2 *p < 
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
Data Source: Household Survey April-May 2011 
 
5.4 Committee Impact on Service Delivery 
5.4.1 Drug Availability and Quality of Service at the Facility 
The availability of drugs at the facility was an important measure/indicator of the 
quality of care mentioned by respondents and was inextricabley linked to HFC 
influence on service delivery at the HFs. Many respondents complained about frequent 
drug stock-outs, being asked to buy drugs from outside the facility or from a parallel 
pharmacy run within the facilities, and the poor quality of some of the drugs they were 
given. In particularly, respondents were unhappy about having to buy drugs and other 
treatment items from outside the facility even after paying the requisite user fees, 
viewing it as a failure by the HFCs to protect them from exploitation by the HWs.25 
Survey data showed that FA had the highest proportion (31%) of clients being asked to 
buy drugs from outside the facility while FC had the least number of users (16.8%) 
required to get their medication from outside the facility (see Figure 5.10). 
 
                                                 
25 It is worth pointing out here that complaints about drug availability arose mainly when the patient 
was asked to buy the drugs from outside the facility after making the indicative user fees; this was not 
driven by a desire to receive a prescription even when from the HWs/Clinician perspective, no drug was 
suitable as is often the case in many care settings.  
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These results resonate with data on priority presented in Section 5.5 showing that over 
74% of respondents who visited FA felt drug stockout/shortage was the most pressing 
issue that the HFC needed to address. IDIs with HFC members and HWs confirmed 
the problem of drug shortage, though each HFC prioritised this differently. The FI for 
FA recognised that drug shortage and inadequate maternity equipment were her major 
challenge, though the Facility Chairperson had other priorities: 
I think the main priority is supply of enough drugs and maybe to equip the 
maternity wing so that we would be charging something small or offer free 
deliveries; another major problem is the committee especially the Chairman … (FI, 
for FA). 
 
Both HWs and HFC members expressed their frustrations with the drug supply 
system 26  used by the government drug agency Kenya Medical Supplies Agency 
(KEMSA). They felt that they were left to bear the brunt of patients whenever there 
were no drugs yet they were not responsible for supplies. HFCs members also noted 
that the revenue from the DRF was not enough to ensure a steady supply, subjecting 
the facilities to frequent stock outs and subsequently forcing them to refer patients to 
buy drugs from private chemists; an experience that was not taken kindly by the 
                                                 
26 The Kenyan government through the drug supply agency, KEMSA, uses a push system where the 
agency orders drugs based on national needs estimates and then pushes the same to health facilities via 
the provincial and district offices. Usually this would take three months, meaning health facilities 
receive their supplies quarterly, but sometimes there is a longer delay. The other downside is that 
facilities are in most case supplied with drugs for which there is no demand. 
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Figure 5.10: Users Required to Buy Additional Medication From 
Outside their Facility After Paying User Fees (% per facility, n =400) 
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
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clients. In general, HWs and HFC members felt that this was a health systems 
problem, which was way beyond them: 
When you just prescribe drugs for the patients go and buy, you know … it’s not a 
happy experience, but we have little options, you just prescribe ... when supplies 
from KEMSA run out, it is just like that … you wait for three months …the DMOH 
is not helping much, they also tell us to wait and there is nothing we can do (FI, 
for FB). 
 
It is because at times we are supplied with the drugs we don’t need and we have to 
store them [the drugs] until they expire and the drugs that we need are not 
supplied enough (FI, for FA). 
 
However, during FGDs, respondents claimed that they had noticed government drugs 
being sold in the community pharmacy, which run side-by-side with the facility 
pharmacy (FA), and in a nearby pharmacy to which patients were referred in order to 
buy drugs after visiting FB. 
After collecting your money [user fee], they will ask you to go buy drugs from that 
chemist [pointing at the chemist in a local market near the health centre]. We 
later came to realise that when the drugs are supplied in the hospital they are 
taken to the chemist so that when you go you are told to buy from the chemist 
and the HWs benefit. The drugs are clearly marked ‘Government of Kenya, not-
for-sale’ (Male participant, Youth FGD, FB). 
 
5.4.2 User Satisfaction and Committees Effectiveness 
An effective accountability mechanism should result in better service delivery and 
protection of clients’ interests. User satisfaction has been identified as a key measure of 
health systems performance in developing countries[139, 180]27 and as an important 
source of information about health care results (outcomes), and the process of care 
delivery [126, 181]. 
 
In order to overcome biases associated with patients reporting being satisfied by the 
overall care [126], the survey question was tailored to remind respondents of their 
answers throughout the survey, so that their response to the satisfaction question 
would take into consideration their overall experience with the service they received. 
The question was then followed by another, seeking reasons for the answers provided, 
in order to account for any underreporting of critical attitudes [126]. Additionally, the 
study drew together all the aspects of accountability investigated so far to assess the 
                                                 
27 This is perhaps in contrast to, the UK, where satisfaction rates are generally so high that they fail to 
offer anything very useful. 
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performance of the HFC as an accountability mechanism in ensuring satisfactory 
service delivery at the facility. 
 
Community members were asked to rate their satisfaction with the service they 
received at the facility in a four-category Likert scale (1 = very satisfied, 2 = satisfied, 3 = 
dissatisfied, 4 = very dissatisfied). These responses were then recoded into a binary 
scale (1 and 2 = satisfied, and 3 & 4 = dissatisfied), after analysis showed no difference 
between options 1 & 2, and between options 3 & 4. 
 
The overall satisfaction rates were high; 63.6% of the 946 respondents28 who had used 
the facility in the last six months prior to the survey, reporting being satisfied with the 
service they received. This could be because, in general, the community did not want 
to portray the HWs in bad light despite the many challenges they opened up about 
during the survey. There were some variations across cluster facilities (Figure 5.11). 
 
 
 
Multivariate logistic regression analysis was employed to understand what elements of 
accountability influence user satisfaction with the service (Table 5.4). Several bivariate 
models were run and variables that were significantly associated with the outcome 
(satisfaction with service) at 10% level of significance included in the final analysis. 
Additionally, variables that were identified to be associated with user satisfaction 
during qualitative interviews were also included.  
                                                 
28 Excludes 73 respondents (35 who had no reported cases of illness in the last 6 months, 30 who used 
other service providers except the HF, and 8 who did not respond to this question).  
FA FB FC FD
40.2%
29.9%
20.9%
53.7%
59.8%
70.1%
79.1%
46.3%
Figure 5.11: User Satisfaction Levels Per Facility 
Not-Satisfied Satisfied
Data Source: Household Survey April – May 2011
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Table 5.4: Multivariate Logistic Regression Model for Determinants of ‘User 
Satisfaction’  
Indicator  
Satisfied Vs Dissatisfied  
Odds Ratio 95% CI  
Social Demographic Indicators      
Cluster Facility (Reference FD)     
FA 2.01* [1.13 – 3.60]  
FB 2.69** [1.46 – 4.97] 
FC 2.84** [1.41 - 5.72] 
Gender (Reference Male)     
Female  1.24 [0.74- 2.51] 
Marital Status (Reference Single)     
Married  1.37 [0.76 - 2.57]  
Age (Reference 16 - 24 Years)     
25 - 34 years  1.07 [0.58 – 1.97]  
35 - 44 years  1.18 [0.60 - 2.33]  
≥ 45 years  1.71 [0.71 - 4.11] 
Occupation (Reference Students)     
Agriculture  0.62 [0.27 - 1.41] 
Skilled labour  0.27** [0.11 - 0.67]  
Unskilled labour  0.23** [0.08 - 0.67] 
Distance to Facility (Reference 3 Km or less)      
> 3 Km  1.17 [0.58- 2.34]  
Don’t Know  0.46 [0.05 - 4.50]  
Education (Reference Primary or less)     
Secondary  0.75 [0.46 - 1.20]  
Post-Secondary  0.42* [0.18 - 0.94] 
Income (Reference KES 2000 or less      
KES 2001 - 5000 1.02 [0.58 - 1.79]  
KES 5001 and above  1.10 [0.58 - 2.12] 
Health & Morbidity data      
Illness Encountered (Reference Malaria)     
ARI  0.97 [0.57 – 1.64] 
Typhoid 0.34** [0.16 – 0.80] 
Others 0.59 [0.34 - 1.03] 
Age of Ill HH Member (Reference Under 5s)     
Over 5 years  1.49 [0.93 – 2.37] 
Given Drugs (Reference No)     
Yes 0.73 [0.20 – 2.76] 
Required to buy drugs (Reference No)     
Yes 0.78 [0.50 - 1.23] 
HSA Indicators      
Issued with Receipt (Reference No)     
Yes 2.23*** [1.39 - 3.57]  
Use fee charged (Reference KES ≤ 50)     
 KES > 50 0.66 [0.26 - 1.70]  
Aware of HFC (Reference Unaware)      
Aware  0.87 [0.54 - 1.39]  
Service Charter Usefulness (Reference Not useful)     
Useful  4.29*** [2.36 – 7.79] 
Ever been to a Baraza (Reference No)     
Yes  0.80 [0.49 - 1.31]  
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
Data Source: Household Survey April - May 2011 
 
The estimates presented here for each variable are adjusted, controlling for clustering 
and all other variables in the model. The main socio-demographic indicators 
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significantly associated with user satisfaction were occupation and education. The 
local health facility to which a respondent was clustered was also significantly 
associated with user satisfaction. Users clustered around facilities FA, FB and FC had 
significantly greater odds of reporting satisfaction with the overall service they 
received at the facility as compared to users in FD.  
 
Compared to students, those in all forms of employment had lower odds of reporting 
satisfaction with the services they received at their local health centre, although results 
for those in agriculture were non-significant. A similar pattern was observed with the 
level of education, with those having secondary or post-secondary education showing 
lower odds of satisfaction, although those with secondary school education showed a 
non-significant result. Even though women had higher odds of being dissatisfied with 
the service at their local facility, compared to men, the results were non-significant. 
 
None of the health and morbidity indicators were significant predictors of user 
satisfaction, even though patients who visited the hospital for the treatment of 
children under-5 had lower odds of satisfaction with the services that they received, 
compared to over 5s. Whether one received drugs at the facility after paying user fees, 
or was required to buy drugs from outside the facility even after paying the requisite 
user fees, one’s awareness of the HFC, the user fee charged, and Baraza attendance 
were not associated with user satisfaction. 
 
However, the odds of satisfaction improved with the perception of SC usefulness, with 
those reporting that they found the SC ‘useful’ having over 4 times the odds of being 
satisfied with the service received at their HF, compared to those who found the SC 
‘not useful’. Similarly, users who were issued with a receipt following user fee payment 
had significantly higher odds of being satisfied with the service at their local facility, 
compared to those who did not get the receipt (OR 2.23; p value <. 001), confirming the 
findings from the qualitative interviews. 
 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to analyse the impact of HSA mechanisms on service delivery. Two 
main mechanisms – HFCs and SCs – were identified as mediums for HSA. Because SCs 
are in many ways a sub-set of HFCs, given how they are set up and the overall 
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authority in their administration, they (SCs) have been used as a function of the HFC 
in the analysis. HFC performance has been considered by assessing the depth of 
engagement with their clients as evidenced in user awareness, levels and mechanisms 
of communication, priority setting and user involvement in decision making, financial 
accountability and finally user satisfaction. In terms of user awareness of HFC, all the 
socio-demographic indicators were significant determinants of whether one would be 
aware of the HFC or not. However, and surprisingly, gender and marital status were 
non-significant determinants of HFC awareness, even though women compared to 
men had lower odds of being aware of their local HFC. 
 
Even though the Baraza was the main forum of communication with the community, 
most of the respondents were not happy with it saying it was not a neutral forum for 
an exchange of views and served mainly the interests of a select few. Only about 33% of 
respondents reported having been to a Baraza, a higher percentage of whom were men 
showing this forum alienated women who happen to be the majority users of health 
facilities and thus bear the direct consequences of decisions taken at the Baraza. The 
receipt and user fee adherence were identified as a significant aspect of accountability 
especially from the community perspective. None of the facilities adhered to their own 
user fee policy despite the fact that HFCs seemed to have significant powers in 
deciding how much users are charged and how the money is spent. In understanding 
user satisfaction as an end product of HFC functioning as reflected by the various 
socio-demographic and HSA variables, ones’ health facility, their occupation, 
education, whether one was issued with a receipt or not, and whether one found the 
SC as useful or not were significant determinants of user satisfaction. 
 
Finally, the chapter has identified four main factors – trust, power, responsibility, and 
proximity - that influence the performance of HSA mechanisms in this area. In the 
next two chapters, these factors, herein referred to as ‘accountability markers’, are 
discussed in light of field experiences and current literature, followed by conclusions 
and recommendations in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTRA-COMMITTEE RELATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the findings of Chapter 4 about Intra-Committee 
functioning, and considers them in light of the literature on accountability in health 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Section 6.2 briefly summarises the evidence presented in the 
thesis on health system accountability (HSA) mechanisms and their role in supporting 
primary care in the study area. Section 6.3 compares these and other findings, with 
available evidence from the literature on accountability and engagement in Sub Sahara 
Africa (SSA). The chapter then turns to the third objective of the thesis; to examine the 
key factors that influence the performance of accountability mechanisms, with a focus 
on the role of process within the health facility committee (HFC) in Section 6.4. Four 
main accountability process markers – trust, power, responsibility and proximity -, are 
employed as thematic areas to facilitate the discussion. The Chapter is concluded by a 
summary in Section 6.5. 
 
6.2 Accountability Mechanisms in the Study Area 
The main HSA mechanisms were the health facility committees (HFCs) and facility 
service charters (SCs). Although there was a suggestion box and a patient rights 
charter, as reported earlier, these were only present in two facilities and were thus 
dropped from the main survey. The HFCs, made up of representatives of four groups 
(the community, health workers, government, and the local political leadership), were 
in charge of the general administration of the health facilities (HFs), and seemed to 
have significant powers over the management of the HFs. The HFCs had substantial 
powers over HFs finances, including setting the user fees, deciding how the user fees 
were spent, raising funds for the HFs operations, hiring local support staff, and setting 
facility priorities. An executive group within the committees, consisting of the 
Chairman, the secretary, and the treasurer, oversaw the day-to-day operations of the 
committee. The HFCs met fairly regularly. 
 
Almost all the committees reported that their executive members had recently been 
trained in health facility financing and management. However, many of them also felt 
that they were greatly lacking skills, especially in the area of community engagement. 
 126 
 
The HFCs reported using the Baraza, - a local development, law and order forum -, as 
their main platform for communication with the community. But the results revealed 
this was not an effective two-way communication mechanism. Awareness of the HFCs 
among survey respondents was fairly high compared to other studies in Kenya. 
However, there was limited evidence of the involvement of the community in the 
election of HFC members. 
 
The SC was an important engagement tool between the HFs and the community. 
Because it is a product of the HFC, it has been used as a proxy for analysing HFC 
functioning. There was some variation in the type and form of information provided 
on the SCs for different facilities. Many respondents reported being dissatisfied with 
the information provided on the SC especially because the facilities rarely adhered to 
the user fee policy contained on the SC. Moreover, respondents felt that the facility 
management lacked accountability given that user fees were well defined, yet no 
income and expenditure data was provided as part of the charter. However, some 
respondents and HWs felt that it was an important engagement tool because it 
allowed them to voice concerns about any abuse of user fees by HWs. 
 
In sum, HFCs and SCs were important HSA tools in the study area. The two 
mechanisms provided a formal forum for engagement between the community and the 
health system, albeit with some major challenges. However, engagement does not 
equal accountability. The way in which the engagement was achieved through the two 
accountability mechanisms is explored in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Comparison with the Literature on Health Facility Committees 
The literature did not contain studies that explicitly analyse the nature of HSA in 
LMICs with the household and the individual as points of focus. Nonetheless, data 
gathered about the functioning of HFCs overlapped considerably with many studies 
that described the impact of HFCs and the factors that influence their performance. 
This section compares those findings with Kenyan and LMICs experiences. 
 
Just like in the study area, HFCs are almost ubiquitous HSA mechanism at the 
peripheral level of health facilities in Kenya and elsewhere in many parts of SSA. They 
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are also the most studied HSA mechanism. Other mechanisms include patients’ rights 
charters, community groups, suggestion boxes, and in some cases, citizen report cards. 
 
There are some common features of HFCs in Kenya; most notably their nature, roles 
and composition. In the coastal province of Kenya for example, most HFCs are 
reported to have been made-up of community representatives, facility staff, and local 
administration. In many cases, community representatives also served as the Chairmen 
and treasurers [97], reflecting the general guideline provided by the MOH Kenya. 
Elsewhere in Africa, a close comparison is reported in Zimbabwe, where, health centre 
committees (HCCs) consisted of a mix of health personnel, officials, councillors, and 
traditional leaders, as well as community representatives [179]. Similar setups include 
areas of South America, such as in Peru, where a similar structure is reported with the 
exception that local administration – traditional or governmental - was not part of the 
committees [85]. Also in Uganda, membership to the Health Unit Management 
Committee excluded political representatives [83]. Generally, it seems committees 
tend to have an apparent universal composition, their location notwithstanding. 
 
In addition to the roles noted earlier, all the studies cited above reported that HFCs 
officials tended to consider certain responsibilities such as influencing the hiring of 
staff or drug purchases, as being beyond the remit of community representatives. Their 
results contrasted with the results of this study, which showed that community HFC 
members, to a certain extent, had some oversight, over all decisions about the facility, 
although experiences differed from one facility to another. In some cases, such as was 
in FC and FD, trust played an important role, helping committee members and staff, 
find mutual grounds in delimiting their roles. In FC for instance, community HFC 
members reported that they trusted the FI to make the right decision on both 
‘professional’ and ‘non-professional’ issues. In FD, the presence of the Chairman at the 
facility most of the time, seemed to put staff under pressure to perform and provided 
avenues for consultations between the Chairman and the staff, even though this did 
not seem to deter the FI from reporting late to work. 
 
The committee selection process problems reported in this study are fairly similar to 
those reported in other settings in Kenya, and can be said to be representative of the 
Kenyan health system. Goodman et al [97] reported that there were problems with 
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committee selection in the coastal province of Kenya where people ended up in the 
committee because of their status in the community and not necessarily because they 
were the best suited for the job. In the same province, dispensary committee members 
are reported to have been democratically elected [82]. It is worth noting that some of 
the experiences reported from these two cases (by Goodman and Sohani), were from 
the same district (Kwale). Since both cases involved separate external support – in the 
case of Goodman, the Danish government and in the case of Sohani, the Aga Khan 
Foundation -, the difference reported between the two highlights the impact of 
external interventions in general outlook of accountability structures. 
 
In terms of the education levels of the HFC members, this study found similar results 
to those reported in Zimbabwe where HFC members were fairly well educated. As 
described in Chapter 4, some HFC members in the studied facilities had postgraduate 
qualifications. This contrasts the findings in other studies on HFCs [97, 128], that have 
pointed to low education levels among community HFC members. In the Coast of 
Kenya for instance, Goodman et al [97], reported that direct election, often resulted in 
selection of very old, often illiterate members, who, could not grasp key concepts or 
deal with management tasks. This contrast, could be explained by the fact that 
education levels in the coast of Kenya are generally among the lowest in Kenya [26], 
and not necessarily because HFCs tend to attract semi-illiterate members. 
 
Comparison of how HFCs performed their roles within and beyond Kenya is 
constrained by the limited number of studies reporting the functioning of such 
committees in their normal setting i.e., without external interventions and support. 
That being said, there is a broader sense that the breadth and depth of HFC roles are 
defined in two main ways – representing community interests to the facility and 
overseeing operations and management of the facility. While the distinction between 
the roles is unclear, representing community interests can be seen as an effort to give 
the community a ‘voice’ in matters effecting their health [11]. Whereas overseeing 
operations and management of the HF can be seen to be about performance 
accountability [13, 16] aimed at improving service delivery. Depending on the facility, 
the driving forces behind the intervention, and the country, other studies report fairly 
similar findings with this study – that HFCs should mobilise the community, raise and 
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control revenue, oversee of the management of support staff, facilitate outreach and 
health promotion activities, and help supply essential drugs [82-84, 97]. 
 
HFC training experience are fairly similar whether committees were set up as an 
intervention, received substantial support from an NGO, or form part of the regular 
health system structure – as in the case of this study. All studies reported that 
committees were trained on certain aspects of health facility management. Yet in all 
the cases, HFC members expressed a need for regular and continuous training given 
the inadequacy they experienced in their everyday running of the facilities. At the Aga 
Khan led programme in the coast of Kenya, as reported by Sohani, committee 
members were also trained on consensus building and conflict resolution; a necessary 
skill that was lacking in the other studies. The only difference found in this study, 
compared to the rest of the studies reviewed - which reflect the impact and importance 
of external facilitation and support -, is in the involvement of women in the training. 
All the studies reviewed had external support that emphasised and ensured women 
members of the HFCs received training, thereby enhancing their depth of involvement 
in everyday committee operations. 
 
At the coast of Kenya where the Danish government and the Aga Khan foundation 
were instrumental, women received training because, communities were encouraged 
to elect women to the committees and to make provisions to ensure gender parity.  
However, this was not the case in this study. Cultural barriers were a major hindrance 
to women being elected to the committees. Even when women made it to the 
committees, they would not be elected to the executive arm of the committee, which 
was targeted for training by the government and by the committees themselves. In the 
end, the women were effectively blocked from training opportunities. Essentially, what 
they had was the label ‘women representatives’. The implications of this are discussed 
further under the section on power and committee functioning. 
 
In summary, the evidence highlights many similarities in the structure, composition 
and purpose of the HFCs in Kenya and elsewhere in LMICs. However, there are some 
important cross-country differences in how committees function and in the process 
through which they structure the accountability system and the outcomes of this 
system. The potential for comparison with the existing literature was very limited for a 
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number of the study findings. For example, findings concerning the main factors 
impacting on committee performance i.e., trust, power, proximity and responsibility, 
differed between this study and others. These are closely related to the processes and 
context within which HSA operate, to which the discussion now turns. 
 
6.4 Process Factors and the Functioning Of Committees 
6.4.1 The Influence of Trust on HFC Operations 
Trust emerged as one of the main factors that permeated HFC accountability relations. 
The significance of trust with respect to health systems draws on its potential to 
facilitate relationships that can result in positive outcomes [132]. In FC, the HFC and 
the community seemed to have developed a strong level of trust in the FI over time, 
thus giving him the authority and space to make certain decisions that would hitherto 
require the authorisation of the HFC. For example, committee meeting minutes 
showed that the FI had been mandated by the HFC to determine and implement the 
drug prices and charges that enable the facility to generate revenue from the drug 
revolving fund (DRF). Additionally, the FI was also fully in charge of the facility’s IGA – 
the farm which generated substantial amounts of money per month (estimated at £ 
150). He employed the gardeners, oversaw the sale of farm produce, and fully managed 
the funds (albeit with some guidance from the executive arm of the HFC). When 
asked, many HFC members explained that the IC had been at the facility for a long 
time, had shown exemplary character and integrity in managing facility resources, and 
had enjoyed considerable community goodwill and trust. As such they saw no need to 
supervise what he did at the facility. In effect, they had received no negative report 
that questioned his handling of facility resources. He had demonstrated, through 
organisational and managerial practices, values and norms that are associated with 
trust practices [182]. 
 
The results of this level of trust in the FI and his staff at FC were a highly motivated 
workforce. Their motivation was shown in the significantly high level of dedication to 
their duty; despite the myriad challenges facing their facility such as drug stock-outs, 
high demand for services against a thin workforce, and limited facility resources. The 
senior facility nurse explained thus: 
Compared to elsewhere where I worked [referring to FD], here we do not have 
much committee interference, we enjoy good relations with the committee … a 
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week won’t pass without the Chairman passing by to ask how we are doing. We 
feel the committee trusts us with the management of the facility and is responsive 
when we need help. As you can see the work is demanding, just look at the queue… 
but at least we know we can count on the committee and the community is also 
very supportive… (Senior Nurse, FC). 
 
These findings, echo experiences elsewhere in Africa, where HWs criticised public 
clinics for the limited control over their work place, and tended to trust their 
colleagues more than their supervisors [183]. Although Gilson et al [183] considered the 
role of trust in HW performance, the findings from this study strongly suggest a link 
not only between trust and HW performance, but also with the broader accountability 
structures supporting primary care delivery, in resource limited settings. This is 
because, where facility managers/supervisors (in this case the HFC) cultivate a certain 
level of trust in the HWs, they also create for them a ‘decision space’ on how, for 
instance, to use the limited facility resources like user fees. This could explain why the 
HFCs for FC and FD enjoyed good intra-committee relations as compared to FA and 
FB; results which are similar to findings in another study in the coast of Kenya where 
cordial relations between HFCs members and HWs were associated with trust [97]. 
 
The opposite was the case in FA, where there were differences that split the committee 
into three groups – the Chairman and his supporters, the FI and HWs and the 
councillor (see Box 3). The handling of facility finances – user fees and DRF – divided 
the committee. The FI and HWs were in charge of the user fee and the Chairman was 
in charge of the DRF from the community pharmacy. The Chairman saw the pharmacy 
as his pet project that he had ‘fought hard’ to have established, and had gone ahead to 
appoint a community member as the ‘pharmacist’ to sell the drugs. The proceeds were 
then handed over to him for banking. When asked why he runs the pharmacy this way 
he retorted that ‘the pharmacy was my idea, besides I don’t interfere with how the nurse 
in charge [referring to the FI] runs the user fees, why should they bother with the 
pharmacy money yet I have given her leeway in handling the user fees?’ However, 
interviews with the FI and the PHO contradicted these views and instead pointed to 
deep-rooted mistrust between the FI and HWs on one side and the Chairman on the 
other. The FI and the PHO explained that the Chairman did not trust the FI to handle 
finances because, the FI was not a clinician, and secondly, in the words of both the FI 
and the PHO, the FI ‘was not from the Chairman’s village and was a woman’. 
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These views were also echoed by the treasurer who felt that the mode of committee 
selection, despite guaranteeing popular representation, did not necessarily lead to 
professionalism in the committee. Because the Chairman and the FI could not agree on 
how the facility funds should be administered, the HWs reported that they could not 
put up a suggestion box at the facility, nor could they provide a fully operational 
service charter as required by the government, further showing the implications of lack 
of trust within the HFC. These findings compare favourably with those of Goodman 
and her colleagues who report that in one facility ‘HFC members were said to have 
demanded that all the facility’s money be withdrawn from the bank account and kept 
at the house of the treasurer, because of a lack of trust in the health worker in-charge’ 
[97]. 
 
The level and nature of trust had implications for processes and relations of 
accountability within the HCFs. First, unlike the other three health facilities, FC 
enjoyed an enviable level of stability and harmony that seemed to stem directly from 
the intra-committee relations nurtured around trust. Second, trust between committee 
members helped reduce process costs associated with the need to monitor 
performance. Situations of uncertainty can arise among stakeholders in accountability 
relationships. This was particularly apparent when one group of stakeholders, viewed 
the other as suspicious or overbearing. In many cases, uncertainty grew, when HWs 
perceived community HFC members as meddling in their work, wanting to know too 
much, simply incompetent or illiterate, and yet wanting to take on roles which could 
require skills beyond their education levels. Such misconceptions whether based on 
evidence or not, can result in friction between HWs and community representatives. 
This is exacerbated when HWs consider community representatives to be uneducated 
or lacking the necessary professional skills to supervise them. Such experiences have 
been reported in several studies across SSA [78, 96, 184, 185]. 
 
However, as Gilson [132] has warned, on an interpersonal level this trusting behaviour 
could foster corrupt behaviour when those involved in the relationship gain at the 
expense others. This study illustrated, an example from the land case in Chapter 4 (see 
Box 1), where the FI was unwilling to confront the Chairman over the facility land; in 
which, the Chairman allegedly acquired under suspicious conditions in collaboration 
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with some local council officials. In order to maintain strong intra-committee relations 
built around trust, the FI reported that he had tactfully avoided having this land issue 
discussed in any committee meetings, fearing it would tear the committee apart, and 
instead chose to use other mechanisms to deal with the issue. 
 
Additionally, trust was an important tool for facilitating communication between HWs 
and community HFC members; a concurrent finding with results from other studies 
[183, 186, 187]. Interviews with members of harmoniously functioning HFCs (FC and 
FD) showed efficient communication and information processes, particularly among 
the executive committee members. The Chairman for FC explained that they were in 
constant contact with the FI and, that he made regular visits to check up on the 
facility. From observations made during facility visits, the relationship between the 
Chairman and the HWs was also cordial. To some extent, this was reinforced by the 
space the Chairman accorded the HWs and some incentives the HFC introduced, such 
as allowing the HWs to use income generated from the facility farm for ten o’clock tea 
and lunch. Thus, trust could have facilitated communications among HFC members, 
resulting in the elimination of information asymmetry among HFC members, which 
can often lead to HWs having control over committees [78]. Consequently, trust 
enhances the depth of engagement among HFC members, supporting the conclusion 
that trust and communication are mutually reinforcing process factors in the 
functioning of HFCs examined in this study. 
 
This conclusion can be examined further in the converse situation provided by FA 
where there was conflict between the committee members. Interviews with the HWs 
members of the HFC and community HFC members revealed that the Chairman rarely 
consulted with the FI - who also doubled as the HFC secretary - and often ignored her 
altogether in decision-making. Instead, the Chairman relied on one or two committee 
members when making a decision; a situation that made the FI feel belittled, 
undermined and excluded. This tension stemmed from distrust between the two most 
important members of the HFC. The conflict spread to the community, with 
interviewed survey respondents showing detailed knowledge about the situation in the 
HFC (these experiences are discussed in the next chapter). 
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In one incident, the area councillor raided the facility and cut down trees for timber 
without consulting the Chairman because they had fundamental disagreements, 
despite being members of the same committee. In an attempt to resolve the issue, the 
Chairman overlooked the FI and the committee. When asked to explain why he 
decided thus, he responded that he was ‘protecting her [the FI] from the community 
politics’, since the last FI had been evicted by the same councillor – and he could not 
‘trust him anymore’. The findings in this study support Gilson’s argument that ‘trust 
underpins the co-operation within health [accountability] systems that is necessary to 
health provision, and trust-based health [accountability] systems can make an important 
contribution to building value in society’ [132:1454]. In this study, the successful 
functioning of the HFCs depended upon the committees’ internal dynamics - informal 
interactions between committee members’ as much as formal procedures that 
characterised committee operations. 
 
6.4.2 Accessibility and Internal Committee Operations 
Closely linked to trust, and in many ways overlapping with trust, is the accessibility of 
committee members to each other. The relevance of accessibility to the working of 
HFCs in the study facilities is best captured by considering the views from the three 
groups making up the committees. Accessibility in this setting was defined both in 
terms of reachability (a committee member being reachable for instance when there 
was a meeting), and in terms of being perceived to be accessible to other members of 
the HFC. This latter definition mainly applied to the executive HFC members and the 
FI who doubled as the HFC secretary. The ability of a committee member to perform 
his/her role depended upon his/her commitment to the committee. This was 
particularly so for the executive members of the committee who in some instances 
spent the whole day in meetings with the DHMT, or with interested parties such as 
contractors working in the health facility. While many committee members reported 
that their work in the committee was not onerous, a review of the committee 
operations indicated that sometimes the opposite was true. For instance, the two 
meetings that the author attended lasted more than five hours. For a role that is 
mainly voluntary, this can be demanding. 
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Interviews with some facility in-charges revealed a perception that the committee 
members were not committed. However, given the demanding nature of some of the 
committee roles and functions (e.g. the long meetings), it would be difficult to expect a 
committee member with other personal commitments to be motivated to dedicate 
themselves to the administrative responsibilities at the facility as a normal part of their 
duties. IDIs with committee members revealed that most members of the HFCs 
considered their work in the committee as a way of giving back to the community, as 
service to God, and for some, as a chance to make a difference in the community by 
helping to improve the operations at the facility. But there were those like the Chief in 
FB and Chair in FA who perceived committee membership as a source of power, 
personal pride and gainful venture; where one could earn some allowance, or receive 
priority service for their family members. Given the poverty levels in the area, it is not 
inconceivable that such benefits as a seating allowance and free medical services would 
attract one to the committee. Nonetheless, evidence from this study strongly suggests 
that accessibility is a function of time and commitment on the part of HFC members 
and is an important factor in the development of trust and skills necessary for the 
HFCs to work in harmony and cohesion, and improve service delivery [188]. 
 
On the other hand, accessibility was also a function of committee internal relations 
and a function of how one perceived their place in the committee, especially whether 
they felt their contribution was valued or not. As already explained under trust, 
committees that enjoyed harmonious relations thrived through trust and frequent 
communications. This was the case in FC and FD where HFCs members were not only 
in frequent contact with one another, but also with the facility. For example, in FC, the 
committee had to temporarily replace the treasurer who had left for studies. 
Committee members explained that it was easy to ask the Vice-chairman to cover for 
the treasurer in her absence because they frequently communicated. However, this 
resulted in an executive committee composed only of men. Because of the good 
relations between the committee members, the Vice-Chairman was accessible and 
took on the role of the treasurer. HWs in this facility had also praised the committee 
members for their accessibility and approachability making it easy for them to deal 
with any urgent issues. 
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FB provided contrasting experiences. Women representatives in FB, for instance, 
explained that they were members of the committee by ‘invitation’ of the Chairman 
and the local Chief, and therefore, even though they enjoyed serving in the committee, 
they did not feel like they were ‘much needed.’ They explained that often the Chairman 
would invite them to HFC activities when he deemed fit; in essence, they were serving 
at his behest. Accessibility, in this case, was influenced by the agenda set by the 
Chairman, and whether the women representatives felt respected and treated fairly in 
the committee. However, the female representatives felt excluded and alienated, with 
little power to influence decisions in the committee. As already reported in Chapter 4, 
the Chairman for FB indicated that they would replace female members who they 
perceived to be ‘inactive’, for instance, if they frequently missed meetings or if they 
were not available for committee assignments. This begs the question, as to whom the 
women represent, and demonstrates the importance of considering gender in the 
selection of committee members. 
 
Accessibility was also linked to approachability. This was particularly emphasised in 
regard to the executive committee members. Interviews with HWs and committee 
members showed how important approachability is to the functioning of the 
committee. The importance of approachability underlies the central argument that 
accountability is about social relations, about interpersonal engagements, and not 
merely a set of policy targets that ought to be achieved by bringing people into a 
committee. This [view of accountability] was the defining factor in separating 
committees where relationships were built and maintained, and where HWs viewed 
community representatives as part of the greater health facility system, from those 
where decisions were centred on specific individuals. In the later, HWs saw themselves 
as educated elite, who could benefit little from community representatives’ 
perspectives. It was noticeable, for instance, the difference in body language of the 
Chairman for FA as he toured the facility and that of the Chairmen for FC and FD. It 
was not uncommon to find the Chairman for FC and FD chatting freely with the HWs 
in their local language. Conversely, in FA the author witnessed a visibly frosty 
relationship between the HWs and the Chairman. The HWs explained that the 
Chairman was interested in the money generated at the community pharmacy, not in 
welfare of the workers or the facility. 
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These views stemming from the IDIs with committee members underscore the 
significance of approachability as an important part in how HFC stakeholders 
perceived accessibility as an accountability marker. Accessibility was signified, first by 
reachability, secondly by, approachability. It is also indicative that being perceived as 
approachable is instrumental in enhancing the relationships within the committee and 
the likelihood of achieving HFC objectives. In turn, approachability, as an aspect of 
accessibility within the committee, helped to enhance trust and vice versa. 
 
Finally, distance from the facility was also a major factor in determining the 
accessibility of a committee member. Most of the HFC chairmen resided nearby the 
facility, and there was a deliberate effort to have HFC chairmen elected from the 
villages around the facility. While this accorded them the opportunity to interact with 
the HWs and patients easily, it was questioned by some community members living in 
distant villages. Furthermore, some committee members felt that certain villages/clans 
dominated the committee, and by extension influenced the functioning of the facility 
to the advantage of the nearby villages. This highlights the tension that surrounds 
committees’ attempt at cohesion and effectiveness. They must balance encouraging a 
closer interaction of the committee members and the other facility stakeholders, while 
at the same time upholding the principles of fair and equitable representation within 
the committee. Because of the important place of the committee Chairman in the 
functioning of the HFC and the facility, perhaps one way to resolve this is to have a 
rotational system where the chair is nominated from a different village at each 
election. 
 
However, rotational representation could undermine the objectives upon which 
representational and universal participation is based - that community members have 
an inherent right to elect those they feel fairly and effectively represent their voices in 
the facility. The tensions between achieving local cohesion and adequate 
representation were captured in the views of many HFC members who expressed 
concern that although they were perceived to be inactive, their absence can be 
attributed to the fact that they resided far from the facility and needed commuting 
allowance to even attend the HFC meetings. This highlights the important question 
that needs to be answered if accountability and participation in such settings should 
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work: why would individuals commit their time and resources to serve the community 
without proper motivation and support in the face of the glaring economic barriers? 
Indeed, until the government started the HSSF system, not many HFC members 
attended meetings regularly; showing that economic barriers can be a major hindrance 
to enhancing accountability in health systems, particularly in resource scarce settings. 
This is partly because addressing poverty may be seen as more important thus 
relinquishing health care services to a non-priority issue [71]. 
 
Further, there is also the need to balance community expectations and individual 
commitment/expectations in serving on the HFC. IDIs with HFC members confirmed 
fears from community HFC members who reported that community members would 
be suspicious of HFC members who spend most of their time at the facility, perceiving 
them to be dependent on ‘their’ money. The treasurer for FB claimed that ‘If I were to 
spend most of my time here, you would hear rumours and murmurs from the villagers 
that I am ‘eating’ their money’. Such sentiments have been reported in other studies 
[90, 96, 99, 106, 110]. 
 
6.4.3 Responsibility, Accountability and Committee Operations 
Despite the importance of having clearly defined roles for members of accountability 
structures [77-79, 111, 189], this study found that many HFC members were not 
sufficiently aware of their roles apart from the general mantra of ‘overall management 
of the facility,’ while some did not understand their roles beyond being committee 
members. Certain roles were emphasised more than others, while some roles were 
either ignored completely, or were too difficult for the committee to achieve, given the 
contextual factors discussed here. Many of the HFCs emphasised that they were 
facilitators of facility development, and were quick to point out areas where they had 
made significant progress. Indeed facility visits by the research team revealed that the 
committees were doing an outstanding job either overseeing either the fundraising for 
or the development of the facility infrastructure. Given these committees are not 
properly remunerated for such functions, it was surprising that they were entrusted 
with major infrastructural projects at the facilities that required handling huge sums of 
money, and were expected to deliver accountably to the community and the 
government. 
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It is this precarious and tempting situation that most HFCs find themselves in; being 
required to oversee fairly massive projects with huge sums of money at their disposal, 
while paying themselves small sums of money as sitting allowance. This raises 
important questions as to whether the accountability structures, as currently 
constituted, are sustainable and to what extent should committee members be 
expected to dedicate their time and resources in what seems to be volunteer, charity 
kind of work. What is certain, however, from the data gathered in this study, is that 
without effective leadership and deep sense of self sacrifice and financial discipline, it 
is almost impossible for the HFCs to institute proper financial and performance 
accountability structures. Perhaps it is this realisation that prompted the government 
to initiate the HSSF programme, whose job is partly to provide incentives for HFC 
members in performing their duties. 
 
There was also, a clear disparity in the understanding of roles among the genders in 
the HFCs; a fact that can be explained by examining the structure and composition of 
the HFC. As already mentioned in the Chapter 4, none of the HFCs had a female leader 
in the executive subcommittee of the HFC. This situation had a direct implication for 
gender parity and the understanding of roles within the HFCs because all training on 
facility management and financing - whether by government or NGOs - were targeted 
at the executive committee members (see chapter 4 on committee training and roles). 
This effectively excluded the female representatives as none were members of this 
important committee, meaning that they rarely understood their roles in the 
committee, or lacked the skills that their male counterparts had, to effectively 
represent their constituency. Indeed, this point is captured by the views of the female 
representatives for FB who complained that the Chairman only summoned them for 
meetings when he needed them. It also meant the female HFC members could not 
question certain decisions in the committee whose origins and implications they 
[female members] did not understand, since they were serving in the committee at the 
behest of the Chairman. 
 
Since the executive sub-committee is effectively the decision making engine of the 
HFCs – it becomes clear how the accountability structure in this area systematically 
excludes women in decision making – by denying them the chance to gain essential 
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knowledge and skills that can enhance their decision making capacity in the HFC. This 
further negates the wisdom behind co-opting women representatives in the 
committees since, unlike their male counterparts who easily get the lead roles, they are 
not helped to participate effectively in the management of the HFC through training. It 
was quite surprising that the major stakeholders in the health system (the DHMT, the 
local politicians and area administration) did not see this form of exclusion as a 
problem; instead they were all quick to highlight the inclusion of women 
representatives in the HFCs as a major achievement in bringing the voice of women to 
the committee. It was understandable that perhaps resources could not allow for all 
HFC members to be trained. To bridge the gap, the trained HFC members reported 
that they shared with their colleagues their experiences which were received well. 
 
Nonetheless, this kind of knowledge sharing is not adequate and may not be reliable, 
given that HFCs are social institutions where there is competition for power and 
decision spaces. Additionally, sharing does not ameliorate the untrained HFC 
members’ feelings of exclusion. This finding has been reported elsewhere in Kenya 
[97]. Also, knowledge sharing among HFC members, does not compensate for the 
value of impartial external facilitation and support; which has been shown to be 
important in successful case studies elsewhere [77]. In South Africa, for instance, a 
facilitation process by a university department is reported to have helped clinic staff 
and community members overcome difficulties and tensions as they arose [190]. 
Meanwhile while in India, three professional local NGOs provided training to 620 
VHCs on areas like project management and adopting VHCs activities to the needs and 
capacities of the local population, thus significantly helping the VHCs improve health 
care coverage and outcomes [191]. It becomes clear that unless attention is paid to the 
quality of training process, the women members will continue to be excluded from 
decision-making even when they are physically present in meetings. 
 
Interviews with some of the most experienced HFC members supported the argument 
that clarity and consensus on HFC roles and authority can significantly help to reduce 
tensions such as those reported in FA and FB. The treasurer for FA, also a qualified 
professional accountant, offered useful comparison between the HFC and the school 
management boards for which he served. He argued that the health sector could learn 
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from the education sector, where boards consisting of properly trained members, with 
adequate support from the education ministry to manage schools. However, it should 
be noted here that school boards in Kenya tend to attract qualified members are well 
funded. Additionally, schools in Kenya are annually ranked by the government based 
on their performance in the national examination, a factor that can push the boards to 
ensure their schools perform well. All these factors are incentives for better 
performance and accountability. 
 
The clarity of roles and functions is also a key aspect of accountability if considered 
from the angle of answerability and sanctions [13]. Brinkerhoff identifies three main 
purposes of accountability in the health system from which a clear understanding of 
one’s responsibilities in the HFC can benefit:  to control the misuse and abuse of public 
resources and/or authority - this relates directly to financial accountability; to provide 
assurance that resources are used and authority is exercised according to appropriate 
and legal procedures, professional standards, and societal values - this relates to 
financial, performance, and political/democratic types of accountability; and, to 
support and promote improved service delivery and management through feedback 
and learning - the focus here is primarily on performance accountability. However, 
these three functions cannot be achieved in an HFC where few or none members are 
equipped with important skills to understand their roles. 
 
A final way to understand responsibility as an accountability marker is to consider 
HFC members’ motivation for serving in the committees. Several HFC members 
argued that they felt obliged to serve in the committee as a way of giving back to the 
society, and as a way of serving God. The Chairman for FB (a university lecturer) 
argued that the society had invested so much in him, and that he felt he could use his 
skills to serve the community by guiding the development at the HF. Meanwhile the 
women representatives FA (all private practising nurses) argued that they felt that they 
could use their skills as nurses to help improve services at the facility, (although it 
emerged from the interviews with other committee members and the community that 
there were competing interests at stake since the private clinics run by these HFC 
members competed for clients with the HFs they served). One of the women admitted 
that she saw several patients who were referred to her practice by the HWs at FA. 
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Responsibility was also largely viewed as ‘God given’; many HFC members argued that 
their participation was a way of serving God. This finding echoes the evidence in the 
literature underlying the role of spirituality as a motivating factor in resource poor 
settings, such as: among volunteers serving poor orphaned nurseries in Malawi [192], 
among lay volunteers in tuberculosis-control programmes in south Africa [193], and 
among other community carers in similar programme elsewhere in Africa [194, 195]. 
Only two interviewees admitted to joining the committee for prestige, power and the 
allowance. Data from IDIs with HWs and community members also pointed to some 
benefits for HFC members’ families, such as free care and medication, (although it was 
difficult to examine the evidence, as these were not formally recognised or outlined). 
In essence, HFC membership provided both tangible and intangible benefits, most of 
which were not comprehensively articulated. Nonetheless, it was not difficult to notice 
the altruistic motive given the compensation for the workload in the committee did 
not match the work the HFCs do. 
 
6.4.4 Power and the Functioning of Committees 
One of the most important process determinants of HFC functioning in the study area 
was power and its application in everyday HFC members’ relations. Power 
encompasses the way on which actors manage to control or direct the actions of 
others, and in some instances, how people are able to resist or subvert such control 
[196]. Power matters to implementation and policy outcomes [133] because it is at the 
centre of every health policy process [117], and is important to sociological 
investigations of the provider-patient relations [197]. Yet power is rarely explicitly 
examined in the health policy process especially in LMICs [129, 198]. Power, combined 
with patterns of patronage and cultural hierarchies, defined the operations of the 
HFCs’ priority setting, decision-making processes, and service delivery at the HFs. The 
evidence shows that, like in the HFC-Community relations discussed in the next 
chapter, the intra-committee relations were often marked by deep suspicion, a lack of 
trust, and a silent but powerful struggle permeating the boundaries of age, gender, 
professional and clan membership to the committee. Additionally, power seemed to 
revolve around two centres – the Chairmen and the FIs -, whose basis of power 
presumably lay, and was negotiated, around, the different facility resources which they 
controlled. 
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While women had representation in the HFCs, their representatives did not seem to 
wield significant power to influence decisions or perform their functions. This was 
perhaps due to the manner in which they were selected to join the committees – e.g., 
by invitation in some HFCs. Even then, their title of women representatives seems to 
imply that they represent only a section of the community they serve; a situation that 
may have implications for their participation in committees issues, for the amount of 
power they wield, and for their self-image as HFC members. Whereas accountability 
and engagement assume equal and fair representation of voice and presence, when one 
is ‘invited to join the committee’ as a ‘women representative,’ this could potentially 
limit her contribution more than it could enhance it. As already shown in earlier 
sections of this chapter, women representatives in FB complained that their 
participation in their HFC was limited by what contribution the Chairman felt they 
could, as evidenced by their limited knowledge of the committee operations. 
 
The same seemed to apply in FD where the depth of involvement of the female HFC 
members was evidently limited. In one of the HFC meetings that the author attended, 
the female representatives were passive in their contribution. The Chairman and the FI 
(both male) seemed to run the HFC by making important decisions on behalf of the 
committee. It was difficult to tell whether the women were comfortable in the HFC 
meeting and in agreement with the decisions being made, or were simply observing 
the meeting’s proceedings. This dynamic further indicates that their presence in the 
committees does not necessarily translate into effective participation. It also shows 
that even with the new government guidelines on HFC membership that require at 
least three out of five community representatives to be women [199], issues impacting 
women and children will not be automatically voiced, at least not until the cultural 
traditions that limit female participation are dealt with. 
 
Nonetheless, there was a unique case that warrants mention. Unlike in FA, gender did 
not seem to disfavour the FI for FB. Evidence from attending the HFC meeting for FB, 
showed that the FI was fully in charge of the operations of the facility, and in some 
instances seemed to have usurped the powers of the committee. In one instance, the 
committee was discussing hiring a new tea lady and a facility cleaner. The Chairman 
suggested having the committee interview the applicants. However, the FI overruled 
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him, arguing that the committee would be overstepping their mandate. Instead, she 
insisted on recruiting the needed staff with the support of the PHO (also a woman), 
and informing the committee of her choices in the next meeting. Despite prolonged 
arguments, and the Chairman receiving support from other community HFC members, 
she stood her ground and ensured that her demands were granted. 
 
Many studies in LMICs have linked committee domination by HWs to their education 
levels vis-a-vis that of community representatives, who in most cases, have been 
reported to be semi-illiterate [77-79, 84, 90, 97, 110, 128, 200]. This generalisation 
cannot be said to hold true for this study, given that almost all the community HFC 
members studied were well educated, some having postgraduate qualifications (see 
Chapter 4 for HFC members description). Therefore, another explanation was sought 
to elucidate these tensions. A review of the committee minutes and of evidence 
gathered from attending the HFC meetings, indicate that a complex web of factors, 
enveloped in power, undermine the performance of women in the HFCs. Plausibly, the 
lack of clearly defined roles among the women representatives - which is linked to 
inadequate skills or training - is one explanation, and is linked to the previous point on 
male domination through culture and traditions. Since none of the female 
representatives were members of the executive, they missed out on the training offered 
by the government. It is therefore arguable that they lacked the ‘brevity’ that comes 
with training, and which has been shown in other settings to be an important 
ingredient in determining the exercise of power within committees [84, 97, 128]. 
 
The male cultural hegemony within the study community reflects the gender disparity 
in training and subsequent power relations within the committees. It has already been 
noted in Chapter 4 that none of the committees had a female chairperson, and that the 
only female member of the FC committee had left for further studies; meaning none of 
the executive committees of the HFCs had a female member. The inadequate female 
involvement in the committees can be traced to the election process. Women, like the 
youths among this study population, tended to shy away from the Baraza where HFC 
elections ought to take place. When asked why, the answer was almost the same 
everywhere ‘mzee wangu ananiwakilisha, lazima nipate ruhusu kwa mzee ndipo niende 
na mara nyingi hawapatikani nyumbani’ translated to mean ‘my husband represents me 
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at such forums, I must get permission from him in order to attend and most of the 
time he is away from home’.29 This was a common theme across the study population. 
Moreover, the culture of the study population limits the contribution of women in 
general since they are not expected to speak freely in front of men. The majority of the 
female HFC members, including the FI, expressed their fears that they would be seen 
to be bringing ‘fitina’ (a Swahili word for ‘bad politics’) to the committee if they 
questioned how things were done, or to demanded a voice in committee affairs simply 
because these were frowned upon in their culture. 
 
Surprisingly it was the women in this community who frequently interacted with the 
HF as they found themselves taking a sick child for treatment or attending regular 
clinics. It is therefore a case of a health system designed with the main target group 
(women, the poor and vulnerable, the youth, and children) in mind, but that fails to 
provide avenues for these groups to take control of their health in the ways envisaged 
by the policies that drive accountability and engagement.  It further negates the very 
principles behind accountability - especially from the western perspective as espoused 
by the WB and donor community – that stakeholders will have a voice in matters 
directly or indirectly effecting them, without which they should have options for ‘exit’ 
[11]. Without ‘voice’ and ‘exit’, stakeholders effectively lack the power to influence 
accountability relations, a fact that was apparent in the study area. 
 
The situation was made worse where the ex-officio members of the HFC happened to 
be male (as was the case in this study). This phenomenon was readily seen in the HFC–
community relations, and is discussed further in the next chapter. Therefore, even with 
proper education, if the cultural practices as anchored in the daily power structures are 
unresponsive to accountability processes, accountability structures are unlikely to 
meet the expectations of supporting primary care, especially in expanding services to 
                                                 
29 The term Mzee as used in this community has a different connotation from regular Swahili - ‘an old or 
elderly person’. Since independence the Kenyan form of the term Mzee has been used as a euphemism 
for ‘a wise revered person’, in many cases referring to a male. It is an earned title often used by cabinet 
ministers or politicians to show awe and respect for the president. It is in this context that it should be 
understood in the study population as the women are expected to revere their husbands to the point 
that they should not ‘unnecessarily’ appear at the Baraza without the husband’s permission. As 
explained below, unlike some other Kenyan communities, the Baraza among the Kipsigis was 
surprisingly male dominated. For a visitor, it could easily qualify as a males’ club where they meet to 
make decisions on behalf of the community.   
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the vulnerable in the community. The case studies (of intra-committee relations) 
provided here illustrates this point. 
 
Over and above power application through cultural and gender dynamics, individual 
understanding of the powers and roles in the committee also had important 
implications for the functioning of the HFCs. In all cases, putting up accountability 
structures (the HFC) also meant releasing power from the centre to the local structures 
(the HFCs), with the provisioning of extra resources and authority over how such 
resources were to be spent. In some facilities this process (of handing over more 
resources and regulatory powers to local HFCs) was also seen as that of giving 
individuals or groups of individuals a chance to apply themselves in determining the 
use of facility resources in a manner that did not necessarily enhance accountability 
and engagement within the committees and with the community. The result was a 
mismatch between the powers of the chairpersons and the powers of other committee 
members (particularly HWs and female representatives), and the poor marginalised 
communities that they sought to represent. 
 
This was particularly the case in FA whose HFC was headed by an activist for a local 
teacher’s union who did not differentiate between his role as trade unionist and as the 
HFC chair (see Box 3). In leading the facility committee, he took an activist approach. 
Two cases illustrate this. In the first instance, the committee had to decide where to 
construct staff houses within the compounds of the facility using money donated by 
the local council and constituency development fund (CDF). All committee members 
and the DHMT were in agreement except the Chairman who then viewed this 
opportunity to apply his activist skills, and demonstrate that he wielded the power 
within the facility. 
 
Box 3: Power, Trust, Responsibility and Gender Struggles in a Committee 
FA served the largest and most populous divisions within Kericho district. Its HFC operations were 
characterised by wrangles that almost halted the operations of the health facility. The Chairman, age 
group 45 and above, is a local primary school head teacher and also the chair of the national teachers 
union, local branch. The facility in-charge is a female Kenya registered nurse, contrary to government 
requirement that a clinician head such a facility. Several events in the operations of the committee 
illustrate this: 
 Community pharmacy set-up and management: According to interviews with the DMOH, the 
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HFC members and record reviews, the pharmacy was set up using funds from the CDF. The 
pharmacy runs parallel and adjacent to the government-funded pharmacy dispensing government 
drugs. During the interview, the Chairman claimed that the pharmacy was his idea, and one of his 
most successful projects for the facility. According to him, it followed that he should be fully in-
charge of pharmacy management. To achieve this, he hired a local girl, without consulting with the 
HFC, to run the pharmacy. The lady reported to him with daily collections, which he claimed, he 
banked. He also decided what medicine to stock, depending on sales. The manner in which the 
pharmacy was run and the management of the funds it generated was a source of conflict and 
tension between the Chairman and the HWs led by the FI. The HWs felt that since the pharmacy 
was a community project, its profits should have been used to support the facility.  The FI claimed 
that they were unable to put up a suggestion box and a proper service charter because the Chairman 
was holding on to the funds, despite the HFC having approved the project. While acknowledging 
this claim, the Chairman informed us that he expected the user fees to be enough to cater for such 
needs, ‘after all, I don’t ask them where they take or how they use daily hospital collections’. The FI 
also complained about the community pharmacist being rude to her, and about her lack of power to 
discipline the pharmacist, who solely reported to the Chairman. 
 Conflict over timber: On the day the research team visited the facility the second time in April 
2011, the local councillor, an ex-officio member of the HFC, had raided the facility trees for timber, 
without consulting the HFC or the local administration. The councillor was very popular with the 
community, and was viewed as their main voice in the committee. In handling this matter, the 
Chairman decided to bypass the FI, instead gathering together a few committee members who he 
said were ‘closer to me’, and the district administration. When asked why he by-passed the FI, who 
is the official government administrator of the HF, he retorted, ‘I wanted to protect her from 
community politics, you know, being a woman she could be in deep problems if she was to get involved. 
This councillor is a beast; he has evicted a FI from this facility before. So it was in her own interest.’ 
When asked whether the FI shared his sentiments and had asked for his protection, he answered, 
‘some decisions you have to take as the Chairman, and I didn’t see the need of involving her.’  
 Facility bank accounts: FA recently had its FI transferred. The law therefore required that the new 
FI is, added to the list of signatories to the facility bank accounts. However, the FI informed the 
research team that the Chairman had refused to do this, claiming ‘he cannot trust a woman with 
facility bank accounts.’ In the Chairman’s words, ‘that woman [referring to the FI who had just 
walked in to the facility at the time of the interview] is not a qualified doctor; we are waiting for the 
government to post a new FI before we make the changes.’ The battles within the HFC spilt over 
into the community, with many respondents supporting the area councillor, who they argued had 
their ‘interests at heart and is the only person we can trust to solve facility issues.’ A respondent who 
had been disappointed with the services commented, ‘I wish the place [referring to the facility] could 
be turned to chicken farm, at least we can get eggs from it’. The residents were also aware of lack of a 
qualified ‘doctor’ at the facility. The majority of men reported that they stopped using the facility 
since ‘there are only nurses,’ and besides they would not ‘trust women from this village to treat men 
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and observe patient confidentiality’. This led to many residents seeking treating from a nearby 
mission hospital and at the district hospital; a situation confirmed by the DMOH who noted, ‘the 
district hospital has been recording rising numbers of patients form the area served by FA. 
Data source: Field notes 
 
He then lobbied some community members from his clan and also managed to 
convince some committee members to change their minds. In the end, the committee 
voted and the Chairman’s group successfully carried the day. It later emerged that his 
opposition to the initial suggested place was not based on any rational consideration; 
instead he was opposed to it because apparently it was the local councillor’s 
suggestion, and there were conflicts between him and the councillor (who is an ex 
officio member of the HFC). Because the Chairman had also convinced the FI to 
support his course, the councillor held a grudge, against the FI, whom he later led the 
area residents to evict from the facility on claims of non-performance. 
 
The second instance arose when the committee had to decide on the usage of some 
money left from a donation by the CDF committee. Instead of convening the 
committee to decide on the use of these funds, the Chairman went alone to the then 
DMOH, and convinced him to approve the use of the funds to start a community 
pharmacy to run in parallel with the government provided facility pharmacy. While 
this initiative later gained favour with the community, HWs and the other HFC 
members, it was the manner in which the DRF from the pharmacy was administered 
that irked the community, HWs and other HFC members. The result of these tensions 
was that the facility could not put up a suggestion box or a service charter since the 
Chairman held on to the money. The results of all these power games were service 
interruptions, low morale among HWs, and a generally disenfranchised community 
that avoided the facility for other facilities (see Box 3). 
 
These two incidences illustrate the intricate power struggles that had significant 
ramifications on the HFCs performance and impact on service delivery and 
representation (albeit less explicitly in the other facilities). What was meant to help the 
community by improving services ended up damaging the quality of care they received 
since the facility suffered serious drug shortages due to mismanagement of the drug 
revolving fund. Additionally, the fragmented manner in which the facility funds were 
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administered (separately by the Chairman and the FI) meant that important 
accountability structures such as a suggestion box and the facility Service Charter 
could not be provided since each camp saw this as the role of the other. Essentially, an 
accountability structure that was meant to support the effective functioning of the 
facility ended up disrupting its operations, and by extension, the service that the 
community received, mainly because of the manner in which power was personalised 
and applied. 
 
A final positive point about power within the HFCs is that when it was applied well, it 
aided the raising of funds for committee operations by lobbying the local politicians 
and NGOs who viewed the committees as legitimate. It was indeed amazing the work 
that FC and FD had achieved through local fundraising efforts, either because their 
HFC members - especially the Chairmen - had important connections with the local 
politicians and councils. FC had received several equipment donations from the local 
Walter Reed offices, thanks to the connections provided by the Chairman, while FD 
had their facility revamped by the Japanese government, thanks to strong lobbying by 
the Chairman and the Treasurer. 
 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this first part of discussion, four main accountability process factors were identified 
as underpinning the performance and functioning of HSA in the study area. These 
factors were: power, trust, proximity, and responsibility. Given the social nature of 
accountability and its complex form, the four factors (also referred in the analysis as 
accountability markers) were a function of committee internal relations; determined 
by how one perceived his/her their place in the committee, especially whether he/she 
felt valued. The four process factors were not mutually exclusive, and in many ways 
influenced interrelations in the committee and in turn, while those relationships 
intern influenced the power of the factors. 
 
These complex interactions (of process issues and accountability stakeholders) 
produced an inherent tension between upward accountability (HFC being accountable 
to the government through the DMOH and politicians), downward accountability 
(HFCs being accountable to their electorate), and horizontal accountability (HFCs 
finding their accountability spaces within the HF in contestation with HWs). 
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Downward accountability is considered in the next discussion chapter. It is also 
important to emphasise that without due attention to the clarity of roles and functions 
and the delineation of HFC powers vis-à-vis DMOH authority in the design of HFC 
operations, these mechanisms risk failure, especially due to multiple lines of 
accountability. The discussion presented above highlights the fact that the area of 
responsibility and lines of accountability among the various committee members were 
far from clear, undermining the legitimacy of some the their decisions. 
 
One further point can be drawn from the discussion above on the understanding and 
interpretation of power among committee members, vis-à-vis their responsibilities, 
and how these translate into better services for the community. Power and its 
interpretation among the committee members particularly the Chairmen and the FI, 
had a major impact on the functioning of the committee, especially due to its gendered 
perspective. Female committee members in some of the HFCs were reduced to 
spectators, underscoring the point above, that unless attention is paid to the quality of 
process (in this case in regard to power), people (women) can be excluded from 
decision-making even when they are physically present. As shown in the cases 
analysed above, an accountability structure in some HFs that was meant to support the 
effective functioning of the facility, ended up disrupting its operations and by 
extension the service that the community received, mainly because of the manner in 
which power was personalised and applied. 
 
If harmonious operations of the HFC can be achieved, one would then expect that the 
community should benefit from the services offered by such operations, and would 
report better levels of patient satisfaction. The following Chapter takes the discussion 
further by bringing in the perspectives from the community and their interactions with 
the HFCs and the SCs. 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMMUNITY – COMMITTEE INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
7.1 Introduction 
Having considered the main accountability markers in intra-committee relations, this 
Chapter moves the discussion to the second level of HSA interrelationships –inter-
mechanism relations - as defined in the conceptual framework by bringing in 
perspectives from the community. The four main accountability markers (power, trust, 
responsibility and accessibility) that defined intra-committee relations were also 
present in the inter-mechanism relations, albeit at different levels, and are considered 
in this Chapter under various thematic areas. This Chapter focuses on how the four 
main accountability markers influenced community-committee relations, thus 
providing a perspective into how the two interact. 
 
Section 7.2 discusses process issues and the depth of engagement between the HFCs 
and the community, including the representativeness of the HFCs. Section 7.3 is a 
discussion of the nexus between the HFC, facility users, and the facility Service 
Charters. Section 7.4 contextualises accountability experiences in the study area by 
looking at the health system and cultural context within which the HFCs operate. 
Finally, the Chapter is concluded by a summary of the main points, setting the stage for 
the final chapter of conclusions and recommendations. 
 
7.2 Process Factors and the Depth of Engagement with Committees 
7.2.1 Committee Awareness and the Functioning and Performance of Committees 
Three main indicators were used to assess the level of respondents’ awareness of the 
HFC: reported knowledge of HFC, knowledge of HFC selection criteria, and knowledge 
of a member of the HFC. Although comparison with other studies across SSA is very 
limited because of design and context issues, the level of awareness in the study area  
(55% of respondents reporting awareness of the HFC in their area), is high, compared 
to two other contextually similar studies [84, 97]. Goodman et al [97], reported an 
awareness level of 44.8% in the coast of Kenya, and Loewenson et al [84], a level of 
59% in rural Zimbabwe. However, these two studies reported on HFCs that had 
benefited from significant funding from donors, and as such, should be compared with 
caution. 
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Bivariate analysis showed that age, occupation, distance from the facility, income 
levels, and marital status were significantly associated with knowledge of HFCs. When 
multivariate analysis was performed, all the socio-demographic indicators were still 
significantly associated with HFC awareness, except for gender and marital status. The 
insignificance of gender is a surprising finding, because women use the facility services 
most frequently, and would thus be expected to have higher awareness levels. 
Qualitative data pointed at an intricate and complicated interaction between health 
system structure, and cultural practices that stifled women’s engagement in health 
related issues affecting their health. The complicated interactions were almost 
impossible to understand at surface level. 
 
Interviews with key stakeholders (DHMT) showed that government policy expected 
women to fully participate in facility issues, and assumed they would do so through the 
Baraza. But as noted in Chapter 6, since the Barazas were male dominated, it did not 
facilitate female engagement in the health system, nor did it allow them to hold the 
system accountable. In any case, cultural norms did not expect/encourage women to 
speak at the Baraza. Many female respondents reported having to seek permission 
from their husbands in order to attend a Baraza. Bivariate analysis confirmed that men 
were significantly more likely to attend a Baraza compared to women. 
 
The women relied on their husbands/fathers to handle facility matters on their behalf. 
Even within the HFCs, where there were female representatives, tradition still dictated 
that women should go through their husbands as intermediaries to reach members of 
the HFCs when they had a problem. Because the culture expected them to be passive, 
few women would take such action, instead preferring to suffer silently. During 
interviews, some women noted that the HFCs ‘hawako karibu nasi’; meaning that the 
HFCs were not accessible to them. Similar sentiments on accessibility were expressed 
about the service charter, which some felt was written in a language they could not 
understand, and about the area Councillors who many felt were only accessible to the 
rich and to men. To some respondents, accessibility issues resulted from being 
physically distant from the facility, (which was also significantly associated with HFC 
awareness). This is expected since the farther a person is from the facility, the less 
likely they are to maintain regular contact with the facility, let alone the HFC. 
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However, to a majority, the distance between the HFC and the households was 
‘artificial’ and was mainly about accessibility (approachability and how reachable) 
HFCs were. This could be an indication that users - particularly women, young people, 
the poor, and the vulnerable - need mechanisms that they can easily access to improve 
their engagement with the health system. 
 
Nonetheless, respondents were more likely to approach a community HFC member, 
and the Chief’s office, because they perceived these two to be closer to them, not 
because they trusted them, or saw them as responsible for facility issues, or because 
they perceived them to be the ones with power to handle facility problems. This 
finding indicates that user-friendly and accessible mechanisms are needed, for 
accountability to work. Scrutinising the sense and feeling of distance among the 
women showed that a majority of women preferred to talk to their husbands, family 
members, close family friends, or associates in women’s groups to discuss facility 
issues, rather than talk directly to HFC members. This was because many felt that 
these categories of individuals/groups were closer to them, and thus generally 
accessible. Proximity was also linked to trust, which is discussed below. 
 
Because most decisions about the HFC are made at the Baraza, and at meetings which 
tend to limit female participation, it is likely that women’s issues, such as user charges 
and maternal health services, would be dealt with differently were they fully involved. 
Findings on user fees and priority setting presented in Chapter 5 confirm this 
assertion. Nonetheless, the insignificant difference in HFC awareness between the 
genders could be explained by the fact that women frequently interact with the HF, 
thereby improving their knowledge of the HFC existence. This may also explain why 
women, as compared to men, had higher odds of being dissatisfied with the service at 
the local facility. Women’s perception of service quality at the facility can be a good 
indicator of the general performance of the HF, and by extension of the impact of an 
HFC since they regularly interact with the health system more than their male 
counterparts. 
 
Based on qualitative data, age disparity in HFC awareness was closely linked with 
gender. The finding that HFC awareness tended to improve with age is an indication 
that the health system has not properly integrated and engaged the young. Discussions 
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with the youth revealed a disillusioned group who felt that their voices were not being 
heard in decision-making about the facility, and that their health needs were not 
properly addressed. Like women, young people did not have a strong voice in the 
Baraza, as they rarely attended. This, they explained, was because the elderly were 
given priority within the Baraza. Many of the young people also feared that if they 
were seen raising many issues about the facility at the Baraza, they would be targeted 
for service exclusion since they were already known to the HWs. Further investigations 
also revealed that youth tended to avoid the Baraza because of the negative 
connotations associated it. From its origin in the colonial time, the Baraza was 
associated with law and order issues, and in the past, perceived offenders were severely 
punished. This instilled fear among residents who view the chief as a government 
agent for law and order, and not responsible for health issues. Indeed many 
respondents (especially young and female groups) were surprised when asked whether 
any health or HF issues were discussed at the Baraza. 
 
Proximity was also evident in the regression results, which showed significant 
variations in the level of reported HFC awareness. Respondents who used facilities FB, 
FC, and FD were more likely to know about the existence of their HFCs compared to 
those attached to FA. Two main factors could explain this: FA covered a huge area and 
large population, making it difficult for the chief to reach all areas whenever a Baraza 
was held. It is also possible that many households were not involved in the 
committees' selection, making it unlikely that they would know about their existence. 
It is also possible that the greater distance between HFC members and the community 
could limit the interactions between them. Secondly, compared to other facilities FA 
suffered an acute shortage of drugs, forcing many patients to seek services at a local 
missionary hospital, or to look elsewhere entirely. Interviews with households revealed 
a general disappointment with the facility, and many respondents expressed surprise 
that the facility had a functional HFC. 
 
7.2.2 Committee Selection and Engagement to Resolve Facility Problems 
The performance and impact of HFCs in the study area was also largely a product of 
their selection, role definition and community dynamics. Data from the household 
survey revealed that the process by which a committee was initially formed 
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significantly influenced its success, and legitimacy in the eyes of the community. 
Awareness of committee selection criteria was very low among survey respondents. 
Only 18.8% of those who knew about the committee reported awareness of its selection 
process. Although it is quite encouraging that a majority of the 18.8% reported 
‘election by community members’ as the mode of HFC selection, this number is still 
quite low, and is an indication of poor community engagement. However, this problem 
is not unique to the study area, and has been reported in Zimbabwe and Tanzania [84, 
90]. 
 
Bivariate analysis, FGDS, and other data sources all showed that gender was 
significantly associated with knowledge of HFC selection criteria, with more men than 
women reporting knowing how their local HFC was selected. Just as with the case of 
intra-committee relations, the male-directed bias surrounding knowledge of selection 
criteria indicates that the committees generally failed to consider the voices of the 
majority that they should serve: women, children, and those in the lower income 
category. The gender disparity in HFC selection awareness is further explained by 
looking at the central role of the Baraza in this important committee process. Few 
women attend the Baraza because of cultural barriers. Their lack of or limited 
participation had serious implications in that they had to rely on men to discuss and 
decide on pertinent issues, such as maternal and child health. Perhaps more worrying, 
is that the health system expected the committees, as constituted, to effectively 
capture the voices and needs of women and children, to formulate and to implement 
policies that could improve their lives, without necessarily giving women a say in those 
processes. It is therefore not surprising that few, if any women made it to the HFCs 
and that instead, women had to wait to be nominated as female representatives. 
Similar dynamics occurred between age groups with older community members more 
likely to know about committee selection methods, compared to the younger 
respondents. 
 
It is likely that Baraza attendance is the main variable that influences the knowledge of 
HFC selection. However, ignoring other process issues such as power and patronage, 
accessibility and trust, and a sense of who is responsible for HFC issues limits an 
understanding of the complex factors influencing HFC performance and impact. 
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Attending a Baraza would help one to know about HFC selection, assuming it is 
discussed during that Baraza. Nonetheless, the fact that younger respondents in the 
age group 16 – 24 years reported less knowledge of HFC selection is a reflection of 
feeling disenfranchised or being ignored when decisions are made about the running 
of the facility. Discussions with this group revealed a sense of alienation from the 
general management of community affairs, which tended to be handled by the elderly 
perceived to be more experienced. The youth tended to avoided the Baraza altogether 
and thus gradually developed a sense of powerlessness in determining who goes into 
the HFC. In effect, they could not trust the available structures to listen to them in 
matters of the HFCs. Sentiments such as, ‘it is not our responsibility’, or ‘it is their 
responsibility’, ‘I don’t trust that they would listen to us in the Baraza’, ‘we are not 
empowered to change the status quo’, or ‘the Chief is too powerful to be challenged’ 
dominated and permeated the FGDs and IDIs responses from both women and those 
aged 16 – 34 years. 
 
A majority of community members and community HFC members did not believe the 
HFCs represented community voices in the facility. Both groups saw the HFC as 
responsible for the general management of the facility; which is certainly a key role of 
the HFCs. However, the community still expected the HFC to represent them. Data 
from the IDIs and FGDs revealed a deep understanding of HFC roles among 
respondents. The majority of respondents mentioned issues such as ensuring waivers 
to the poor, implementing user fee policy, ensuring drugs availability, ensuring HWs 
performed their duties, holding HWs accountable for facility finances, and protecting 
the facility users from rude HWs, as key roles that the HFCs should perform. As 
discussed later in this chapter, community members viewed being issued a payment 
receipt as more important than the amount they had paid to the facility in user fees. In 
their understanding, these broad issues constituted community representation, and 
are what they expected the HFC to account for. 
 
On the other hand, HFC members saw themselves as administrators of the HFs, and 
fundamentally as agents of development of the local facility; a role they played quite 
well. As already highlighted in Chapter 4, it seemed that HFC members in some 
instances did well in mobilising funds for facility development, and in managing 
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infrastructure activities. It could be that their level of dedication was purely out of 
goodwill and commitment to community service. Few HFC members saw themselves 
as representing community voices in the facility, highlighting an important shift in 
understanding of accountability among different stakeholders. For example, HFC 
members reported when interviewed that they expected the FI, with the help of the 
DMOH, to supervise, and thereby ensure HWs performed their jobs (because the 
DMOH had overall authority over the HWs appointed by the MOH at the district 
level). While acknowledging that the HFC could not effectively supervise HWs, the 
DMOH indicated that the committees were at least expected to take up complaints 
about HW behaviour through regular meetings, and thereby ensure the HWs were 
accountable to the community through the HFCs. 
 
Therefore fundamental questions remain about where and with whom the 
responsibility for accountability, and the power to impose sanctions lay.  Perhaps the 
lack of clarity over the roles of the HFC, the inherent feeling among community 
members that HFC members were ‘distant’ from the community, inaccessible, in some 
cases either unwilling to help or lacked the powers to influence meaningful change at 
the facility, and therefore could not be trusted altogether, explain community 
members choices of where to seek help when faced with a problem at the facility. The 
majority of respondents (35.1%) preferred to talk to HWs (the majority singled out the 
FI), as their first choice, followed by a family member (26.4%), and the area chief 
(21.3%). Only 13.7% chose a community HFC member; showing that many people do 
not see the committee as appropriately representing their problems or suited to handle 
issues of the HF. The majority of respondents reasoned that the HWs, especially the FI, 
being the ‘duty bearers’, were also responsible.  
 
7.2.3 Committee – Community Communication 
In order to achieve accountability to the larger community, it is essential that 
communication mechanisms are carefully considered in the process of setting up the 
HFCs [79, 97]. Communication mechanisms best ensure accountability when they are 
dynamic and reciprocal. For the study area, HFC relied almost entirely on the Baraza. 
As already noted in Chapters 4 and 5, the Baraza in the Kenyan setting, is an 
administrative forum convened by the local administration (usually the Chief’s office) 
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to discuss issues affecting the community. However, the main users of the HF who 
could benefit from the decisions made at the Baraza, (i.e. women and youth), were less 
likely to attend these forums. Data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 showed that men 
and those in the age bracket 35 and above were more likely to attend a Baraza as 
compared to women and those in the age category 16 – 34 years. 
 
The reasons for the variations along age and gender have already been highlighted in 
this Chapter, and are closely linked to the four main accountability markers already 
identified, namely: accessibility, power, trust, and responsibility. Data from the IDIs 
and FGDs help shed light on how these four process markers interact to influence 
accountability of the HFC to the population via communication. In terms of 
accessibility, the majority of women and the younger respondents (irrespective of 
gender) lamented that the key stakeholders at the Baraza (the area chief/village elders) 
were not easily accessible to them, and that they would need permission from their 
husbands/elders to approach them. Even if they asked for permission, their issues must 
be judged by the men to be significant and worthy of the attention of the chief. 
Additionally, women and the young particularly, may not have felt free to raise 
confidential issues with the elderly in this community.30 Therefore, they lacked the 
trust that is fundamental for accountability mechanisms to be effective. 
 
Secondly, the community in this area still considered the Baraza a law and order 
forum. Many respondents expressed surprise when asked whether any HF issues had 
been discussed in the last Baraza that they attended, wondering aloud that ‘health 
issues were not the responsibility of the chief.’ The community did not see the 
chief/village elders as responsible for health or health facility issues, highlighting a 
failure by the government in reforming the Baraza to make it suitable for its new role 
as a community development forum where issues such as health can be dealt with. 
                                                 
30 A case in point is the new government policy of provider initiated testing and counselling (PITC). 
Since many people do not volunteer to take HIV tests because of the stigma associated with disease, this 
policy is meant to help detect new cases of HIV, and to put those infected on medication. During FGDs 
with the age group 16 – 24 years, we learnt that this group was being denied services if they did not 
accept to be tested for HIV. While many reported to be happy to take the test, they reported that they 
faced two main barriers. Firstly, the staff hired by the HFC to run the VCT centres were local females, 
and were reported not to keep confidentiality (as they supposedly would talk to other community 
members about those they found positive and warn peers against any sexual engagement with the 
victims). Secondly, they queried why HIV testing was now linked to other services and why it had 
become compulsory. 
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Lastly, the power dynamics within the Baraza in this setting did not favour or provide 
an environment conducive for women and youth participation. The current set up of 
the Baraza still borrows heavily from the traditional African practice perfected by the 
colonial British government where community elders convened meetings to deal with 
communal issues, such as conflicts, family disputes, land disputes, security, among 
other issues - more of an instrument for pacifying the communities and ensuring law 
and order. The remit of such meetings were unlimited, but it is important to note that 
within the African traditional setting, such meetings were embedded within the 
patriarchal societal practices and, as such, the Baraza in many communities was male-
dominated. Subsequent Kenyan governments reformed this important communal 
institution but in a way that served the interest of the ruling class.31  
 
Little has changed in the community of study. In fact, experiences from the field 
strongly suggested that the institution of the Chief in which the Baraza is anchored is 
associated with corruption, nepotism, harassment, punitive actions levelled against 
perceived offenders or lawbreakers, and in some cases extortion from would be clients. 
It has been applied like a kangaroo court of some sort, often avoided by the youths -
mainly due to fear - who view it as a platform for the ‘wazee’ to discuss community 
issues. Comments from the FGDs pointed to why young people in the study area 
avoided the Baraza: age difference, the discussion of irrelevant or unappealing issues, 
the mode of conducting the meetings with the chiefs viewed as being unfriendly, and 
the lack of perceived benefits from attending such meetings. It is therefore difficult to 
see how the women and young people would contribute effectively in such forums, let 
alone hold the HFCs accountable. As was the case with HFC elections, the HFCs in 
many cases failed to find the proper communication mechanism that was necessary for 
ideal engagement with the community, resulting in a breakdown of accountability. 
 
 
                                                 
31 For instance, the Baraza was to be summoned and conducted by the area chief (an administrative 
position under the office of the president meant to facilitate development though ensuring law and 
order), supported by village elders, representing clans or ‘milango’. Under the one party state (which 
lasted till 1992) the position of chief, as the ‘eyes’ and representative of the president at the local level, 
was an exceptionally powerful institution, and was easily abused by the holders. It is until recently with 
the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010 that the provincial administration was 
reconstituted requiring the central government to reform the institution of the chief, a factor that has 
further weakened the Baraza as a mechanism for facilitating accountability in the health system. 
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7.2.4 Responsiveness - Engaging Users in Priority Setting and Decision Making 
An important facet of an accountability mechanism is its ability to ensure efficient use 
of resources, and effectiveness in implementing programmes that meet the 
community’s health needs [201]. Results from this study showed that HFC’s decision 
making and priority setting processes influenced whether users perceived them as 
responsive or not and whether users would report satisfaction with the services they 
receive. This study evaluated HFCs responsiveness based on three main indicators 
identified during the pilot: equity (user fee charges), quality of service (drugs 
availability and financial accountability) and involvement in priority setting.  
 
There was little evidence that the HFCs ever consulted with the community when 
deciding on the amount of the user fee, even though government policy required them 
to do so. Instead, IDIs with HFCs members across all the four facilities revealed that 
the HFCs decided on a figure (KES 50 across the board) - based on the 
recommendation of the FI, and with the approval of the DMOH. This partly explains 
why the level of awareness on user fee setting was very low among survey respondents. 
Generally, the committees felt that having been elected, they represented the voices of 
the community, and as such it was unnecessary to consult the community. To many of 
the committee members, this would amount to a ‘failure in/of leadership in the eyes of 
the community’. Additionally, committee members mentioned that the community 
was not consulted because it was so difficult to organise a forum where community 
members could share their views even though the Baraza, however ineffective, already 
existed. 
 
However, both quantitative and qualitative data produced a surprising finding; users 
were not as much concerned about the level of user fees paid, as they were about 
adherence to the user fee policy. Additionally, users were more concerned about the 
HFCs inability to account for the funds they collected, and to provide some form of 
waivers for the poorest, rather than how much they were charged. None of the HFCs 
had a clear exemption scheme for users who were unable to pay. Those mostly effected 
were pregnant women who could not deliver at the facilities due to the high costs, and 
children under 5 who, despite the government policy of total exemption, were in some 
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instances being charged more than the HFC’s own prescribed fee of KES 50.32 
Additionally, non-adherence to clear and explicit fee arrangement engendered 
mistrust, because many users, having accepted that services will likely have some costs, 
questioned why these were not explicit. In cases where fees were explicit (on the 
facility service charters), they questioned why the HWs did not adhere to their policy. 
 
In the regression analysis, adherence to user policy i.e., whether one was charged the 
right amount, was a significant determinant of HFC awareness. Those who had been 
overcharged were more likely to know about the existence of the HFC, showing that 
users associated user charges levels with the HFC. The finding that best captures users’ 
perception of HFC responsiveness is from the regression showing that those who had 
been issued with receipts on user fee payment had higher odds of reporting 
satisfaction with the general performance of the facility. It is imperative to note that 
the amount one paid, whether it adhered to the set user fee or not, was not a 
significant determinant of user satisfaction. Additionally, HFC awareness and income 
levels were also not significantly associated with user satisfaction, indicating that users 
valued certain aspects of accountability; and in this context, being issued with a receipt 
was a key indicator of accountability. Indeed overcharging at the facility was ranked at 
number four by respondents when asked what priorities they wished addressed by the 
HFCs. 
 
On quality indicators, users were particular about drug availability at their facility and 
linked this with user fee payment. Whether one received drugs during their last visit 
was not a significant determinant of user satisfaction in general. However, those who 
received drugs in their last visit to the facility had higher odds of being aware of their 
local HFC. One explanation is that users linked quality service as indicated by drugs 
availability to the HFC, and expected to get at least the basic drugs after paying user 
charges. Qualitative discussions showed that in facilities where there were frequent 
drug stock-outs, users pointed a finger at the HFC as being irresponsive to their needs 
especially when they had to pay user fees and then buy drugs from outside the facility. 
There were also reports of corruption where users claimed that government drugs were 
                                                 
32 During the survey, the research team encountered two families who had lost their loved ones because 
they could not afford the requisite KES 700 which two of the facilities FA and FB charged for HW 
supported delivery at the facility. This is highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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being sold to them at private pharmacies owned by the HWs. Availability of drugs was 
identified by the respondents as the main problem that needed addressing by the 
HFCs. This was followed by staffing and HWs behaviour. 
 
A spot check at the facilities during the both the pilot and the main survey found that 
the facilities suffered drug stock-outs, for which the HWs blamed the government 
push system; which in most cases sent facilities drugs they did not need. It was not 
possible to verify how the facilities used the drug revolving fund (DRF), which accrued 
from sales of drugs. Of users’ priorities for their facilities (drug shortage, staffing and 
HWs behaviour), only staff shortage matched those of the HFCs. It was only in FD that 
drug shortage was a priority. This difference in priorities could be explained by the fact 
that HFCs rarely consulted with the community in their facility priority planning 
processes. But it could also be an indication of a breakdown in the overall processes 
that sustain accountability: committee selection, the understanding of committee 
roles, communication, and a lack of willingness among various stakeholders to actively 
engage and be held accountable. In the same way that centre powers (in this case 
MOH) are expected to be devolved and eased into the hand of local units (the HFCs), 
these local units must also be ready to relinquish some of their powers to those they 
serve. Local units are expected to communicate their priorities and to accept that for 
accountability to work, an open communication process must be sustained between 
the duty bearers and the public. 
 
HFCs have a duty to their electorate to maintain communications without becoming 
complacent. In return, the electorate are expected to actively seek information and 
demand accountability from the HFCs. In a culture where open conversation is not the 
norm, and certain members of the community are not expected to freely engage with 
the authorities, a constant nudging might be required to build and encourage 
ownership of the HF just as it is with the schools. Only then can a genuine process of 
accountability can be achieved. On the side of the community, there were those who 
were eager to engage, but were limited by numerous barriers such as a fear of being 
‘marked’ and denied service at the facility, or being viewed as polemic in a community 
where people frequently mentioned relying on God to punish irresponsibility. 
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7.3 Community, Committees and the Place of Facility Service Charters 
No previous studies were found that had evaluated this mechanism for accountability 
in health, showing that it could be a relatively new idea especially in LMIC settings. For 
this study, the SC was considered an independent variable in the analysis of HFC 
functioning since the HFCs are directly involved in setting up a SC. The HFCs are also 
expected to ensure that commitments on the SC are met. None of the SCs in the 
facilities met the standard set by the government in terms of the information provided 
to facility users. While all of them had provided a list of services offered and the 
corresponding costs, the information was fragmented. It was generally hard to 
understand whether the information provided on the SCs were a genuine commitment 
to accountability by the HFCs, for example, for the service they gave their clients. 
 
Bivariate and multivariate analysis showed that one’s cluster facility, occupation, 
education level, income, and whether one received drugs at facility or was required to 
buy drugs outside the facility were all significant determinants of perceived SC 
usefulness. These associations notwithstanding, there were three main ways in which 
the SC facilitated and influenced accountability relations at the facility. Firstly, it 
provided users with a voice to curb potential overcharging (though the study found 
only one case where a user had relied on the SC to query the amount he was charged). 
Secondly, it provided useful information about the services offered and their costs. 
Finally, many uses felt the SC helped them plan their medical expenses before coming 
to the facility for service, while others felt the SC was a sign of transparency or ‘uwazi’ 
in Swahili as they referred to it. Even though the research team identified only one 
case in which a client had queried the amount he was being charged after reading the 
information on the SC, this mechanism has a potential for enhanced accountability 
that can supplement the Baraza and other modes of communication between the HFC 
and facility clients. 
 
A number of factors lead to this conclusion. First, over 80% of the study population 
can read basic English and Swahili, meaning that if the information was provided in a 
user friendly manner, many clients would benefit from it. Second, a majority of 
respondents expressed a desire to have financial accounts displayed as part of the SC 
commitment. The logic, they argued, was that it’s often difficult to bring facility users 
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together for a meeting to share this information, but that it would be easier and 
cheaper to print it and display the accounts on a public notice board at the facility. In 
fact both pilot and survey data reveal that the majority of respondents expected this to 
be the practice, and were disappointed that none of the facilities ever provided 
information on how they spent the money they collected, despite that the user charges 
were clearly shown. 
 
The challenges associated with displaying such information, though, would be the 
sensitive nature of the information, especially in a poor area where majority still live 
below poverty line, and the extra human resources that would be required to put 
together this information given the HWs are already overburdened by the huge 
number of patients they have to attend to. A number of studies have reported that  
HWs and administrators were reserved displaying financial information openly as a 
source of possible security risk to HWs and the facility, especially where their security 
cannot be guaranteed [99, 106]. Nonetheless, evidence from this study such as HFCs 
disagreeing on who should handle which funds, suggests far more might be going on 
beyond the superficial explanations about security and sensitivity of the data. In actual 
fact, one of the major challenges to achieving financial accountability particularly in 
the study facilities was staff shortage. The FI did not have enough time to monitor how 
the support staff (facility clerks) handled the finances. These challenges are not unique 
to the study population and have been reported elsewhere [96, 110]. With the new 
HSSF programme currently being introduced, there is hope that this level of 
accountability could be achieved when facilities are provided with professionally 
trained staff to handle finances. 
 
7.4 Contextualising Process Issues in Accountability Mechanisms 
In developing the conceptual framework that guided this study, it was hypothesised 
that the functioning and performance of accountability mechanisms (in this case 
HFCs) would be influenced to a greater extent by the overall functioning of the health 
system i.e. the context within which the mechanisms find themselves (see figure 3.1 
chapter 3). This is because health systems not only produce health care and directly 
impact health, they also can shape wider norms and values around which the care is 
received [12], and provide a site from which to contest accountability spaces [14]. It is 
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therefore imperative to see the functioning and performance of HFCs in Kericho 
district as part product of Kenya’s primary health care system, and also of the cultural 
environment within which the HFCs operate. 
 
At the time of this study, there were some policy changes that were being introduced 
but whose impacts on the HFCs could not be immediately evaluated. Examples include 
the implementation of the Kenya community strategy which sought to give more 
powers to the communities in managing their own health, including recognising the 
household as one of the levels of care in the health system [202], and the direct 
funding of facilities through the HSSF [199]. This study thus provides important 
baseline data for future comparison on the impacts of the new programmes. 
 
Prior to these programmes, Kenya had implemented a decentralisation programme 
anchored to the concept of PHC where lower rung facilities are managed by HFCs 
under the supervision of the DHMT. In the study area, the DHMT through the DMOH 
had significant control on the affairs of the HFCs, which according to the team, 
‘ensures accountability of the HFCs and protection of the interest of users’. Apart from 
being in charge of the health system in the district, the DHMT had certain key roles 
and powers in relation to the HFCs, such as: approving any charges proposed by the 
HFCs, presiding over the election of community HFCs members, facilitating staffing of 
facilities, and maintaining an overall supervisory role over staff. In fact, the line of 
accountability of the HFCs to the DHMT was much clearer as compared to HFC-
community accountability. There were however strong points and grey areas which we 
now turn to. 
 
7.4.1 District Health System Leadership 
Two cases illustrate the impact of health system leadership structure on the 
functioning and performance of accountability mechanisms in the study area. First, 
Kericho district had a DMOH who developed an excellent relationship with the HFCs, 
HWs, and the community. His leadership style seemed to endear him to the local 
community and his staff, and therefore was largely trusted. The effect of this trust was 
that they supported his decisions, and did not assume he was interfering with their 
activities, even in cases where he clearly overstepped his mandate. A case in point is 
FA, where the DMOH ordered that the local community pharmacy at the facility be 
 166 
 
shut and merge with the government pharmacy after disputes between the HFC 
Chairman and the FI on management of DRF proceeds. Although according to the 
HWs this was the right decision-since it meant that they could now consolidate facility 
finances and ensure improved drugs supply--some members of the committee saw this 
as usurping of HFC powers, especially because the DMOH did not involve them in the 
decision to close down the pharmacy. This resulted in the one side of the HFC 
represented by the FI feeling victorious, and the other side led by the Chairman feeling 
wounded. The decision also received praise from community members who felt that 
the pharmacy was a moneymaking venture by the Chairman, since they had to buy 
drugs from it even after paying the regular user fees. 
 
A second case in point comes from the HFC elections. By law, the HFCs are required to 
hold elections every three years. This exercise should be organised by the DHMT and 
presided over by the DMOH and the area DO to ensure fairness and effective 
participation by the community. Since the chief is an ex officio member of the HFC, 
the elections ought not to held at a Baraza that he convenes to avoid any conflict of 
interests. During the time of the fieldwork, the HFC had outlived their three year 
terms but could not hold elections because they had not received authorisation from 
the DMOH. Instead, the HFC members and the DHMT confirmed that the DMOH 
postponed the elections until the facilities received the first batch of HSSF funds from 
the government. The DMOH explained that since the funds required signatories, two 
of which should be community members, it was not possible to hold the elections. 
However, community members felt that they did not have powers to influence 
important processes such as HFC elections, and identified this as a case in which the 
centre intentionally refused to release power to the local level. 
 
These cases highlight the four main issues discussed in Chapter 6 namely: 
responsibility, power, trust and accessibility in the operations of the HFCs. The cases 
also show the significance of understanding accountability as a function of complex 
processes, and not merely of structures and outcomes, as is portrayed in most of the 
literature and donor-funded projects. In terms of responsibility, it is important to 
clearly define lines of accountability and associated roles and responsibilities in order 
for mechanisms to function optimally. In the cases highlighted here, while the DMOH 
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may have been acting in good faith to close the pharmacy, it resulted in further 
division within the committee thus failing to achieve the intended purpose. It did not 
help that the HFC Chairman for FA took personal liberties with the pharmacy to the 
extent that it almost was a private enterprise. Further still, while postponing HFC 
elections may have been the appropriate action to ensure the facilities did not miss out 
on funding, the manner in which it was done portrayed the DHMT as overstepping on 
their roles and powers, and thereby causing disquiet within the HFC’s and the 
community. 
 
Moreover, these cases also show the complex interplay of power within accountability 
structures. As shown in the literature review, policy makers rarely expect such complex 
interactions[65, 129, 198], but instead tend to assume that the HFCs, like clinical aspect 
of care provision, will be devoid of politics of power and power struggles. This 
assumption is a major oversight on the part of policy makers, at least based on the 
experiences reported in this study. Accountability in the health system, the level 
notwithstanding, involves human relations around scarce resources. Whether they are 
intended so or not, such interactions and relationships will be about who gets what, 
when and how, and that implies the politics of power and power struggles, however 
subtle. Therefore, the government would do better in developing the capacity of HFCs 
and the DHMT to deal with conflicts that arise from these accountability relations. 
Particularly, it is important to build trust among committee members through 
continuous training, role clarification, and supportive supervision which can reduce 
the personalisation of power and facility resources. 
 
7.4.2 Socio-Cultural Context of the Local Community 
Finally, the cultural context within which the accountability mechanisms are meant to 
work is equally as important as the context of the health system [5, 35, 203-205]. The 
mechanisms themselves are an articulation of particular cultural values, and as such, it 
is important to consider to what extent these ‘fit’ the wider cultural context. For this 
study, the culture of political patronage, male dominance and inequality served either 
to hinder or promote accountability and engagement. The role of cultural context 
becomes clear when looking at the accountability-based decisions and options that 
users have for recourse whenever they feel the health system is failing them, and the 
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reasons behind those decisions. Respondents in this study were asked to discuss their 
options when dealing with the health facility and the facility committee. For example, 
respondents reported that they would consult a certain authority (family member, 
community HFC member, local administration, HWs, local politician) mainly because 
they felt the authority was responsible (42%), nearest to them (26%), trustworthy 
(17%) and because they were powerful and could deal with the issue (15%). 
 
Investigating these choices further through FGDs and IDIs revealed deeper, but hidden 
reasons behind the choices that were linked to Kipsigis culture. As already mentioned 
elsewhere in this Chapter, most women were likely to choose a family member, most 
probably the husband, to help resolve any problem at the facility. This, they reported, 
was because they were nearer to their family member (accessible) and they trusted 
them. On the contrary, most men would approach the local politician (councillor or 
MP) to deal with facility issues because they believed they were powerful and could 
handle facility problems. Again, compared to women, men were likely to have easy 
access to the local power wielders. Chapter 4 narrated a case in FA, where the 
councillor mobilised local residents to evict the FI who was perceived to be 
underperforming without involving the DHMT or the local HFC. Similar cases--of local 
politicians or elite taking control of HFCs--for personal or insinuated community gains 
have been reported in other studies across LMICs [82, 206, 207]. Most men clustered 
around FA reported that the councillor was their best choice in dealing with poor 
performance at the facility, noting that the Chairman and his team had failed to listen 
to them or were not powerful enough to bring meaningful change to the facility. 
 
Interviews with community leaders pointed to a cultural issue that went beyond the 
HFC and its members. Generally the Kipsigis community tend to shy away from 
confrontation, and as such they do not question the community HFC members on 
matters of the facility fearing that it would be seen as ‘fitina’ or ‘bad politics’. Closely 
linked to the ‘fear of confrontation’ and ‘fitina’ is the place of religion in everyday lives 
of the Kipsigis. Many respondents pointed to God as the ultimate judge of people, and 
as the ultimate holder of the ‘accountability stick’; used to punish those who do not 
perform their roles in the community. Responsibility was linked to the perception that 
it is human to serve and ones’ duty to perform to their best of ability. God would be 
 169 
 
the one to deal with you should you fail. Perhaps this is what Dowden has referred to 
as ‘a clear evidence of the humanity of Africans, rooted in traditions of duty and deeply-
felt religion’ [208]. Rather than take accountability actions or sanctions as envisaged in 
the literature, most community members felt they would leave this to God as 
‘responsibility is God given, and it’s our duty in service to him to perform our roles, 
failure to which it’s him to punish.’ Many ideas about accountability of the HFC were 
actually embedded not only in the wider social structures, but ultimately on beliefs 
about the cosmology. 
 
There is also the ‘strong African man syndrome’, where power and institutions tend to 
be personalised, and any attempts to challenge underperformance would be seen as an 
affront on the person holding the position of authority. It is therefore difficult to see 
how HFCs as mechanisms of accountability can function effectively with all these 
caveats enveloped in socio-economic and political hierarchies. This is perhaps best 
exhibited by the comment of the HFC Chairman for FA in reference to the FI, and in 
response to a question asking why he was sidestepping the FI in committee decisions; 
‘I am protecting the woman from local politics’. Several studies [96, 108, 188] have 
reported similar experiences in other parts of Africa.  
 
But the silence was much pronounced among the women who society did not expect 
to openly engage without the permission of their husbands. Therefore most women 
relied on their husbands to represent them at the Baraza where facility issues were 
discussed. Indeed during the researcher’s interaction with the female respondents it 
was not hard to notice their timid nature, with most of them commenting that ‘mzee 
wangu [my husband] is better placed to answer that,’ even after the research team 
emphasised that the interviews were personal and confidential. In both cases (of the 
cultural and health system context) the problem was not so much that the 
patients/community members were disengaged/did not want to engage with the 
system, but rather that the providers/HFCs and the health system was not always vey 
engaging. The story in Box 4, illustrate some of these issues. 
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Box 4: Culture, Health care Costs, and Engaging the HFC to Resolve Facility Problems (FB) 
Claire* has five children aged eight, six, five, three, and one. Given her young age of 25 years, it’s clear 
that she must have been married early. As we get into the details of the interview, Claire’s eyes change 
and her jovial mood disappears. She begins to narrate to us her predicaments since her husband left 
for work in the coastal city of Mombasa. She reveals that her last three children have been ill for the 
last three weeks. From their hospital records, one was diagnosed with malaria, typhoid and the 
youngest a mild cough. She says she couldn’t afford the cost of care at the hospital and after the 
diagnosis, she was denied medication because she couldn’t produce the KES 500 that the HWs had 
demanded. She narrates how the health facility (FB) had ‘become like private where one cannot get 
treatment unless you part with specified amounts of money’. The only difference between private and 
public facilities, she says, is on the quality of care given. Most of the times ‘the HWs would still ask you 
to buy drugs from the private pharmacy outside the facility even after paying the requisite user charges’. 
 
Claire tells us that she got to know about user fees from the facility service charter, but that most of 
the time, users end up paying more since each window or department at the facility will demand some 
money before helping. To cope with the high user charges, Claire sometimes opt to buy drugs directly 
from the pharmacy when the illness is not severe, arguing that it made no economic sense to visit the 
HF, pay user charges, but not get the drugs. She also tells us that sometimes she would visit a private 
clinic in the local market where she can get treatment on credit since the proprietor is a local and 
knows her circumstance. She would then pay latter when she got the money. At times she would also 
use local traditional herbs and other times resort to prayer for healing. 
 
At this point, we ask Claire about the whereabouts of her husband and she tells us that, ‘since he left 
for Mombasa about six months ago, he had not returned, but had called the other day to say that he had 
found a second wife, a Luo, and that he will be bringing her home’. She adds that ‘men in this village 
resort to additional wives or extramarital affairs, once they get some extra money, leaving their wives to 
shoulder all family burdens’. She tells us how she is struggling to cope with high costs of care, finding 
food for the children and ensuring they can go to school. Claire thinks that cost sharing is not a bad 
thing; but that the charges at the facility are too high for the poor and that despite government policy 
for free care for under 5s, she is always charged even when she goes for regular immunization. 
 
Claire is aware of the HFC and knows some of its members. She tells us that the community including 
herself, have complained several times to the committee, ‘but nothing is changing; I gave up on putting 
my hopes on them [the HFC], if I can’t afford it, I stay home or seek help elsewhere, otherwise they will 
accuse you of petty politics, that you are full of “fitina” [bad politics]. It’s not unusual to be accused of 
spreading gossip, especially for me being a woman and my husband is away; they would say I am 
idle…you know such kind of talk’. Claire tells us that she leaves it to God who is in charge of everything. 
Source: Field notes  
*Name changed for anonymity  
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7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The discussions presented in these two chapters point to the fact that health systems 
are complex socio-political institutions, and not merely delivery points for bio-medical 
interventions [132]. Though four main accountability markers identified (trust, power 
accessibility and responsibility) form the main dynamics influencing the performance 
of accountability mechanisms, and represent a complex web of factors that either 
enhance or undermine the performance of accountability structures in the study area. 
All the four factors were closely interlinked, serving to illustrate the fact that 
accountability in health is not a linear process. Instead, it is constituted of much more 
complex processes that involve determination and human and policy interactions. It is 
rarely a simple cause-and-effect relationship as current policy envisages, but instead 
chains of factors, potentially quite long, which cause and are embedded in multiple 
interactions. It is therefore impossible to separate aspects of power from trust, 
responsibility and accessibility or proximity. 
 
Comparison of the study findings with other literature on accountability and 
engagement in health, though limited, revealed some similarities on the functioning of 
HFCs in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. There were also some differences. For instance, 
unlike in other studies where the level of education in the community was reported to 
be an important influencing variable in the functioning of committees (i.e. that low 
education levels among community HFC members and HF users tends to undermine 
accountability relations), this study found that this did not hold entirely in the study 
area. Instead, power relations, trust within HFCs and with the community, accessibility 
of HSA mechanisms, and an understanding of responsibility of HSA structure 
members were important explanatory variables. Within committees, power was at the 
centre of stakeholder relationships (Figure 7.1), while the committee-community 
interrelationships were largely revolved around trust, which influenced how 
stakeholders understood their responsibility, applied their powers, and actualised 
accessibility (Figure 7.2). These factors were accentuated by cultural values and 
practices, and the health system context within which HSA was applied. The 
interactions of various forces caused the difference between what policy had envisaged 
for HSA, and what committees and health workers implemented, and what users 
experienced.  
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Figure 7.1: Accountability Markers Characterising Intra-Committee Relations  
Source: Author  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A final conclusion that can be drawn from the results and discussions above is that 
context matters in understanding the performance and impact of HSA mechanisms. 
For instance, it seems that the committees studied here were quite successful in 
Power
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Responsibility 
Trust
Trust
Responsibility
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Figure 7.2: Understanding committees - community interrelationships 
Source: Author  
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bringing in women as representatives in the committees. In fact, it would seem that 
they had overcome the representation challenge and met the government policy on 
gender inclusion [199]. But that was just about it; co-opting women in the HFCs to 
achieve gender balance did not result in more female issues being articulated or 
prioritised, nor did it result in their male counterparts opening up any ‘decision space’ 
so that they [women] could influence policy in the HFCs. Perhaps it represents the 
‘naïve position’ that more participation equals more accountability, and that HSA are 
devoid of politics of power since they handle health, which has traditionally been 
perceived as a non-political issue. However, evidence discussed in this study point to 
the need to understand that HFCs are made of complex human beings engaged in a 
web of interactions, motivated by a range of different financial and non-financial 
incentives, and that accountability relationships are deeply hinged in cultural and 
professional value systems. 
 
The following Chapter takes these points into consideration and provides some policy 
options for addressing some of the issues that arose from the study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
8.1 Summary of the Study 
Drawing on existing theoretical and empirical research, and a pilot study to 
contextualise the practice of accountability to the study location, this thesis has 
examined the factors that impact the functioning and performance of health system 
accountability mechanisms (HSA) in rural Kenya. In particular, the study primarily 
focused on the process factors that influence the health system accountability. 
Following a mapping exercise that identified the main HSA mechanisms in the study 
area, health facility committees (HFCs) and facility service charters (SCs) were 
identified as the predominant HSA mechanisms in the study area, present in all the 
HFs studied. Further, SCs were found to be part of the broader function of HFCs and, 
as such, were analysed as a determining variable (sub-set) in the operations of HFCs. 
The analysis presented took a two pronged approach, where accountability within 
HFCs was considered, followed by an analysis of HFC-Community relations, thus 
providing a holistic picture of the practise of accountability that has hitherto been 
lacking in the literature, as most studies focused primarily on either the HFCs or the 
community perspectives on HFCs [77]. 
 
The importance of understanding the factors impacting on the performance and 
effectiveness of HSA mechanisms flows from a sustained international emphasis on 
accountability in health, especially in LMICs where health systems are struggling to 
effectively allocate scarce resources in the face of growing demands for PHC [12, 58, 
119]. Also important is the realisation that involving people in planning their health is a 
human right in itself, besides the other possible benefits which may include: raising 
additional resources for facilities; reducing the impact of medical costs through waiver 
schemes; and generally promoting equity and reducing poverty in the health system, in 
the wake of the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other infections in 
LMICs. 
 
Using data from a household survey in a rural Kenyan district, this study sought to: 
describe the range, nature and composition of existing HSA mechanisms supporting 
primary care in peripheral health facilities; analyse the perceived impact of the above 
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mechanisms on PHC delivery through an assessment of their depth of engagement, 
responsiveness, and effectiveness; examine the key factors that influence the 
performance of the above mechanisms with a focus on the role of process; and to 
identify policy implications for improving HSA at the peripheral level. The study 
systematically reviewed the available theoretical and empirical literature on HSA and 
PHC service delivery and developed a multi-factor conceptual framework that 
incorporated aspects of various theories on accountability in health and pilot data from 
the study location which led to the gathering of a rich mix of data. To examine the 
factors impacting the performance of HSA mechanisms, mixed methods analysis was 
employed ranging from univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical tools using IBM 
SPSS software, complemented by qualitative thematic approaches. 
 
8.2 Study Limitations and Attempts to Overcome Them 
Although much care was taken in designing and implementing this study, no research 
is without limitations and some of these are highlighted below: 
 
 The study relied on user satisfaction with services received at the HFs as one of the 
measures for responsiveness and quality of care. Despite being considered an 
important measure for understanding the quality of care from users’ perspective 
[126, 209], patient satisfaction as a construct is subject to many biases since it 
reflects people’s expectations in addition to their experiences [210, 211]. To 
overcome this weakness, the questionnaire was designed to allow users to explain 
their answers, which have then been used to further, explain the results. 
 
 The study was conducted among a population from a single district in rural Kenya, 
limiting the applicability of the results to the district of study and perhaps other 
areas with similar sociocultural and economic context. Nonetheless, the study is a 
much-needed addition to the empirical evidence on the functioning of HSA and 
can be a major contribution to policy. Further, the focus allowed for in-depth 
accounts that give insight into processes that are more generally relevant. 
 
 Regarding the methods, the study relied on a cross-sectional survey raising concern 
as to whether this was enough to fully understand the functioning of HSA 
mechanisms. The three months within which the study was conducted was not 
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enough to allow a richer and fuller understanding of users’ experiences, which 
might have been best captured through a longitudinal survey, but which was not 
possible due to time and financial limitations. Attempts were made, however, to 
learn as much as possible from the operations of the HFCs by reviewing their 
minutes over several months prior and during the study period and incorporating 
this in the analysis. Additionally, the study adopted a multi-methods approach, 
relying on different kinds of data in order to produce a more holistic account of the 
functioning and performance of HSA mechanisms in the study area, than 
qualitative or quantitative sources could, on their own, provide. 
 
8.3 Key Findings  
The following key findings summarise the complex nature of health system 
accountability practices in the study area: 
 
Four accountability mechanisms provided linkages between the users and the health 
system in the study area. These were: HFCs, SCs, suggestion boxes and patients’ rights 
charters. Of these, HFCs and SCs were the main mechanisms in use and were present 
in all the facilities surveyed. The HFCs were hybrid in composition and structure, 
drawing their membership from community representatives, government 
administrative representatives, health workers representatives, and area political 
representatives. 
 
On the SCs, there were several similarities across all the facilities. These included 
information about the types of services offered (consultations, laboratory tests, drugs 
available), the user fees charged for each service, and the facility working hours. None 
of the facility SCs met the minimum standards provided for by the government. 
 
Four main accountability markers – power, trust, responsibility and accessibility - were 
identified as the key influencing factors on the performance of HSA mechanisms in the 
study area. The markers mediated relationships between users and those 
administering health, in formal and informal ways in the system producing both 
negative and positive results. Formally, the government with the DMOH and DHMT 
being in charge of implementation defines the roles and powers of the HFCs. But even 
then, these relationships were not clearly defined and in many instances different 
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stakeholders had to find innovative ways to overcome challenges of accountability in 
the system. For instance, while the government user fee policy for services at the 
health centre level is KES 20, the HFCs had to review this upward to KES 50, with the 
approval of the DMOH, in order to raise additional resources to keep the facility 
running. However, none of the HFCs could effectively implement this policy and 
evidence presented in this study show that users were, in many instances, overcharged. 
Many users saw this as corruption, pointing to the failure of the HFCs to ensure 
accountability in the facility, with negative consequences for the majority of the poor 
users and equity in general. 
 
Further investigations revealed that the HFCs could not hold the HWs accountable 
since they were not the appointing authority. These realities lend themselves to the 
argument that informal HSA relationships, anchored on political leverage, competing 
interests, and ambiguity of roles, can distort regulatory mechanisms in ways that 
obstruct service delivery [131]. The case of HFCs raising the user fee charges beyond the 
official government guideline, and then failing to implement the new fees, is an 
indication of formal hierarchies of power being ineffective in dealing with problems 
affecting the local population, which led many people to lose trust in the mechanism. 
 
Related to how power was understood and applied among HSA stakeholders, and the 
role of trust in building effective HSA mechanisms, was the finding that fees charged 
were not a significant determinant of user satisfaction with service; instead, a 
significant determinant was whether one was or was not issued with a receipt. Unlike 
what has been reported in many other studies on cost-sharing of PHC costs (in the 
form of user charges), in that most populations report resentment to charges, this 
study found a unique response to such charges. Despite their high levels of poverty, 
most respondents were not against the cost-sharing scheme. Instead, the majority of 
the community in the study area recognised and accepted that services will come with 
some costs, but expected that such costs should provide, in return, value for their 
money.33 They expected the funds to be accounted for in the form of open financial 
information at the facility and issuance of receipts upon each payment. This 
                                                 
33 Though value was equated to a number of different things and dimensions that users felt were 
important to them such as ‘medication’ and ‘intervention’, these expectations were not out of the 
ordinary and could be judged to be well within what the HFCs should account for.   
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conclusion is supported by another important finding in the study: that whether 
someone received drugs/treatment items or not, and whether they were required to 
buy additional medication from outside the facility after paying requisite user fees, was 
significantly associated with user satisfaction with service received, and with perceived 
SC usefulness, and not with awareness of the HFC. 
 
Closely linked to power relations within HFCs was a lack of clarity of roles among HFC 
members. HFCs members perceived their main role, rightly so, as that of the overall 
management of the HF. This is intriguing, given almost none of the HFC members 
interviewed mention representing the community or community interests as part of 
their key responsibilities, again illustrating conflict between formal and informal 
accountability relationships. This perception of HFC role [as being one of management 
of facility] significantly limited HFC members’ level of engagement with the 
community since they did not think they were answerable to the community. Instead, 
most of them envisaged an accountability relationship defined by one partner (the 
community) playing the election role and the other (HFC members) playing the 
information-giving role. This limited view also impacted the relationship with HWs, 
particularly in FA and FB where supremacy wars and conflict concerning management 
of finances and hiring of support staff dominated. 
 
Among the key findings of this study was the contrast between quantitative and 
qualitative data on links between gender and HSA mechanism experiences. Save for 
gender and marital status, all the socio-demographic indicators were significantly 
associated with HFC awareness among the study population, even though women, 
compared to men, had lower odds of being aware of their local HFC. The same held for 
overall satisfaction with service where women had higher odds of being dissatisfied 
with the service at their local facility compared to men, though the results were non-
significant. However, further analysis of qualitative data revealed how the health 
system systematically excluded women and young people (age group 16 – 24years) 
from participation in matters affecting their health. This is despite women and young 
people, representing the demographic groups with the greatest need for PHC and 
being the majority users of the HFs. 
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From the set-up of HFCs, to how they are run, to the information provided on SCs, the 
study found a health system insensitive to the needs of the neediest demographic 
groups. In some cases, women representatives were invited to attend HFC meetings at 
the behest of the Chairmen who also handpicked them to join the committee. In the 
committee meetings they faced frustrations and could not question certain issues since 
they needed to show allegiance to the Chairmen and the Chief who appointed them to 
the committee. Yet, their attendance was still classified as involvement and 
representative of women issues in the HFCs. These findings support and are related to 
evidence presented elsewhere in India and Uganda on local politics [212-214]. It is 
therefore inconceivable to think that through regular election at three year intervals, 
the poor and vulnerable, women, and young people will have a voice in the decision-
making processes of HFCs, when clearly they have very little or no input between 
those elections. Because electoral and elections systems often reproduce themselves 
over time, unless genuine efforts are made to correct their anomalies, often, they end 
up marginalising women, minorities and vulnerable groups [214]. 
 
The problem of getting community voices into decision-making and priority setting 
was not just limited to the poor and vulnerable groups, even though they were the 
most affected. This study found that HFCs and community members often held 
different priorities; an indication that even if the community selected the HFCs, they 
were unable to capture user needs in their decisions/policy choices, reflecting little 
relationship with the desires of their clients. The system assumed that HFCs, having 
been elected, were able to assess the detailed needs and priorities on behalf of those 
they represent and that HFCs’ decisions would reflect users’ needs. 
 
Linked to the Baraza and financial accountability, was the finding that communication 
strategies used by the HFCs to reach out to the community were ineffective as 
evidenced by the fact that those who had attended a Baraza were more likely to know 
about the HFC compared to those who had not, and that very few respondents had 
ever been to a Baraza. It is indicative that the HFCs failed to communicate their 
successes and challenges to the community, leaving many community members either 
unaware of their existence or altogether questioning their usefulness. Findings 
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presented in this study point to the significance of communication as a tool for 
building trust within the HFCs and between the HFCs and the community. 
 
The results presented in this study showed that the majority of the community HFC 
representatives were well educated unlike the current literature that point at low 
education levels as a major problem for HFCs in SSA. This is very encouraging and 
needs enhancing by providing the much-needed incentive to attract the best skills in 
the community to the HFCs. 
 
The research has shown that socioeconomic status was a major influencing variable 
impacting the performance of HFCs especially on depth of engagement, and 
knowledge of HFC members. Socioeconomic status reflected in reported monthly 
income was significantly associated with perceived SC usefulness, awareness of HFC, 
and user satisfaction. Quantitative findings also pointed to the divide between the 
poorest in the income category KES 2000 or less and those in the higher income 
categories who had higher odds of knowing about the HFC and reported less concerns 
with the user fees charged at the facility. Because the HSA mechanisms are primarily a 
tool for achieving equity in health service delivery by putting in place mechanisms 
such as waivers, credit facilities and encouraging healthy lifestyles, it is clear that HFCs 
in the study population are failing the neediest among them. 
 
Finally on SCs, analysis showed that user perception of SC usefulness varied depending 
on one’s occupation, cluster facility, income, and whether a facility provided drugs or 
not after user fee payment. Some respondents reported that the SC provided them 
with a useful platform to challenge perceived ‘acts of corruption’ and therefore was an 
important tool for ensuring accountability at the facility. The SC was also seen by some 
users as having useful information that ensures that they do not waste time when they 
visit the facility, including finding the right amount of money for specific services 
before they reported for treatment. Therefore, the SC was an important tool for 
planning one’s medical budget and as a signifier of transparency at the facility. 
 
8.4 Significance of the Findings  
Findings in this study confirm the initial hypothesis that features of process are critical 
to the functioning and effectiveness of HSA. While previous studies have focussed 
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mainly on the HSA structures and their outcomes, and their impact on PHC delivery, 
the evidence obtained from this study suggests a critical need to understand the 
structure-PROCESS-outcome interrelationships that underpin performance of HSA 
mechanisms as a first step in HSA evaluations. Although there may be merit in looking 
for outcomes of HSA, especially where donors and governments are keen to justify 
certain policy actions, a holistic assessment is nevertheless important. As this study 
demonstrates, it provides a better understanding on how process issues combine with 
other variables such as socio-demographic characteristics, context specific 
accountability indicators and the health system context to produce the outcomes 
reported in many studies. In addition, a focus on process reveals that there are a 
number of relevant outcome issues in addition to the usual metrics of health 
outcomes, for instance, issues of continuity, gender, power distribution, and trust 
among others. 
 
This study has also disproved the common logic in the literature that more 
participation necessarily equals enhanced accountability or responsiveness to users’ 
needs (especially the poor and vulnerable). This study supports the understanding that 
there cannot be accountability without some level of participation – but that this does 
not equate simplistically with numbers of people, and reinforces previous findings in 
other LMICs, which generally concluded that decentralisation efforts, though 
producing more participation and increased representation, ended up proving little in 
the way of empowerment or enhancing equity [76, 213-222]. 
 
In sum, this study has added important knowledge about the functioning of HSA 
mechanisms with special reference to SSA and Kenya in particular. More importantly, 
the focused analysis on HSA processes adds much needed detailed description and 
analysis in this field. The use of mixed methodology in both data collection and 
analysis contributes significantly to bridging the gap in lack of robust methods for 
studying the complex relationships of accountability. 
 
8.5 Policy Implications 
A number of policy implications arise from the findings of this study:  
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 The findings lend support for initiation of programmes and policies that takes into 
account user perceptions and calls for full involvement of users in designing such 
programmes. 
 
 There is a strong case for a review of the HSA mechanisms in the study area to 
provide for and strengthen processes by which the community can filter through 
their needs to decision makers. These could take the form of patient report cards, 
suggestion boxes (SBs) and public consultation meetings at the facility, to seek user 
views about what they wish done. Given the success of biweekly health talks at the 
facilities targeting breastfeeding mothers, such initiatives can be expanded to 
include consultation with the rest of the community on their health needs and how 
best they can be tackled. Users were particularly keen on having SBs placed in 
facilities that lacked them. This was especially so because suggestion boxes were 
seen as providing a safe and anonymous platform for airing views given the fear of 
victimisation among users if they were to directly confront HWs or HFC members 
with some of their concerns. It is encouraging that two of the facilities that lacked 
SBs were in the process of setting them up following feedback from the research 
team. 
 
 It is important for HFC members to be offered continuous on-the-job training on 
important accountability areas such as conflict resolutions (both within and 
outside of the HFCs), financial accountability, community representation, and 
engagement. Particular emphasis should be placed on how to mobilize and get 
community members to be actively engaged in the running of HFs. Perhaps the 
government could borrow a leaf from the education school boards system as 
recommended by treasurer FA, to institute continuous seminars bringing together 
HFCs from different settings to facilitate learning and sharing of best practices. 
 
 There is an urgent need for the Kenyan government to revamp the HFCs selection 
process with a view of opening the process to capture more women and young 
people. This study has shown that the Baraza, as currently constituted, does not 
address the needs of these two groups and as such the government should consider 
using forums which attract women and young people’s participation such as school 
 183 
 
meetings, religious gatherings, community groups, public notice boards, and 
women self-help groups (chamas) as election platforms for the HFCS. 
 
 It would be important for the government to revise the HFC selection process in 
order to ensure that special groups such as the poor, youths and women are not 
only represented, but also supported to achieve effective engagement in the 
committees. Special provision for their nomination can be a beginning point, but 
ultimately it is giving these groups a voice in the committee decision making 
process that counts. 
 
 Related to the selection process is the need to reconsider the role of the provincial 
administration through the local Chiefs and VEs, since this study found that they 
tend to scare away young people and women from openly participating in HF and 
HFC issues. While this could be partly due to traditional cultural values and 
practices, whether Western or non-Western, which are often not ideal to the 
principles of accountability, one option can be to completely separate HF issues 
from the law and order arm of government. This is because many respondents 
continue to associate the Chief’s office with law and order issues, rather than with 
issues concerning health. In fact this study found that the Baraza was causing more 
damage than help to the HFCs as they were politicized and tended to attract 
competing political interests who used the HF problems as a platform to achieve 
their own agenda. Importantly, the government would do well to discourage 
politicisation of HF issues at the Baraza. 
 
 Also requiring special attention is the need to deal with deep-rooted cultural norms 
and practices among the Kipsigis that tends to mark out community leadership 
positions as the preserve of the elderly people. A targeted health promotion 
programme including information about the benefits of getting women and young 
people involved in the management of their own health could help the community 
overcome some of the cultural barriers. Discussions with all age groups during the 
fieldwork showed that, in many cases, it was not a case of the community members 
not wanting to be involved, rather it was the health system failing to engage the 
community and to mobilise their efforts into supporting the HFs. 
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 The government should take advantage of the positive attitude of the community 
in the study area towards cost-sharing, not just to mobilise resources for the health 
system, but also to help community-based accountability structures to maximise 
the use of resources so that people are not disenfranchised and led to withdraw 
their support for the HFs. Particularly, there are several opportunities such as the 
use of social media, mass media and open forums to engage community members 
on why it is important to support the health system and also to help HFCs reach 
the community with information about facility funds and how these are used. 
 
 The HFCs and the HFs need to be supported to provide publicly accessible 
information on important operational areas such as the resources they have, how 
they are used, and how services are being provided. This should help build trust 
among various accountability stakeholders in the health system. 
 
 In addition to strengthened community oversight, the government should consider 
institutionalised mechanisms such as audits of HF books of accounts as 
recommended by the treasurer FA and supportive regularised supervision by the 
DHMT to ensure that the HFCs operate within their mandate without interfering 
with their autonomy. There should be standardised procedures that allow for 
professional audits and oversight on matters of finance at the HFs without 
compromising the strength of local voices and independence of HFCs. Perhaps, 
professional audits could be linked with supportive supervision and 
institutionalised and specialised mechanisms put in place to check that HFCs are 
performing their roles. As it is now, the line of accountability to community is 
vague and fraught with fear, mistrust, and power politics. 
 
 Finally, incentives for members of HFCs should be a priority for the government if 
it is to attract the most qualified community members to serve in the committees. 
With the new HSSF for HFs, tailored along the lines of free primary education 
programme, now being scaled up across the country, it should be possible to attract 
some of the best brains in the community to serve in the HFCs albeit with some 
incentives like enhanced allowances and facilitation for serving in the committees, 
like is currently the case with schools. 
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8.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
This study has relied on a cross-sectional survey design to generate data on the 
functioning of HSA mechanisms. However, the results presented here show HSA as a 
complex social process that brings together several stakeholders and involves 
multilayer interactions and interrelationships. As a result, recommendations for future 
research are based upon this conceptualisation: 
  
 Such relationships can be best understood through a longitudinal methodology 
that allows for accountability mechanisms to be followed, and studied, over a long 
period of time, to enable a richer documentation of their experiences and changes 
over time. Based on the researcher’s field experience and the evidence presented 
here, it is strongly recommended that future studies consider a longitudinal 
methodology that can generate qualitative and quantitative data, with strong 
descriptive and analytical elements. 
 
 The results presented in this study were from accountability mechanisms receiving 
no external support or facilitation. This significantly limited the level of 
comparison with the current literature since all other studies were based on 
experiences with externally supported projects. Therefore more studies of the kind 
presented in this thesis are recommended in order to generate enough scientific 
data that can lead to some epistemic consensus around the functioning of HSA in a 
‘normal’ or ‘natural’ setting void of external intervention. The alternative could be 
case control studies looking at HSA mechanisms operating at ‘normal’ health 
system structure vis-a-vis those receiving external facilitation and support. This 
latter type of study presents the opportunity to identify areas that need 
improvement for HSA mechanisms in normal health system settings, and could 
present more, and perhaps varied, useful policy data compared to the current case 
where studies compare supported HSA mechanisms with those facilities without 
any accountability structure. 
 
 This study found that many HFCs members did not expect any significant 
monetary incentives in order to serve in the committee despite the fact that they 
were in charge of comparatively huge sums of HFs monies and oversaw projects 
worth thousands of shillings. Discussions with most of them pointed to a religious 
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angle to their commitment, though this was not an objective in this study. Many 
reported that they felt they were giving back to the community and in that way 
serving a higher calling by God. In the health sector, several studies have been done 
on the motivation factors for staff especially those serving in rural and resource 
scarce settings with low pay. However, there is very little on the motivating factors 
for those serving in non-professional voluntary positions such as HFCs, yet such 
information could significantly shed light on why accountability mechanisms 
involving voluntarism perform as they do. This is therefore an important research 
area that future studies should incorporate. 
 
 Finally, this study was done among the Kipsigis of Kericho district, Kenya, using a 
customised conceptual framework. In order to provide cross-culture comparative 
analysis, there is need for similar studies to be carried out among different cultural 
groups and perhaps countries, adopting and adapting such a framework. Data from 
such studies can provide useful comparison of differences as well as similarities, 
and sharing of best practices. Fundamentally, there is a huge methodological 
challenge in researching accountability necessitating continuous sharing of 
information and frameworks among researchers in order to isolate and apply what 
works best, where and how. It is hoped that the framework presented in this study 
can be seen in this light. 
 
8.7 Final Conclusions 
There is a renewed interest in health system accountability as a means for enhancing 
health system performance and the delivery of services especially at the primary care 
level. However, the evidence on the practice of accountability, especially on the factors 
influencing the performance of accountability mechanisms, is to date very limited. 
While there is considerable literature on conceptions of accountability and, to some 
extent, on the impact of accountability mechanisms on service delivery in some LMIC 
settings, primary analysis of the process factors that influence the performance of HSA 
mechanisms is largely missing. This study has combined available literature on 
conceptions of accountability, pilot data, and data gathered from extensive fieldwork 
to offer a holistic analysis of the concept and practice of HSA in Kenya. While the 
thesis findings have immediate relevance to the improvement of the performance of 
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HSA mechanisms in Kenya, it is hoped that the concepts and methods employed will 
be of use in expanding our knowledge of the structure, process, and outcome of 
developing country health systems accountability and accountability in health care 
delivery initiatives generally. 
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